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Examining American antisemitism, with James Kirchick

A talk with journalist and author James Kirchick (jameskirchick.com) about antisemitism. Topics discussed include: the origins of various varieties of American antisemitism, controversial statements about Jewish people from Kanye West and Whoopi Goldberg; Donald Trump; Israel; George Soros; Louis Farrakhan; Black Hebrew Israelites; the term “globalist”, and more.

For a follow-up episode about antisemitism, see this talk I had with Yakov Hirsch.

Transcript is below.

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TRANSCRIPT

Zachary Elwood: Welcome to the People Who Read People podcast with me, Zach Elwood. This is a podcast aimed at better understanding other people and better understanding ourselves. You can learn more about it at www.behavior-podcast.com

On today’s episode episode I talk to journalist and author Jamie Kirchick about antisemitism. In 2017, Kirchick had a piece in Commentary magazine titled The New Jew-Hatred: Right and Left. In that piece, he described antisemitism coming from both the political right and the left, as he saw it. 

One reason I wanted to talk about this is that antisemitism is in the news a lot recently, with Kanye West making antisemitic statements, and him saying that black people are the real jews, and with him bringing a strange white supremacist troll over to Trump’s place to have dinner together, amongst other strange things he’s said and done. Also not too long ago Whoopi Goldberg said on the show The View basically that Hitler and the Nazis trying to commit genocide against the Jewish People wasn’t about race, and was a case of “white people fighting other white people.” So I wanted to examine some of these things and talk about where some of those ideas come from 

Another reason I wanted to do this talk is that I see it as tying in to political polarization topics. In the last few weeks I’ve seen a lot of liberal-side rhetoric about how Trump and Republicans are anti-semitic, that there is a huge problem on the right with this. And I think a lot of those takes are taking the most pessimistic, worst-case framings one can make, and in doing that, they’re adding to our divides. Aren’t there many Jewish conservatives and Trump voters? Wouldn’t many people view the Republicans as the more pro-Israel party? What do those people see? Why is it that some people see antisemitism as a bigger problem on the left than the right? 

So I thought talking to Kirchick might give some people some different perspectives on these things. I thought listening to his takes might help us see why some conservatives perceive liberals as rather hysterical on the topic of antisemitism, and as also being somewhat hypocritical. And, to be clear, you don’t have to agree with all of Kirchick’s points, but seeing how one can have such views can help us better understand our fellow citizens. As with many of the interviews I do, the value I see is not in reaching some definitive, accurate view on any specific stance; it’s not about establishing who’s right and who’s wrong. There’s very few things I myself have confident beliefs about. To me the value of these talks is in seeing the wide variety of views that rational and well meaning people can reach on these matters. That seeing of other perspectives is much more important to me than feeling I’ve got the right views, or any answers. Because seeing how others can see things differently, and examining the nuance present on any specific subject, is inherently depolarizing and inherently anger-reducing. Especially when our country is very polarized and we have a tendency to consume simplistic narratives from our preferred bubbles: not just simplistic narratives of what’s right or wrong, but simplistic narratives of what the people on the other side are actually like and what they actually believe. And the more we attempt to see others’ points of view, the more sane and respectful and functional our public conversation will become. 

In this episode, we talk about Trump, we talk about Kanye West, we talk about Whoopi Goldberg’s controversial statements, we talk about antisemitism on the left and the right, we talk about criticisms of Israel, we talk about George Soros, and we talk about the term ‘globalist’ and how that word is used. 

A little bit more about Jamie Kirchick: 

He’s a columnist for Tablet magazine, a writer at large for Air Mail.

A widely published journalist, Jamie has reported from over 40 countries, and his reportage, essays, and reviews have appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, the Spectator, the Atlantic, the New York Review of Books, and Rolling Stone, among many other publications. His first book, “The End of Europe: Dictators, Demagogues and the Coming Dark Age,” was published by Yale University Press in 2017. 

In 2022, he had a new book published titled Secret City: The Hidden History of Gay Washington, which was an instant New York Times bestseller. A New York Times review called it “ a sprawling and enthralling history of how the gay subculture in Washington, D.C., long in shadow, emerged into the klieg lights.”

You can follow Jamie on Twitter at @jkirchick.

Okay, here’s the interview with journalist Jamie Kirchick. 

Hi, Jamie, thanks for coming on the show.

James: Thanks for having me.

Zach: Maybe we can start with defining antisemitism as you see it. How much of it do you see as a focus on Jewishness as a race versus Jewishness as a religion? Are there other factors you would put in there?

James: Well, I guess there’s very different varieties of it. Judeophobia would probably be a better term for the hatred or bigotry of Jews based on their religious faith. And that probably requires a maybe deeper understanding of Jewish texts and whatnot that I think a lot of people who we would view as anti-Semites might not have. Whereas anti-semitism, I think is broadly a racist conception. It’s the hatred of Jews based on their peoplehood and their belief that they constitute a separate and distinct race, and prejudice against them based upon that. I guess that’s how I would define it. It’s interesting you asked that question because I feel like we don’t see that question asked a lot in these conversations. And I think so much of the reason why this is a controversial topic is because no one ever really defines it, or it seems that so much of the controversy revolves around what is and what isn’t anti-semitism.

Zach: Right. Yeah, it kind of strikes me in other areas of things that can cause big divides often. There’s a failure to even define the concepts we’re talking about like CRT or whatever it is. Do you see it as maybe hard to define sometimes because it does overlap so much with these conspiracy theories of, you know, the Illuminati or these other powerful forces controlling things behind the scenes, which I think people on the far left or far right political spectrum can have these kinds of conspiracy theories and maybe that helps explain why it can be hard to disentangle sometimes.

James: Yeah. Well, anti-Semitism is the ultimate conspiracy theory. It’s really sort of the oldest one. I mean, if you think of conspiracy theories as being modern phenomenon, I think anti-semitism is probably the oldest if there are conspiracy theories. And it seems that all the conspiracy theories go back to antisemitism. They all basically, you know, if you’re talking about shadowy elite secret people in power orchestrating things from behind a kind of dark curtain or whatnot, it’s hard not to end up with the Jews in some way. And I often find that some people might even be repeating antisemitic tropes without often even knowing that they’re antisemitic. I do think that there are people who are genuinely surprised when they hear that, they might not even know it. For instance, the ease with which people– this is separate from conspiracism– but the ease with which people throw around Holocaust analogies, I often think that they’re not consciously antisemitic, but what they’re doing is in effect antisemitic. Comparing your opponents to Nazis is something that so many people do these days, right? Or likening the treatment that one suffers, whether it’s under COVID regulations. On the right, you’ll see people do that, or people on the left might complain about police powers acting like the Gestapo or something. In both cases, I often think that most people who make these claims don’t really realise what they’re doing, it’s just become such a part of our political vernacular. It’s the reductio ad Hitlerum tendency, and oftentimes that can be labelled antisemitic but I’m not really sure it is. It’s totally distasteful and inappropriate.

Zach: Because it downplays the importance of-

James: It downplays the holocaust. And it also just raises the stakes in our political discussions to the point where you can’t have a civil conversation. I mean, if you’re comparing lockdown policies to the Warsaw Ghetto, it’s hard to really move on from there and have a meaningful conversation. I don’t think that the person making that accusation is antisemitic. In fact, often they’re putting themselves in the place of the Jews. So if anything, they are trying and they’re very stupid in a historical way to identify with the plight of the Jews. Of course, it’s minimizing with what the Holocaust was, but I don’t think it’s right to call those people necessarily antisemitic. Some of them might be, but I don’t think that that’s… That is not what’s keeping me awake at night when it comes to antisemitism.

L: Yeah. And your 2017 piece that I read that initially made me contact you, you talked about antisemitism as you saw it on the right and the left. One thing you did which I thought was really responsible was giving your opinion about how the United States is actually very Jewish appreciative and how it’s not as big a problem as some people say. Maybe you could give your summary of your opinion of how big a problem do you see it as in the United States, and do you see it as having grown recently?

James: Yeah, with what’s happened in those five years. [laughs] But in terms of the United States, no country in the world has been better to its Jewish population or better place for Jews to thrive than the United States. And there’s really no argument about that, I don’t think. Of course, one could argue Israel might be an exception but that’s a special case. Israel was only created in 1948 but Jews have prospered in the United States like nowhere else if you just look at how successful they’ve been in professions and culture and politics and philanthropy and just becoming a part of the American tapestry. There’s obviously antisemitism in America and there has been. It was not that long ago that Jews were victimized by quotas, right? You couldn’t get into… There was a limit placed on the number of Jews who were allowed into elite schools and universities, and there were neighborhoods that were not open to Jews. But this pales in comparison to what Jews had to suffer pretty much anywhere else in the world. Certainly from the countries where most American Jews trace their lineage, which is Europe. And Jews came to America for good reasons. They were subjected to all sorts of discrimination and second-class citizenship and worse, obviously, in places like the former Soviet Union Russia– Imperial Russia– so they came to America seeking a better life and they achieved it. And I feel enormously fortunate to have been an American Jew born in 1983. I mean, there’s really no better.. That’s really kind of a golden age.

So, that article was published in 2017 and I do think things have gotten worse for Jews. Not nearly to the point where anyone should be thinking about packing their bags, but Donald Trump obviously unleashed a lot of ugly things in this country. And I’m gonna say this, I don’t think he is himself an anti-Semite. Even knowing we’re recording this podcast a week or two after he sat down to lunch or dinner with Kanye West and Nick Fuentes, I don’t think that’s because he’s an anti-Semite. I think his vanity and his narcissism is world historical that he’ll break bread with people who flatter him. Even if they’re Nazis! That’s how pathetic this guy is. He’s not doing this because he seeks to hurt Jews. I mean, his daughter is Jewish, he has Jewish grandchildren, I don’t believe that he is himself an anti-Semite. It’s not excusing his behavior, it’s reprehensible, and the man clearly has no business being a dogcatcher or let alone President of the United States.

But put that aside, whether he is or isn’t an anti-Semite, I find it a waste of time and this is something that whatever I say I’m gonna get attacked by the people who hate him and think he’s Hitler, or I’m gonna get attacked by the Trump supporters who think he’s done better things for the Jews than Cyrus the Great. It’s indisputable that a lot of far right legitimate open proud anti-Semites flock to him and like him, and I saw that in 2015 when he was running for president. I wrote an article which I still stand by. I said, “Donald Trump is the candidate of the mob and the mob always comes for the Jews. He is a candidate of conspiracy theories, he’s the candidate of mindless populism.” Populism in itself is not necessarily always bad, there are good aspects of populism. I don’t think he represented a lot of bad aspects of populism. So he kind of opened a Pandora’s box and a lot of nasty shit came out, and I hold him responsible for that and I’ve held him responsible for that before he had dinner with Kanye West and Nick Fuentes.

Zach: Yeah, before we move on from that point about that dinner, the Kanye dinner, I’m with you in the sense that I really think if anybody really flattered Trump, he would basically do anything they want, really. And I think people underestimate how easy it would be for Kanye to be like, “Hey, Trump, I really want to have dinner with you and I’m bringing this guy,” and not even maybe tell him until they got there. There’s all sorts of ways this can play out and I think Trump is so desperate to appeal to the Black vote and such too, he would probably have done many things that Kanye asked him to do. So I think people underestimate those kinds of factors, like you say his ego and how far flattery gets people with him. These kinds of things.

James: Yeah, I said from the beginning, Trump isn’t a fascist, he’s a golfer. And it’s just reading him incorrectly to imagine this kind of devious plan.

Zach: Well, sort of like you say too, like we’re saying with the Holocaust and people making Holocaust analogies, and I think the analogies that Trump is this raving anti-Semite or this racist in general, these exaggerated claims don’t help. There’s plenty of things to actually focus on that we legitimately know, and the more exaggerated claims just rile up the tensions and to me, they create the very things we’re angry about.

James: Yeah. Yeah, I think that’s fair and I think our country has suffered a lot because of not only Donald Trump, but the way in which the Left has basically used him to validate their own transgressions and their own overreach and their own liberal behaviour. We could look at what’s going on Twitter right now and what’s being revealed now that Twitter was basically running censorship campaigns against conservatives for years. And they did that because Donald Trump existed. And Donald Trump’s existence has basically been used by the left to validate all sorts of things that I think are destructive and bad for our country. But that’s a separate podcast, probably. But I will say there’s been the Right and there’s been absolutely marked increase in antisemitic activity and the prominence of anti-Semites on the Right with the rise of the alt Right, and just with the whole Donald Trump [gestalt]. It’s been bad for the Jews. And I say that in spite of what I do think are some really important geopolitical advances that he made with the Abraham accords. Great. With recognising Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, great. With pushing back on Iran and reneging on the Iran deal and killing Qasem Soleimani also great. I don’t believe that just because I’m pro Israel, that I therefore have to praise Donald Trump as a wonderful person. I can hold two ideas in my head. And a lot of conservative Trump-supporting Jews don’t seem to agree with me. They think that because he did these wonderful things for Israel, you have to shut up and praise him as the best president ever for Jews, maybe since Harry Truman recognised the State of Israel.

I just don’t buy that. I don’t buy that when it comes to anything political. I think for myself and I’m able to criticise and compliment at the same time. And it shouldn’t be difficult for people but it too often is today, unfortunately. And then of course there’s been increasing antisemitism on the Left. We now have for the first time a small but very vocal antisemitic caucus in the House of Representatives among the squad. We’re talking about a handful of representatives, but they regularly make antisemitic statements. And that is not something that’s really existed in living memory, for me at least, and it’s really hard to remember when that happened. And the kind of spinelessness of Democratic leaders to really condemn and call this out, there have been Democrats who have called out Ilhan Omar, Rashida Tlaib, and there’s a few others, but it’s been mostly crickets and that’s disappointing.

Of course, and then the anti Semitism on campuses, which just gets worse and worse every year and the stories just pile up you can’t even keep track of them with all the sorts of boycotts and cancellations of antisemitism under the guise of anti Zionism. I think that there isn’t a distinction between the two. I think they are one and the same one and we can talk about that if you want. But on the Left, it’s less.. The Left wing anti Semitism I find more insidious and obnoxious because at least the Right-wing anti-Semites tell you as Jews that they hate you. They’re very open about it and unapologetic. When I was criticizing Donald Trump in 2016, I would get all sorts of blatantly antisemitic messages on Twitter, in my email, on Facebook; people doctoring cartoons with me in a gas chamber and Donald Trump pulling the lever, lots of Pepe the Frog tweets and all that kind of crap.

Whereas the Left, it’s always this very erudite, you know? “Of course we don’t hate Jews! Hating anyone is not… We don’t hate anyone, that’s something that only right-wingers do. Knuckle dragging right-wingers hate people, we just oppose this racist colonialist occupier and its supporters in America who have dual loyalties– who aren’t really loyal to this country. They’re Israel firsters and whatnot.” That’s how Left-wing antisemitism carries itself. And there’s a third form of antisemitism which frankly we don’t see that much in the United States, and that’s the Islamic kind or the Islamists kind. That’s much more prevalent in Europe where they have large– it depends on the country if we’re looking at France, for instance, and England to an extent– you know, large, not-well-assimilated Muslim communities who basically imported this antisemitism from the Arab Muslim world. And that’s why you see these Jewish institutions and Jewish leaders and whatnot living under armed protection. Which, unfortunately, is actually increasingly happening in the United States now too, Jewish institutions in the United States, synagogues, Jewish day schools and whatnot are also getting armed security, which is a really unfortunate development but unnecessary one.

Zach: Getting back to the liberal side academic antisemitism, as you see it, you also talked about seeing Jews as white or white adjacent views too, which I think that’s maybe a separate category or subcategory or maybe are related to some of the campus anti-Semitism as you viewed it. And maybe you can describe a little bit of that argument.

James: Yeah. So as American discourse and society or the salience of race is increasing in our conversation, I actually think it matters less and less, right? Like in terms of your life chances, in terms of your economic station, in terms of the kind of everyday discrimination one faces as an American. I actually think race is less salient. There’s more intermarriage, the Black middle class is growing, the number of actual police shootings of unarmed Black men has actually gone down, okay? All those statistics, I think, are moving in the right direction. Unfortunately, we have this intellectual conversation and this discourse where race seems like it’s never been more prevalent. And there’s this new terms, intersectionality, which is basically inverting a racial hierarchy with Whites at the bottom and non Whites at the top. And there’s various levels even within that non-White category, there’s a hierarchy.

And it’s unclear where Asians lie in this, right? Asians are considered White adjacent according to some woke people. Hispanics are also dangerously becoming White adjacent, and that’s purely based on the fact that they’re increasingly voting for Republicans. There’s nothing to do with anything else but that fact. And so because we have this discourse now where Whiteness, and Whites and white people are considered all to be inherently racist, they all carry implicit bias, they are all responsible for the historical injustices that were committed by white people of generations before, they’ve inherited this guilt to say that Jews are White, and to constantly make this point over and over again that Jews are complicit with whiteness. While I agree that I as an Ashkenazi Jew, I present as White. Yes, I am not going to be stopped by a police officer for driving while Black, I’m not going to suffer from that kind of discrimination. Okay. I’m not going to be followed around in a department store by a sales clerk in the way that Black people often wrongly are. I’m not going to suffer that. But that’s not the purpose of what this discourse is. I think this constant harping on White Jews ‘white Jews this, White Jews that’ is to basically rob Jews of any kind of minority status, any kind of history that they’ve endured of past oppression and suffering and discrimination, and to just group them with this bad group; the bad group is the Whites with a capital W. And so I see as a very kind of provocative hostile act, frankly, that is meant to divide and is meant to demonize Jews, it is meant to identify them as part of an oppressor class, and I think that it is in some sense antisemitic. Yeah, I do.

Zach: One of the things that seem to play a role there is this kind of binary view that differences in racial outcomes are solely due to racism, it almost seems like there’s this binary which leaves a lot of the factors that can be involved out of the picture, you know? Like what happened in the past and how that-

James: Yeah, and what’s the flip side of that if Jews are so successful far beyond their 2% of the population? How do we explain that at one point a third of Yale was Jewish, and the Ivy League schools were disproportionately Jewish? Listen to what Ye is saying, right? Or listen to what people say about Hollywood or the publishing industry, what can that mean? It can only mean that if the disparate outcomes are only explainable by these invidious explanations, then it must mean that the Jews must have done something wrong to get to where they are. They must have cheated out other people. How else can we explain this enormous, disproportionate presence of Jews in certain institutions and certain professions? So yeah, the whole equity agenda I think is antisemitic and racist, but particularly antisemitic because there is no group that I think has more disproportionate presence where the difference between their percentage of the population and their presence in certain institutions is more disproportionate than Jews.

There is, it’s true. There are a lot of Jews in Hollywood. Yeah, there are. Why is that? Is it because they’re all meeting on Friday nights to kind of help each other out? Is there some sort of surreptitious, nefarious agenda going on? Or are there other explanations for it? I mean, why is the NBA so heavily African American? You know, not everything has some evil nefarious explanation behind it. But when you argue that there is, and as the Ibram X Kendis of the world say, that unless… He basically says that every institution and every outcome has to be almost exactly proportionate to… Isn’t that what he’s basically saying? So that’s arguing for a return to quotas. That’s an argument for a return to the 1940s, at least for Jews it is. Its argument for return to the 1940s when the number of Jews in institutions there was a ceiling placed on that. And I mean, that’s not something… That’s antisemitism, I don’t know what else to call that. And now it’s anti Asian.

Zach: Right. I think it gets back to this whole concept which I think is driving a lot of this, is that any differences in outcome are due to racism or White supremacy. And there’s so many factors. I mean, you can believe that Black people and other groups have had a hard time and that has affected them in many ways, just like for example Appalachian coal miners can have a hard time and we don’t say it’s because they’re lacking in some fundamental way, we can just recognize that there’s all these factors present. But to boil it all down to, you know, there’s racism in the society to explain these things is just such a simplification and that makes people look for, you know, “Where’s the racism? It must be coming from the people that are perceived as having more power, and are they oppressors and stuff?” And then that creates its own animosity.

A note here, these are hard things to talk about in passing as it’s easy to mistake people’s stances, and easy for people talking about these things to be misunderstood. If you want to do your own research into these topics more, I’d recommend a few books. Ibrahim X Kendi’s book, How to Be an Antiracist is where many of the most prominent anti-racism ideas come from. So that’s probably the key book for understanding some of the most common anti-racism arguments. And then as a rejoinder to that. You could read John McWhorter’s Woke Racism, which goes through various criticisms of those types of ideas and makes the argument that many of the anti-racism arguments are simplistic and divisive. Another book that might be pertinent to the topic of this episode is David Bernstein’s book Woke Antisemitism, which is similar to John McWhorter’s book, but from a Jewish perspective.

Okay, back to the talk. I want to get back to your views on Kanye West and what Whoopi Goldberg said on The View and some things like that, but one thing you said that I want to focus on more which I think of all the things you’ve said, it’s probably something that many liberals might find fault with is when it comes to criticism of Israel, how do you draw the line between what is valid criticism that anyone can make about a country or anybody doing bad things as they see it versus antisemitism?

James: I actually have a pretty… I think I have a pretty strict definition of this. I don’t think that, you know, there are some people who would say that criticizing Israel for actions that you wouldn’t criticize another country of or another democracy of… A lot of defenders of Israel would say that that’s antisemitic. And I’m not willing to go that far. I think there are lots of people that might be misguided, but they do hold Israel to a higher standard. That’s not always necessarily antisemitic. Most Jews I know would hold Israel to a higher standard. They expect more of Israel than they do of even Britain or France or other exemplary human-rights-respecting democracies. And it pains them that Israel is often in these situations due to its geography and its history, where it is engaged in constant military activity. I mean, it’s been militarily occupying a large population of Arabs since 1967 for 55 years, that’s a long time. So it’s going to do things that… It’s going to do things that a country does when it’s engaged in military actions, and there are always going to be mistakes, there are always going to be innocent people who are harmed, and there’s occasionally gonna be atrocities. Even great democracies commit atrocities because humans are infallible and they make mistakes, and everyone is capable of evil. Every individual is capable of evil.

And a country is no more than the sum of its citizens. And I don’t sit here and claim that Israelis or Jews are any more moral as individuals than any other people. What I would say is that I think the sort of obsessive criticism of Israel that we see in some quarters mostly on the Left– the obsession with Israel, with this relatively small country– I think assigning to it, describing it in almost demonic fashion… If you’re comparing… Again, this is actually where I would say that Hitler and Nazi comparisons are antisemitic. If you are comparing the actions of the Jewish state to what the Nazis did to the Jews, at the very least you are being extremely insensitive and unnecessarily provocative at the very least. I mean, in most cases I would say that that’s antisemitism to compare the treatment of the Palestinians or even the citizens of the Gaza Strip to the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto.

There are lots of things that you could say about how the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are treated, but to deliberately choose that comparison, that analogy, that I would say is anti-semitic. I think singling out Israel is also antisemitic. Like when you look at the amount of time that is spent at the United Nations on Israel in the Human Rights committees where there are real egregious abuses of human rights; Cuba, North Korea, it’s a joke for those countries. For the Arab world, by the way. There’s no Arab Muslim country which can hold a candle to Israel when it comes to not only rule of law, democracy, freedom of speech and whatnot, but the treatment of its minority citizens. I mean, Arabs in Israel are treated better than Arabs in any Arab-ruled country. So to single Israel out– and I’m not saying to criticize Israel, I’m saying the singling out of Israel, right? The boycotting of Israel, the fact that Israel is targeted and is the subject of more resolutions in these committees, the fact that you have these academics who choose only to boycott Israel… If they were so concerned with human rights, there are lots of other countries in the world that are much, much worse in terms of their human rights practices than Israel.

There’s no argument about that, right? So when you see a group of academics in Britain decide that they’re going to boycott Israeli scholars, that to me is blatant antisemitism. What else is it that’s making them choose this country that just happens to be the world’s only Jewish country? Why else are they doing it? I think that’s de facto antisemitism. So singling out Israel… If Israel is doing something singularly bad, fine, then you can single them out. But they’re not. Okay, at least in these conversations about human rights practices and whatnot. So that I think is antisemitic. But look, Israel has a very vigorous free press and you can read extremely critical things of all aspects of the Israeli government and society and culture in the Israeli press. And any Israeli would… You know, there’s the old joke ‘Two Jews, three opinions,’ it’s even more pronounced in Israel. So it has a very vibrant civil society where all sorts of criticisms are aired. And by the way, Israelis love to throw Nazi analogies back and forth at each other. Okay? And maybe there’s a kind of special dispensation we can give them because they’re Jews and whatever. But yeah, that’s where I would say the legitimate criticism of Israel crosses the line into antisemitism.

Zach: Do you think some of these things have a feedback mechanism of once they get started, it’s hard to stop them in the sense that there can be elements of peer pressure of people just not being aware of the complexity of Israel? That’s one thing that strikes me there as one I’ve tried to dig into. The things that have happened in Israel and what the narratives really were, it’s really hard to… It would take me I feel like a lifetime of research to really fully understood it but yet people have these simplistic ideas of like, “Oh, look what’s happening over there. Something bad happened, Israel must be at fault,” and leaving out all the context of the history and what led up to that. So I’m curious if you see some of these things having a life of their own once they get into these established and people are like, “Oh, they’re saying this, I’ll say it too” kind of thing.

James: Yes. I just think there’s a lot of peer pressure particularly among young people in college campuses and in certain spaces, where it’s very fashionable to embrace the cause of the underdog, and for the first 25 years of its existence or 20 years, you could say until 1967 really, Israel was the underdog and Israel had the support of the global Left and had the support of the Soviet Union in 1948. And it had the support of most socialists and other people on the left around the world. And that began to change in 1967 once Israel won a defensive war that was waged by its Arab neighbors to destroy it, and found itself in possession and in control of territories where Palestinians were residing. And that’s how the Occupation began. And so yes, Israel is absolutely of course responsible for the way it treats the citizens under its control in those territories. But I do believe that there’s a level of complexity to this conversation that many of Israel’s critics don’t appreciate, or many I should say, the ones who sort of joined the bandwagon, right? The ones who would post memes of likening Palestinian children to children in the Warsaw Ghetto. I don’t think that those people who do that are really historically aware. And I think that they are often, I mean, the people who are liking those posts on Facebook are ignorant. The ones who are posting and the ones who are actively spreading those memes and those messages I think are anti-Semites.

Zach: Maybe we can go to some specific instances, for example, when Whoopi Goldberg on The View basically said that the Holocaust was basically White people fighting with themselves when it came to Jewish people being killed in World War Two. Maybe you could talk about how you see that as playing into some of the liberal side philosophies arguments about race and seeing Jewish people as White, things like that.

James: Yeah. Again, I think it’s partly ignorance and it’s partly this very American-centric view of the world where our main cleavage is the race question. That’s the main societal cleavage in this country. And it’s taking that prism– the kind of White versus non-White or the Black and White issue in the United States– and thinking that every other issue in the world should be seen through that prism. That’s just wrong. Again, this would sound sort of… Maybe I’m playing into it by talking this way, but the Jews were like the Blacks of Nazi Germany. Okay? If that helps Whoopi Goldberg understand. So yes, they have the same skin tone as Aryan or however they call themselves in terms of the master race. They have the same skin tone, but they were not viewed the same way and they were not treated the same way clearly. Because 6 million of them were murdered. And by the way, they viewed Eastern Europeans and Slavs as subhuman races. Again, if you held up their hands– the hand of a German and that of a Pole or Slovak or Romanian or a Russian, their skin tone would be the same, Whoopi. But that’s not how the Nazis viewed things. You know, was she acting from some deeply thought antisemitic impulse? I don’t think so. I think she’s just extremely ignorant and it’s also very self-centred. It’s this belief that the world revolves around America and the American race issue.

I’ll just give another example of this in a different context. I was at a dinner a couple of nights ago with a group of Ukrainian Members of Parliament who were visiting from Ukraine and it was a dinner with a group of American journalists. And the whole night, everyone was talking about… It was mostly these young women, they were all women, they were presenting their case and what their country has been going through with the Russian invasion and how terrible it’s been. And at the end, there was a someone at the dinner table– we all gave our two minute spiel– and there’s one young man who got up and said that he could relate to it as an African American because African Americans are fighting the same sort of existential struggle for their survival that you Ukrainian people are. And I’m just thinking to myself, I’m like, “Come on! These women are in a country right now where apartment buildings are being blown to bits from the sky by Russian bombers.” Like, literally there’s a campaign of genocide is arguable. It’s arguable that the Russians are committing genocide in Ukraine right now. I don’t know what the latest death toll is, it’s in the tens of thousands if not higher. And you listen to Vladimir Putin, he sounds Hitlerian in the way he talks about Ukrainians. “Okay, this is a fake made up country and it needs to cease to exist.” And he’s sounding like Hitler talking about the people to his East, or the Jews for that matter. To compare the plight of what Ukrainians are going through right now with that of African Americans, I think is just minimizing what Ukrainians are going through. And it’s also just incredibly self-centered. Not everything revolves around the American racial issue, and not everything should be seen through that prism.

Zach: Yeah, I think there’s so many of these simplistic narratives that, as you say, seldom get challenged and these us-versus-them narratives that-

James: Of course, no one. Yes, of course, no one in that room by the way a couple of nights ago. It was a very fancy restaurant in Washington, DC. I could maybe suspect that other people agreed with me that this was an absurd thing to be saying and almost insulting to the women who were there. But of course, no one was going to pipe up and say, “Hey, you know what? This is kind of a stupid comparison. This is really stupid and shallow analogy, maybe you shouldn’t be making it and you’re insulting our guests.” Of course, no one’s gonna say that. And there are a whole lot of things that people don’t say when it comes to these sorts of issues.

Zach: Yeah, I’m somebody who works on depolarization and one of my big beliefs is that we all need to speak up more when we hear unhelpful and divisive narratives and viewpoints on our side– specific on our side– but that’s the nature of polarization that makes people unlikely to challenge people on their side and that’s the very way it works; it’s just people are unwilling to challenge things on their side so their side becomes more and more unreasonable etc. When it comes to Kanye, I’m curious what you think and I’ll give my brief thing and you can maybe play off of that. I see Kanye as having… I think he has some personality disorder in the way he behaves, but I can also see that some of his views he’s also imbibing through the culture on the far Left and far Right, in my opinion, in various ways and just swimming in these weird waters and he’s saying weird things because he’s got some issues. But I’m curious what your take on it is?

James: Well, look, I’m not a psychiatrist but I do think he clearly has some mental problem– I’ve heard bipolarism mentioned. And so I don’t know how much we can attribute to that.

Zach: A small note here. If you’re interested in the connection between mental health and saying offensive things, I’ve examined that in some previous episodes. The reason I delved into that topic previously was that I saw a lot of liberal side overreactions to various viral videos of people who were saying racist or offensive things, and some of these people were quite clearly suffering from mental issues. At one point, there was even a protest staged in California based on the ravings of a clearly mentally unwell woman. And on the Left, even now with Kanye, there is often a framing that having mental problems or personality disorders aren’t a factor in people saying antisocial or racist things. And this is clearly not true. Some mental issues or personality disorders will result in people saying horrible antisocial things. If you’re interested to learn more about that, check out those previous episodes. One was titled Factors Involved in Offensive Speech, and another one was a talk with Rob Rob Tarzwell about his emergency room psychiatric work. Okay, back to the talk.

James: in terms of the content of what he’s saying, look, it’s coming really heavily from… It’s not the far left, it’s coming from… Sorry, it’s not really the far left or the far right, it’s Louis Farrakhan. It’s black nationalism. And this is the elephant in the room that no one wants to talk about, which is the prevalence of antisemitic thinking among African Americans. It’s higher than among the general population significantly so. I just saw a poll that said only 44% of African Americans responded yes when asked if Kanye West’s remarks are antisemitic. Which means that a majority either don’t know or do not think that what he said was anti-Semitic. But in terms of the content of what he’s saying, like the Jews who claim to be Jews are fake Jews, you know, Blacks are the real Jews, that’s the Black Hebrews. Your listeners might not know this but there was the largest antisemitic demonstration since Charlottesville happened just a couple of weeks ago in Brooklyn. Two or 300 Black Hebrews were marching in support of Kyrie Irving, another very prominent Black celebrity who’s made blatantly antisemitic remarks that was not covered in the media. We’re still hearing about Charlottesville five years after it happened. We hear about that a lot. It’s very much imprinted upon the American mind. And rightly so. But there was hardly any coverage of a similar-sized antisemitic demonstration because the people who were the villains in the story, it’s inconvenient, right? And so the mainstream media and basically our sensemaking institutions and the culture, you know, academia and all these institutions, they don’t want to confront this. And that’s why you just don’t really hear about it because it’s a very inconvenient and uncomfortable topic to discuss.

Zach: And a good number of hate crimes and even murders of Jewish people have been by the Black Hebrew Israelite type of people. Is that true?

James: Yeah, or just random assailants. You look at New York City where, you know, I’m not visibly Jewish. I’m not orthodox, I’m not wearing a yarmulke, I’m not wearing long sideburns pious. But among that segment of the Jewish population, yeah, it’s quite dangerous. And there’s been a huge spike in violence against them. And it’s almost exclusively from African Americans, you know, non-White assailants basically are the main perpetrators of that violence. Again, that’s a subject that you will not really see covered outside of the Jewish press and the conservative press. It’s something that the mainstream media does not want to touch because it doesn’t fit into this narrative that they’ve been crafting since 2015-2016 that the rise of Donald Trump and White supremacy is the central evil of our time. You’ve even seen this when there was this spate of anti-Asian attacks about two years ago. Much, if not the majority of it, was also perpetrated by African Americans. We were being told that this was the fault of White supremacy and there was just no logical… People were saying this in full view. There was video evidence of these attacks that were happening and yet they would constantly say that it’s still– I don’t even know how they rationalized it– that this was still somehow the fault of White supremacy.

Zach: Another example that often is brought up of antisemitism is the George Soros memes and insults and such, and in my own research of delving into some of the darker parts of the internet, I went into some pro-Trump Facebook groups and interestingly to me or surprisingly maybe to me, the amount of hate that I saw for George Soros was just off the charts compared to other people. Hillary Clinton and Obama and all these people got a lot of hate too but the amount of visceral death wishes and this kind of thing were just off the charts for George Soros. And I’m curious how much of the anti-George Soros speech and language and rhetoric from conservatives do you view as antisemitic? Because in some ways, I can see some of it has been similar to what we talked about with criticism of Israel where some of the people doing this would not view… They view it as, “Oh, there’s a powerful person with money giving money to liberal causes so I hate them,” kind of thing. But I’m curious what your take on where you see the boundaries of that is, or how much of it do you see as being antisemitic?

James: Well, I’m not a fan of really vitriol or hateful unhinged criticism and commentary in general so I don’t like it. When it comes to George Soros, look, the man is the biggest funder of the Democratic Party and he has been. And generally of liberal progressive causes. It should be fair to criticize him. And I think liberals and progressives, many of whom are very quick by the way to deny any antisemitism in their own ranks and are very quick to defend people whom I consider to be anti-Semites like Ilhan Omar, they get very, very, very sensitive about criticizing George Soros who by the way does not really even identify as Jewish. He’s been open about that. He identifies as a Jew, but he doesn’t give any money to Jewish philanthropies or any causes, he very much sees himself as a citizen of the world, he’s cosmopolitan, he kind of despises what he views as this grubby particularism of Jews. But that’s his decision and that doesn’t mean that he should therefore be subjected to antisemitic attacks. But it is an interesting side note. But when Marco Rubio or other conservatives criticize or they use the term ‘Soros-backed prosecutors’ to describe some of these progressive very Left-wing prosecutors in various cities across the country who are letting criminals out of jail and not prosecuting them for various crimes or reducing their sentences and removing cash bail and whatnot when they refer to these individuals as Soros-backed prosecutors…

There was a huge controversy about this in August and this was deemed antisemitic, you know, merely to point out the fact that George Soros is funding to the tune of tens of millions of dollars prosecutors who are public officials who are pursuing very controversial policies. That, to me, is ridiculous. Look, if George Soros is being discussed in terms that are the same that the Left uses to describe the Koch brothers, then I don’t see how that can be antisemitic. By the way, they’re describing the Koch brothers as these shadowy actors who are destroying the country and whatnot. That’s fine. That’s political rhetoric. They’re allowed to do that. I don’t think that when people on the Right– or not just the Right– when other people criticize George Soros in similar fashion, that is ipso facto an example of antisemitism in the United States, that is.

It’s a somewhat different conversation when you’re talking about Hungary, which has a different history than the United States in a very different context. And there’s a very different relationship between the Jews and that governments and Jews and non-Jews in Hungary. This is a country that largely collaborated in the extinction of its own Jewish population during the Holocaust. And when the leaders of that country decide to make George Soros this Emmanuel Goldstein-type boogeyman, when Viktor Orbán gives a speech and he says that the country’s enemies are not loyal, they’re not patriotic, they speculate with money, they’re internationalists, they’re globalists… to me, that’s crossing a line. Because there is a baggage and there is a context and there’s a history in Hungary that getting back to where this conversation started, is not the history of the United States. It is in many ways the opposite of the history United States. It’s the reason why Jews left places like Hungary in the last century and even earlier to come to the United States.

So I think there’s a kind of naivete among a lot of American right-wingers and conservatives. You actually ask them and a lot of them don’t even know he’s Jewish. I’m not trying to play defense for the Right here, because there are some people on the Right who know exactly what they’re doing. They know exactly they’re playing into Jewish tropes, and they use those anti-Jewish antisemitic tropes. But there are lots of conservatives who they’re just watching Fox News or they’re listening to talk radio. And yeah, “George Soros is the biggest donor to the Democrats and progressive causes. Of course, we’re not gonna like him.” And they use intemperate language to describe him but you know what? I don’t see liberals being very nice when they talk about Mitch McConnell or the Koch brothers or Peter Thiel or the Big Bad Bboogie Man who writes checks to conservative causes. So I’d like it if we were all a little more restrained in how we talk about our fellow Americans, but in the absence of that, I’m not so quick to just rush and say any intemperate criticism of George Soros. Even saying that he’s evil, okay? That’s not necessarily antisemitic.

Zach: Another thing you made me think of is the focus on the word ‘globalist’ and some people treat that as code for Jewish. I’ve seen that a lot and I’m honestly kind of perplexed by that sometimes because back in the day I read Jerry Mander book, The Case Against Globalism early on and he’s Jewish, and I just wonder how you see that word being used.

James: I think it can be, it depends on the context. All this stuff is contextual and I think-

Zach: It’s complex. Yeah.

James: Yeah. Well, you say no question but a lot of people don’t see it that way and they make these categorical judgments. And they’re not willing to abide any nuance or apply it in a case-by-case basis. I first came across the term globalist when I was researching the Ron Paul newsletters, which was a story that I broke for The New Republic in 2008. Ron Paul published all these newsletters dating back to the 1970s where he was railing against his usual bugbears like fiat money and the Federal Reserve and big budgets, big government spending, deficit spending. But there was also a lot of Right-wing, pro-militia, racist conspiracy theory stuff in there, too. And he was using this word globalist a lot. Then I looked into it more and it seemed that it was really kind of popularised with the John Birch Society, which was a far right– it still exists– was founded as a far-right anti-communist organization and definitely was antisemitic. And William F. Buckley Jr. sort of famously kicked them out of the conservative movement in the 1960s, if you will. So the word definitely has antisemitic intonations or associations if you will, but it is not always everywhere.

So I think that if you’re talking against free trade deals and international agreements and you want the United States out of the United Nations and you want the United States out of NATO, you know, come home America, and you’re just a kind of isolationist… You know, have isolationists been antisemitic in the past? Yeah, Charles Lindbergh the leader of the America First Movement was an anti-Semite. But not everyone in the America First Movement was anti-Semitic. And I don’t think that someone who poses international trade deals or American involvement in the world is necessarily anti-Semitic. There’s a lot of overlap because it often comes back to, “Well, why is it that the United States has these big defense budgets and is involved in all these wars and international conflicts?” It’s because they’re trying to support or defend the State of Israel. And why are they supporting or defending the State of Israel? Oh, it’s because of these neocons in Washington with all their money.

So that’s why there’s a lot of overlap between the isolationist community and the antisemitic community, but I have friends who are more libertarian inclined who just don’t believe that the United States should play a global leadership role, and they want out of all these institutions. And they’re not antisemitic, and they’re not driven to this position because they have some kind of conspiratorial view of what the Israel lobby is kind of hoodwinking the American people. They don’t share that. Again, there’s context, you know? Sometimes globalist can be used in an antisemitic context, sometimes not. I don’t think Donald Trump or necessarily even Steve Bannon who was the one– I think Bannon was the one who really inserted that word into Trump’s speeches and whatnot– I don’t think that they’re being motivated by an antisemitic impulse there. I think it is this genuine American nationalism that has a very long pedigree in this country, you can trace it all the way back to Andrew Jackson and maybe even earlier. And you know, these guys would say that they traced it all the way back to George Washington who opposed entangling alliances with other countries. So this is a real aspect of American foreign policy thinking. And while it has attracted anti-Semites under its banner, it is not inherently antisemitic.

Zach: One question I’ve sometimes wondered is, do you think that Jewish people’s not believing in an afterlife is a factor in them seeming to as a group be very hard workers?

James: It is a good question. And I’m not a very religious Jew so I’m probably not the right person to be asking, but I have gotten the sense just growing up. You know, I am a Jew and I was Bar Mitzvahed and I had a somewhat Jewish education growing up, but very much culturally Jewish, you could say. And I definitely got the impression that there was the sense that, you know, like the Catholic kids could go confess whenever they committed a sin. They could go confess and get absorbed by the priests. And there was this afterlife, right? That that’s what ultimately as Christians they were ultimately striving for, a place in this afterlife. And we didn’t get any of that. [laughs] That’s not how Jews live. It’s like, there’s this world, and you gotta make this world better and you have to succeed in this world, and you have to treat people good in this world. You can’t keep on committing a sin every week and getting absolved and going back and doing it again. So I think there was this kind of cultural sense that maybe the Christians had it easier, right? Or maybe non-Jews. I don’t know about the Muslim tradition here, or other religious traditions. But growing up in America, Christianity is obviously the predominant culture. And yeah, just this sense that we didn’t believe in heaven. You don’t hear that in the synagogue, you know, all this talk about the afterlife and trying to win a place in heaven. It’s just not a part of… It was not a part of my Jewish upbringing, whether or not that has– on a larger scale– whether or not that has anything to do with Jewish success.

I definitely think it has a lot to do with the Jewish philanthropic drive, the Jewish priority on learning. You know, you just see the enormous amount of support that Jewish philanthropies and charities do, individual Jews are extremely philanthropic with non-Jewish causes too. Right? I mean, David Geffen’s name is everywhere. There’s all these Jewish philanthropists. I think it does have something to do with that. Yes.

Zach: Yeah. It’s just interesting to me because it’s something that I’ve often wondered and I’ve just never seen anything written about it. And I kind of wondered if it might be viewed as insensitive to talk about, but it just seems to me like you say, it’s ‘I want to get my rewards in this life. I don’t have a second life to fall back on, I have here and now.’

James: Yeah. No, I think it’s a fair question to ask.

Zach: Do you want to mention anything else? Maybe anything that you thought we missed, or else go into what you’re working on these days.

James: Well, I published a book this past summer, which doesn’t really have anything to do with what we’ve talked about today. But it’s about another minority. It’s called Secret City: The Hidden History of Gay Washington, and it’s about the role of homosexuality in American high politics from World War Two to the end of the Cold War when to be a homosexual in Washington was really the most dangerous thing you could possibly be. Even more dangerous than being a communist. That book was published in the summer, it was a New York Times bestseller, it was just named to the list of the top 100 notable books of the year by the Times. And I am back to journalism, writing for Tablet and Air Mail and [Colette] and other places that I write for, and thinking about a next book but not settled on one yet.

Zach: Congrats on the book’s success, that’s great.

James: Thank you.

Zach: And yeah, thanks a lot for coming on, and thanks for giving your opinions.

James: Thanks for having me.

Zach: That was journalist and author, Jamie Kirchick. You can learn more about him on his website, jameskirchick.com. You can follow him on Twitter @jkirchick.

That was journalist and author Jamie Kirchick. You can learn more about him on his website JamesKirchick.com. You can follow him on Twitter at @jkirchick. 

I wanted to mention some people and resources who contributed to my research for this episode. I read some of David Bernstein’s book Woke Antisemitism, which makes the case that some common liberal-side antiracism approaches are divisive and can lead to antisemitic views. Bernstein has long been an influential person in Jewish organizations and he shares his experiences seeing the new antiracism ideas grow in influence over the last couple decades and how he’s seen those ideas affect Jewish organizations and affect people’s perspectives on Jews and Israel. 

I also wanted to thank Marshall Herskovitz, who I follow on Twitter and who is also someone interested in depolarization, for talking to me a bit on this topic. 

I also read some of a book titled The Enduring, Invisible, and Ubiquitous Centrality of Whiteness, which was a series of antiracism essays, and a couple of those essays were by Jewish people considering their so-called whiteness. 

This has been the People Who Read People podcast, with me Zach Elwood. You can learn more about it at www.behavior-podcast.com. Remember that you can subscribe to it and get ad-free episodes, amongst a few other features. But mainly you’d be helping me work more on this podcast and help promote it to others, so if you enjoy my work or think it’s important, that’s the main way you can show your appreciation. 

Okay thanks for listening. 

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podcast

Is liberal bias impeding U.S. depolarization and conflict resolution efforts?, with Guy Burgess

A talk with conflict resolution specialist Guy Burgess, who, along with his wife Heidi Burgess, run the project www.beyondintractability.org. Guy and Heidi wrote a paper in 2022 titled “Applying conflict resolution insights to the hyper‐polarized, society‐wide conflicts threatening liberal democracies.

A transcript of this talk is below. I talk with Guy about: how conflict resolution principles might be applied to U.S. polarization problems; the importance of addressing liberal-side contributions to polarization; the common objections people can have to seeing polarization as a problem that both sides must tackle; how some in the conflict resolution space may be hindered from helping by their own liberal bias and polarization; the Burgesses’ ideas for what society must do to reduce polarization to more healthy levels, and more.

Episode links:

Resources related to or mentioned in the talk:

TRANSCRIPT 

Note that this transcript will contain errors. 

Zach Elwood: Welcome to the People Who Read People podcast, with me, Zach Elwood. This is a podcast about better understanding other people and better understanding ourselves. You can learn more about it at behavior-podcast.com.

As you probably know if you’ve listened to this podcast before, I often focus on polarization- and depolarization-related topics. In this episode, I talk to conflict resolution specialist Guy Burgess about the problem of American polarization, with a focus on liberal-side contributions to the problem.

And to be clear up front: if you’re politically liberal, thinking about how liberals are contributing to our divides does not mean you have to believe that both political groups contribute equally to the problem of polarization. In other words, you can continue thinking that one side is much worse than the other side while also working on understanding what drives our divides and thinking about ways we can reduce those divides.

And the reason I sometimes focus on liberal-side contributions is because I think it’s something that liberals don’t like to talk about, and many liberals have a blind spot about what those contributions even are. And if we’re going to solve our very serious problems, we need many more people to be willing to take open, honest looks at our polarization problems and be willing to do the hard work of trying to solve those problems. And I’d also say that it’s especially important for liberals to think about these things because we can only influence our own group; we can only influence people who are similar to us; our righteous judgments of the other side and desires that they improve themselves have no real influence on them. Research shows change of a group must come from within, so we need more people, both conservatives and liberals, thinking about these things and thinking about how they can make their own political groups less toxic.

I learned about Guy Burgess because a friend of mine who works in mediation and conflict resolution, Eleanor Bravo, sent me a paper that Guy and his wife Heidi had written titled Applying conflict resolution insights to the hyper‐polarized, society‐wide conflicts threatening liberal democracies.

And one of the things that stood out to me in that paper was that Guy and Heidi briefly discussed liberal-side contributions. I’ll quote one of the more pertinent lines from the paper: they wrote that the objective of the left seems to be to quote “cancel and drive from the public square anyone who has ever expressed the slightest doubt about the merits of any aspect of the progressive agenda.” end quote.

They also mention conservative-side contributions in the paper, but the thing that is noteworthy about this is that it’s rare to see conflict resolution and peacekeeping organizations and experts be willing to even discuss liberal-side contributions. And the reason for this probably isn’t that surprising: many of the people who work in those fields are politically liberal and thus may have their own blind spots and biases, and even apart from that they can face peer pressure from their colleagues to not talk about such things in their papers and public discussions.

And if you’re new to my podcast and haven’t heard me cover these topics in past episodes, and are wondering ‘Wait, what’s he talking about; how are liberals contributing to our divides?’, I think you should listen to this talk, and also listen to some of my past episodes on this topic. You might also like a book I started reading recently called Beyond Contempt, by Erica Etelson. Etelson is a dedicated progressive, and her book focuses on the ways in which liberals speak in dismissive and insulting ways about conservatives and how that riles up conservative anger and contributes to the very things liberals are upset about. If you’re curious to learn more about the topic of liberal-side contributions to our divides, I’ll include some relevant resources in the blog post for this episode, which you can find at behavior-podcast.com.

If you’re someone who scoffs at the idea that liberals need to do more to work towards healing our divides, I’d ask you to question your certainty around that. Is your scoffing at that idea much different than the conservatives who would scoff at that idea, who would insist that the problem is entirely the fault of the left, and that their side doesn’t have to do anything to fix the problem? Are you willing to examine the reasons why many experts in conflict resolution, including some politically liberal people, think it’s important to discuss liberal-side contributions to our divides? Are you willing to examine why it is that some people, including some liberals, have written articles and books about the ways in which liberals contribute?

Are you willing to examine why it is that Guy and Heidi Burgess can express frustration with some of their colleagues in the conflict resolution space for, to paraphrase here, often acting more like liberal activists than conflict resolution professionals?

If you’re someone who scoffs at the idea of depolarization, I hope you take some time to think about these ideas and learn more about these ideas, because it’s a very important topic, perhaps the most important topic of all. And it may be that more of us need to recognize the importance of this topic and attempt to rise above our emotional and reactive stances on these things if we’re going to avoid worst-case scenarios.

So a little bit about Guy Burgess: he’s a conflict resolution specialist who, along with his wife, Heidi Burgess, operate the project Beyond Intractability, which you can find at beyondintractability.org. Guy and Heidi have a long and respected career of working on conflict resolution, and are well known in the conflict resolution space. It’s impossible for me to boil down their work in a quick way, but I’ll give a few of the highlights:

  • They founded the Conflict Information Consortium in 1988 at the University of Colorado.
  • They created a knowledge base they called Beyond Intractability, which was focused on tools for resolving very entrenched, so-called intractable, conflicts.
  • They wrote the book Justice Without Violence, and the book Encyclopedia of Conflict Resolution.

And just a note: these are very hard topics to talk about. Whenever I do these polarization-related interviews, I always wish I’d said some things differently, or feel I missed a vital point, or feel that my suboptimal wording will likely cause some people to misunderstand me. Aside from my own mistakes, the polarized nature of our society means that some people will be filtering any of these discussions through a very pessimistic lens, looking for any small misstep or thing they disagree with as an indicator that the whole concept of depolarization is faulty and oblivious. These are extremely hard conversations to have; and I think the hardness of them, the risk of offending our friends and family and colleagues, the risk of being perceived as foolish and naive, is a major reason people avoid these conversations, on both sides. We become more scared of offending our side, more scared of helping the other side, or even of just being perceived by others as being not sufficiently pure or moral. But I think more of us need to see the value in having these conversations, and see that accomplishing very important things, like healing divides that pose existential threats to a country or society, requires a lot more people to make themselves uncomfortable. It requires more bravery, more patience, more long-term thinking, and more cutting of slack to the people around us.

If there’s something in this talk that offends you, or a major point you think that is being missed in these discussions, maybe you’d take the time to write to me about your thoughts. You can do that at my site behavior-podcast.com using the contact form. I’ll actually be spending the entire next month working on my depolarization book so I would appreciate any thoughts you’d care to share.

Zach: Okay, here’s the talk with Guy Burgess.

Hi Guy, thanks for coming on the show.

Guy Burgess: Thank you. I’m looking forward to this.

Zach: Let’s start out with a little bit about your background. What are the most relevant parts of your career that you think puts you in a good place to have ideas about how to reduce American polarization if you could give a summary of, I know it’s a long career but maybe summarize the high points.

Guy Burgess: First of all, I should say that pretty much everything that I’ve done going way back to graduate school days which were in the ’70s, a long, long time ago, I’ve done with my wife and partner Heidi Burgess and we’ve been working as a team for a very long time. And some folks think that’s our most persuasive conflict resolution credential. The other thing, we both have PhDs in sociology but we’ve never worked in a disciplinary department. Our careers have been spent entirely in interdisciplinary settings and we’ve worked really at the intersection of research, teaching and practice. We’ve engaged in a variety of conflict resolution efforts of one sort or another as practitioners. Done spent a lot of years teaching and probably most of our time doing research and trying to compile and bring together what the conflict and conflict related fields collectively know about how to deal with our most difficult problems.

So the biggest thing that happened in our career and this goes back to the late ’80s, we received a major grant from the Hewlett Foundation and the Hewlett Foundation supported us for over 20 years. And they were at the time establishing a series of university based conflict resolution research centers. And we were the only one between Northwestern and Stanford in each of these centers and they eventually got to be 10 or 15 of them, specialized in different things. And what we chose to specialize on was intractable conflict. And this goes back to the late ’80s. And that was a time when an organization called the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution, which was the precursor to the Association for Conflict Resolution that exists today, put out a manual on how to deal with public policy dispute resolution. And this was a time during the first great energy crisis in the ’70s and early ’80s where the problem was not climate change.

The problem was political restrictions in the global energy supply. And there were proposals to build giant energy facilities all over the country and they were extremely controversial. And there were lots of conflicts about that and we were involved in those. But at any rate, what Spider did was they put out a manual and it had, the first half of it was how to identify really intractable conflicts that as a mediator you should stay away from because you don’t stand a prayer of being able to get through these without some sort of terrible blow up. And we thought that it would be good to have an organization that’s specialized in trying to understand and deal with these intractable conflicts. And the other thing that we specialized in, again, under the support of the Hewlett Foundation was using these new technologies of computers and telecommunications and all.

This was a time that actually was before the IBM PC when we first started exchanging information about how to deal with conflict electronically. It was on five and a quarter inch floppy discs. And we’ve tried to improve that over the years as the technologies improve. And the other thing that’s exceptional about our career is that since we never really worked in a practitioner organization or a tenure track faculty position, that we’ve been generalists. And we are a society of specialists and everybody knows a lot about a narrow field in dispute resolution. It’s a particular kind of mediation perhaps. And there are very few people who have a chance to spend their career looking at what lots of different people in different fields are doing and trying to fit it all together. So what we did under a support from the Hewlett Foundation is we build a series of knowledge bases that are increasingly sophisticated and they’re full of lots and lots of information and we’ve never been able to quite find the perfect way of organizing it all.

And we’ve never had anywhere near as much money as a task like this really needs. But we’ve still been able to pull together an awful lot of insights from lots and lots of very different people. And when we first started this, we thought that there would be lots of different views on how to deal with conflict. And while that’s certainly true, what we really found is that there are lots of people working on different aspects of conflict from different perspectives. And if you start putting them together, it gives you a very different view of the overall situation. So one of the essays that we have is builds on the old metaphor of the blind men and the elephant where you have all of these blind men approaching the elephant and one encounters the leg and decides it’s like a tree and one encounters the soft, fussy tail and thinks it’s nice and somebody else runs into the tusk and so on and so forth.

But what we’re giggling with is a giant monster in terms of intractable conflict that really is threatening pretty much everything that we care about. And it’s so big and in many ways we all have our own versions of blindfolds on that. We can only understand parts of it. And it’s hard to get an image of what the whole big thing is and how to deal with it. So what we’ve been focused on with our knowledge based systems and the of theory of how to try to organize this is how do we combine what we collectively know into a strategy for dealing with a problem that’s as big and complex as intractable conflict and what we’re calling in our latest effort, the hyper polarization problem.

Zach: I first learned about your work through a paper recently. It was called Applying Conflict Resolution Insights to the Hyper Polarized Society-wide Conflicts, threatening Liberal Democracies. Maybe you could talk a little bit about the goals with that. What were you trying to communicate and what were the most important points, would you say?

Guy Burgess: Well, what we did with that paper and we don’t write many academic papers and academic papers tend to be very full of jargon written for narrow audiences. And there are a lot of problems with them. And the fact they tend to be insanely expensive and only people at universities with access to libraries can really access them. But the conflict resolution quarterly was starting something different and they were going to start publishing a different kind of article. They called them feature articles and the idea was to raise questions that the field of conflict resolution and more broadly peace building ought to be talking about, thinking about. And they invited us to write such an article and we’d been a bit frustrated, I think you could say, on how little the conflict resolution community was doing to help society address these hyper polarized conflicts that are tearing us apart.

And so we decided to write an article that was a bit of a challenge to the field to do more that also outlined a strategy, again, for trying to bring together our different areas of expertise into a comprehensive effort. So that’s what we wrote. And I’ll talk a little bit more about the key points of that article. But we also set up on our website, which is beyondintractability.org and online discussion. So we now have a lengthy series of articles that have been written in response to our article and responses to those articles. And we’re continuing to encourage people to contribute their ideas to this discussion. We have a sub stack newsletter that comes out with summaries on the latest things that we receive to the discussion every week or so. And that’s been really very exciting and we’re getting a lot of people to start grappling with this problem.

We tried something similar a couple years ago. We tried to push something we called the Constructive Conflict Initiative. And there what we argued was that the conflict problem is as serious and difficult a threat to humanity as something like climate change or infectious diseases as we’ve recently discovered. And in that, I tell the story of how as a young PhD just out of graduate school, I had a chance to work at the National Center for Atmospheric Research. And this was 10, 15 years before Wikipedia thinks the climate change movement started. And at that time, there were a few scientists who were studying climate, and these are guys who were accustomed to writing very scientific papers and going to very scientific conferences and talking to people in pretty much the same field. And they knew lots about atmospheric physics and chemistry and all of that.

And they just discovered that we are in the process of dramatically altering the global climate system, and that they needed to tell the world that fundamental changes in every element of society need to be made or we’re facing what over the next century or so could be a real catastrophe. This was when they were just starting to say, “Okay, how do we take this understanding of climate problems and turn it into a global political movement?” And in the next 25 years or so, they developed it to the point where they won a Nobel Peace Prize for it. And that was 15 years ago or something. And we’re still a long way from having addressed the problem but I think that there are a similarly small number of people who understand and they’re working in relatively isolated fields looking at human interactions in one’s way or another. How really far we are from being able to build the kind of global collaborative system that we need to deal with the problems that we face and that we need to start thinking about how to change all this. And we over time are going to have to mobilize something comparable in scope to the climate change response. Five years ago, we had real trouble persuading people that that was the case. And with this latest effort, that’s a lot more people are understanding this and are willing to start engaging the problem which is very encouraging really.

Zach: Yeah. What stood out to me reading your paper and your other work was just how similar it was to my thoughts in terms of seeing polarization, extreme polarization as the most significant threat we’re facing in the sense that if we can’t solve this problem, we can’t solve the other problems. And aside from even the conflict it represents, it’s just a distraction from solving other very serious problems. And also the fact that you talk about liberal contributions and how people on the liberal side need to do more which I think is something I talk about a good amount in this podcast and it’s been disappointing to me to see how that seems to be something liberals even educated academic people and conflict resolution people seem to really avoid talking about the contributions there or what liberals can do.

And I think it makes sense in the sense that it’s understandable that polarization is so hard to get around so that these are often liberal people who are either themselves pretty polarized, pretty biased or else they feel pressured to avoid talking about those things. And sometimes I’ve even had conversations with people I’ve interviewed where they’ll be more willing to talk about those things off the record and not really want to talk about it on the record. So I’m curious, do you see, when it comes to trying to find these multiply or very massively parallel efforts to try to reduce polarization, do you see the obstacle there as just getting people to even recognize polarization as a problem worth reducing?

Guy Burgess: That’s certainly a issue and there’s a sense in which, well no, I’m back up a little bit. Well, one of the most lively parts of this discussion that we’ve been having really reveals the deep tension between the peace building worldview or a conflict resolution worldview and a progressive worldview of social justice. And at the extreme we had been having an exchange with one of our colleagues who was really torn. And on the one hand he hears the argument that we are at the beginning stages or maybe not even the beginning stages, maybe the mid stages, the transition from a democracy to some sort of terrible authoritarian rule. And that if we talk in conciliatory terms and try to understand the other side and empathize and try to really diffuse the conflict, what we’re really doing is playing into the hands of the authoritarian wannabes who are going to make the same transition that we saw in Nazi Germany and take over the society.

And then we’re going to be in really big trouble. And the argument here is that the threat is so severe that we need to mobilize all of the resources available in the society. And that includes the conflict resolution and peace building field to the task of fighting systemic oppression and these authoritarian trends in our society. And at the other hand, you have those and a lot of this comes from people who have been instrumental in trying to help war torn societies, reconcile their differences and recover. And they see that even in society’s plagued by terrible authoritarian strong man rule, there’s also an underlying conflict. And there are fundamental, reasonable, substantive important differences between various elements of the society that play into the conflict and make authoritarianism possible. And this is what you might call the divide and conquer syndrome. And this goes way back thousands of years in human history where people have tried to deliberately divide societies as a way of gaining control.

And so at one end or one side, you have that. And then the other side, and what we’ve been trying to talk up is the notion that we need to reframe conflict from the conflicts we face. Right now we think of them in us versus then terms and we tune in to the news every morning and we anxiously look to see whether our side, whether it’s progressive or conservative, won some points yesterday in the news or whether they lost. And everything is reduced to what at least one fellow called political hobbyism where it’s a spectator sport and you keep rooting for the home team and it gets all sort of silly like that. And we certainly have seen that, in fact, in many ways the recent election is kind of the end of the season of one season of this us versus them political contest and we’re just embarking on the next one. And a lot of the news coverage is sometimes it’s called horse race coverage, who’s ahead, who’s behind?

Zach: A small note here, people have been writing books for decades about how the so-called horse race coverage of politics has undermined democracy and increased our divides. On the liberal side, outlets like Fox News get a lot of the attention for increasing divides but it’s possible to have a view that a lot of mainstream media increases our divides. An early book I read on this topic was from 1997, it was titled Breaking the News, how the Media Undermined American Democracy. That book and other books and papers from around that time talked about how covering politics and elections like sports as a game of wins and losses of victories and humiliations, instead of focusing on the ideas and the issues made people perceive politics to be like sports. If you have many media outlets treating politics basically like a sports game, it’s not surprising that it will trigger people’s us versus them emotions. The same emotions that can make people so angry and emotional about sports. This is just to say, when one starts to dig into the large monster that is polarization, one can find plenty of factors and plenty of blame to spread around our society. Okay, back to the talk.

Guy Burgess: But what we’ve been trying to talk up is that we reframe the conflict, so it’s not us versus them but that there are, we focus instead on a series of complex and destructive conflict dynamics that make it difficult for large and diverse societies to live together in peace and mutually supportive ways. And that we need to systematically understand those dynamics and find ways of correcting them. Now if you can reframe things that way, what you do is you take people from being opposed to one another to cooperating on the same task of trying to control these destructive conflict dynamics. And so that’s, I think, a way to look at things. And then as you do this, then you raise the question and it’s hard for both liberals and conservatives to see this sometimes is that these dynamics bend your mind in a sense that you wind up doing things and believing things that you wouldn’t ordinarily do and believe because of these pressures. And so we can go into a little more detail on what these things are but you mentioned a massively parallel peace building or problem solving idea. And basically what it focuses on is trying to get a lot of different organizations doing different things to go after different dynamics in a way that collectively can attack a large portion of them enough to alter the trends in society.

Zach: Yeah. And to give a couple examples here, I mean some of the things that you’ll hear liberal people say in pushing that against depolarization framings or goals, you might hear the quote from Desmond Tutu that goes, if you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor. If an elephant has its foot on the tail of a mouse and you say that you are neutral, the mouse will not appreciate your neutrality. That’s one thing you sometimes hear. Another one in a similar vein is we are tolerant of anything except intolerance. And I think maybe you could talk a little bit about more about what those arguments are missing. For example, the one thing that stands out is that sometimes that relies over a huge amount of complexity. For example, you can find some of the left activist framings of things very arguable and subjective that where even people on their own side will disagree with them about the harms being done or how exactly to find the problems.

I think that one of the things we see and it’s just a natural thing of polarization, I think, where both sides have these righteous and very certain framings of things that they don’t like to hear people disagree with. I think there’s that on the left where even though we can find a lot of complexity and nuance on any specific subject, you often hear these big statements of how there cannot be any negotiation or any negotiation is itself a harm. And I’m wondering if you could talk a little bit about maybe that discussion that’s come up.

Guy Burgess: Yeah, well that’s absolutely critical and it’s a very difficult one to work through. A couple of the things that we’ve been talking about that address this, one paper that we just posted to this discussion is something I call the QED syndrome. And when I was in high school, I learned in geometry class that I’m supposed to write QED at the bottom of any proof. And when I prove something like, “Hey, that’s a real fact.” Now I can rely on this going forward. And it seems to me that this same principle applies to a lot of society’s big conflicts that from one line of reasoning, you will work through something and come to a conclusion and say, “Aha, this is absolutely it.” The example that I use in the articles about climate change, there’s some folks that look at a particular line of evidence and come to the conclusion that climate is an emergency.

And if we don’t drop absolutely everything and subordinate pretty much every other human concern at redoing the energy system, we’re going to be facing a new retrievable catastrophe. Once you decide that you believe that, then a whole series of decisions flow from that. And then you start thinking that anybody who disagrees with that is part of the problem and they have to be opposed. And you think of it in us versus them terms. Likewise, you will have groups that with a different line of evidence conclude that it’s all just a scam designed to sell solar collectors and electric vehicles. You’ll find other folks that argue and this is a stronger argument. I think that the situation is serious but not as serious as it’s sometimes made out to be. And that we do have more time to respond and we do have time to think things through carefully and make sure that what we’re doing will in fact work and to preserve the economic viability of the society which are ultimately going to need in order to be able to adapt to inevitable climate changes.

So there are a whole series of different arguments and I can have a longer list there. The same sort of thing applies to social justice issues. You can come up with a line of reasoning that convinces you that racism is behind everything and it explains all that there is in society. And then there are a whole series of other arguments. But once you get to this QED point where you’ve decided that you really have got it all figured out, then you quit thinking about other competing arguments. You decide that they’re disinformation. And the truth is the world that we live in is so complex that there are a lot of these and there are different lines of reasoning that take you to somewhat different conclusions. And the only way that we’re ever really going to solve the problems is by really engaging these debates and trying to look at the strengths and weaknesses of them and trying to combine what people learn from different perspectives. So part of the argument is that going back to the destructive dynamics, a lot of the dynamics that the Democrats claim afflict the left also afflict the right, also afflict the left. And so you need to look at those as well. Going a little too far in too many directions here. Why don’t we stop there and let you pose? And these are huge questions.

Zach: Oh, yeah. It’s so hard to talk about. And that’s part of the problem with these things is just such a monster as you say. Getting back to you, talking about the motivated reasoning, this filtering of everything through these specific narratives that we’ve built up. The more emotional and angry and fearful we are, the more motivated reasoning we have that’s motivated by these emotions we have as opposed to stepping back and being like, “Well, is the righteous narrative I’ve crafted the actual truth? Can I see how well meaning and rational people might be able to have a different perspective on these things even people on my own side?” And I think it gets back to that reframing you talked about where as opposed to viewing things like an us versus them framing, you can continue working towards the things you want to work towards while trying to speak in depolarizing and persuasive ways.

And I would argue that that’s actually a much more effective way to achieve the things you want to achieve on both sides. Both sides have a better chance of I think persuading and reaching their goals as opposed to creating this us versus them war where really nobody wins really and you have the possibility for societal and democracy destruction and such. Wasn’t really a question there but let me continue on. Let’s see. One of the things you talk about in your paper are the bad faith actors, the people who deliberately inflame tensions for their own profit or ego, other things. And one thing that strikes me in that area is the more polarized the society becomes, the harder it can become to distinguish the bad faith actors from the true believers.

And polarization itself leads us to perceive the other side with more paranoia and distrust leads us to viewing some of the true believers on the other side as being disingenuous and liars because we literally just can’t understand how people can believe those things. And so I think that points to maybe being cautious in general even while we work towards depolarizing, being cautious about assuming some people are bad faith. And I’m curious if you have any thoughts on the hardships of distinguishing bad faith actors from true believers who may still be deliberately polarizing but are actual true believers.

Guy Burgess: Yeah. I think the bad faith actor sections, I think one of the major contributions that really came out of that paper that we tend to think of things and hyper polarize. That is two polls. There’s the left and the right Republicans and Democrats in this country and something comparable in other countries. But I think it makes a lot of sense to think in terms of three sets of actors. There’s grassroots citizens on the left and the right and there are a variety of kinds of bad faith actors who are folks who have figured out how to profit from our conflicts and they amplify them but they don’t really care about one side or the other. It’s the conflict that’s in their best interest. Now, some of these folks are divide and conquer authoritarian wannabes. There’s a great book on The Dictator’s Handbook that basically is the time tested strategy for seizing dictatorial control of a society. And a lot of it implies this kind of deliberate inflaming of conflict. But there’s also in our society, and this I think is a big part of the problem, the structure of the media tends to reward those who provide more inflammatory content. One of the features of the internet is that as we’ve moved essentially all political reporting and opinion pieces onto the internet, there is very detailed tracking not only of who reads things but how long they spend reading it, who they share to others, how much they are engaged by it.

And you have news outlets that have figured out that the only way in which they can remain financially viable is by building and retaining a large audience. And you do that by giving your audience what it wants to hear and what people like to hear is they, well, and this goes back to some of the psychological vulnerabilities, the destructive conflict dynamics that we need to figure out ways to control. But one of these is worst case bias and this is a deeply embedded psychological bias. There are studies that show that the fear part of the brain is literally wired ahead of the hope part of the brain. And things that are scary or threatening will get our attention way ahead of things that are hopeful and promising. So one of the ways in which media outlets get our attention is by sending us scary stories.

But scary stories are most attractive when they are a coupled with an account of how this was a narrow, a scary encounter but we’re going to win. And you feel self-righteous and you feel like if you keep staying in the course, you’re going get through this all right. So you get that kind of material spread on both the left and the right. This is in editorial papers and you can look over time at how there have even been studies that have looked at how the content of headlines over time has gotten more and more inflammatory. How major news sources on the left and the right increasingly focus on a relatively narrow audience and tell them what they want to hear. Those audiences stick with a cluster of similar news stories. They come to regard any other view as disinformation or worse.

The algorithms that drive social media are basically take this and amplify it tremendously. The thing about broadcast news or newspapers is that you have to write one thing that goes to thousands or millions of people and it has to seem sort of reasonable to millions of people. The thing about social media is that you can tailor your propaganda or your bias news reporting to very precisely to what a particular individual is likely to fall for or find attractive. And that information is never seen by the larger community. There’s no real way to tell what’s going on. We now have very sophisticated algorithms. I was just reading an article on how TikTok is especially scary in this regard to really psychoanalyze people with an astonishing degree of sophistication and figure out using these artificial intelligence driven algorithms exactly what bits of information will inflame the reader to get whatever opinion it is that you want.

And so this kind of micro targeting is a whole new level of propaganda. The other thing that’s scary is that some of this is quite intentional. Some of it is being pursued by hostile foreign powers to an unknown degree. Some of it is being pursued by political campaigns that feel really compelled to use every available trick to try to win over votes from the other side. It’s all hidden and dark and you don’t know who’s paying for it or what their motives are. And it’s a big part of what’s pushing us ever further apart. And so a big part of conflict resolution or efforts to try to diffuse all of this, is figuring out how to control this kind of inflammatory media dynamic.

Zach: A small note here. Regarding social media, a lot of the attention in this area tends to focus on the ways in which social media companies try to get our attention and arouse our emotion. A lot of the focus is on product decisions, in other words. But in the previous episode of this podcast, I focus on the ways in which social media and internet communication generally may have some inherent properties that amplifier divides in bad thinking. And maybe the inherent aspects are much more the problem than are the product decisions. For example, we behave worse to each other when we’re distant from each other and the internet is a form of communication at a distance. For another example, research shows that we’re less likely to change our minds when we write down our beliefs. And the internet induces us to write down our beliefs on a wide range of topics.

So it could be making us more hardened and stubborn in our beliefs. So if that topic interests you, you might like that old episode. Okay. Back to the talk. One thing we’ve talked about it a little bit, but maybe we could focus on it a little bit more. The obstacles that, the mostly liberal conflict resolution and peace building group of people have in tackling polarization. One thing you say in the paper is one cannot bridge the left right divisions while advocating for a progressive agenda with which the conflict field is largely aligned. Our interventions cannot succeed if we also advocate for values and policies that are contributing to hyperpolarization. And maybe you could talk a little bit about how possible do you see it as that these things will be effective because as you say, to get more people to think about these things the people that will help spread these messages. It seems a pretty big obstacle that they’re suffering from, in my opinion, suffering from the same polarization and peer pressure that tends to affect polarized societies generally.

Guy Burgess: Well, there are a couple of things here. One, I think it’s important to distinguish neutral peace building roles from ad social justice advocacy. And social justice can be defined differently depending on the community one belongs to. And one of the debates we’ve had in this discussion is whether or not this peace building role is even legitimate. And we argue that you certainly need peace builders to try to find some way to get parties to diffuse all of this. The other thing that we argue for is something we call, and there’s a big section on our website focused to this, something we call constructive advocacy or constructive conflict. And there are a lot of things that the conflict resolution field insights that come out of the field about ways people hear and respond to opposing ideas, how escalation and polarization dynamics work, what leads people to misunderstand one another, how you can communicate in ways that actually do promote understanding.

So the idea is to help people understand advocacy strategies that because they’re based in a more sophisticated understanding of conflict dynamics are more likely to work and less likely to inflame opposition and drive the escalation spiral. An awful lot of the things people do as part of their advocacy efforts really wind up making things worse. It’s great fun to have a snarky reply that puts down the other side but that’s what inflames opposition. And if you approach people in a more respectful way, you can still, well, basically it’s a chance of arguing your case without provoking the kind of backlash that’s counterproductive. So there are a whole series of ideas on how to be more effective advocates but that’s a fundamentally different role than the neutral mediator peace building role. And we need both of these.

Zach: Yeah, and it feels really connected to me too, the more I have thought about it. I was reading Erica Edison’s book beyond contempt about basically how liberals can be more persuasive in the arguments and also take a depolarizing approach. And I was thinking of her book as mainly a depolarization related book but to her it would be a book about how to actually accomplish your goals more effectively. And the more I thought about it, those things are so intertwined. I mean, to me they’re basically the same. And, and it doesn’t matter which side you’re talking about, these are just ways to actually accomplish your goals more effectively. And in the process you are actually taking a depolarizing approach. And maybe that’s a good segue into this question I had.

The thing that strikes me is that it’s a very important concept that I feel is often overlooked. It seems like the more polarized we become, the more we tend to forget what the role of a democracy is. That the role of a democracy is not to achieve some paradise of whatever sort any specific person envisions. The point isn’t to create a place where everything is right as we envision it. The point is merely to resolve differences of opinions without political violence. And I think for many people, as we become more polarized, that they become increasingly intolerant of the idea of not getting their way because they perceive things in such largely good versus evil ways. I think we need to remind ourselves that what the nature of democracy is and that we will have political losses and that we will have things that happen that we think are very wrong and so will the other side. d I think, I’m curious what you think of that as far as like something to focus on. Something to keep in mind as people work on these problems. Because I think at the end of the day, we do have to face the fact that the reality that we live in a world that people can believe vastly different things than us and have their own complex reasons for believing those things and we have to keep that in mind.

Guy Burgess: Now, one of the most important ideas and well, one of the other articles in this discussion focuses on vision. And if we don’t have a sense of where we want to go, it’s going to be awfully hard to get there. And one of the things we’ve done over the years with our students is ask them to describe, offer their vision of what a peaceful society looks like. And almost always they come back with a description of what society would look like if everybody finally agreed that their side had it right and that their vision for the future prevailed and nobody disagreed with it. That’s the sort of advocate’s dream is that the other side will finally decide that they were right all along and everything will be fine. But what we really need is a vision of not how one image of social justice will prevail but an image of how to build a society in which we have diverse communities with different images of social justice and how they can coexist and tolerate one another and still able to work together on areas of common interest.

And that’s a very different image. The democratic vision is something that underlies and makes possible a diverse society. Without it, the diversity will wind up tearing itself apart. And that’s sort of what we’re looking at the moment. So that’s one way of looking at it. Another thing that we talk about is something we call pragmatic empathy or I sometimes use the phrase bridge building or not bridge building, mirror building. The idea is to see yourself as others see you. And once you do that, then you get a sense of what makes others so mad at you and willing to fight so hard. And you can then start asking questions about, well, do I really need to do those things? Or maybe if we did it this way, I wouldn’t provoke so much opposition but I’d still get the things that I really care about.

And once you make that kind of jump, then our chances of working through our problems are a whole lot better, I think. And offer one example of this that I was thinking about this morning actually, and this goes to I think the core of the left’s contribution to the problem and maybe can help people understand this a little better. But right now we have an elaborate legal structure that has emerged to protect what you might call protected classes. These are groups that liberals have progressively over the last several decades argued are being unfairly discriminated against by society whether it’s on racial grounds or gender or any of these things. That civil rights laws have been expanded to protect those groups. And that we’ve now reached the point where anything that’s seen as threatening or well, that I guess the next point is we add to this a whole set of harassment kind of rules where now embodied in title and a lot of other legislation, there are rules that if people make you feel bad for whatever your identity is, that’s actionable.

And there are all these stories of people getting fired or otherwise canceled for doing things that members of such protected groups feel infringe upon their rights. And that all seems absolutely fine and there’s lots of very good reasons behind a lot of this, but it gets to the point where it’s so pervasive that it’s inspired a huge backlash. And a way to think about this and to try to understand it for folks on the left is imagine that we had another society that was, say, predominantly ruled by traditional Christian values. And when you apply for a job, you had to write an essay that says how much you support traditional Christian views on issues like sex and morality and family structure, or that when you went to publish a book, you had your manuscript went through sensitivity readers that would review it and see if there was anything that traditional Christians found objectionable. You could tell the story for quite a while. But the truth is that there are similar institutions enforcing progressive views on these issues and that’s what makes the right mad. And had that situation been reversed, had there been conservative leaning institutions enforcing things in the same sort of way, that would’ve inspired a similar response on the left.

Zach: A note here. One very good book about the unreasonableness and badness of some of these kinds of things is titled The Tyranny of Virtue: Identity, The Academy and the Hunt for Political Heresies. That book was written by Robert Boyers, a politically liberal university professor who edit Salmagundi, a respected literary magazine. If you’re someone who doubts that these things are problems, I’d highly recommend checking out that book. At the very least, you’ll walk away with a better understanding of what it is that rational and well-meaning people can see as very big problems in this area. Back to the talk.

Guy Burgess: And what you need to do is to craft some sort of middle ground where you have a set of principles that apply equally to people regardless of their beliefs. So for instance, you can’t wear political branded clothes to work. That’s different from saying you can wear a Black Lives Matter hat but not a MAGA hat. I think that if we would recognize this kind of tension and try to find a mutually acceptable set of principles that would protect folks on both the left and the right, we’d really go a long way towards defusing our current problems. There’d still be these bad faith actors that will try to undermine something like that. I mean, there’s got to be a way to push back against that.

Zach: Yeah. It reminds me of, I was listening to a depolarization aim talk the other day that involved Erica Etelson and she had a great quote, which was something like: liberals often have a delusion that if you can prevent people from talking about something that they aren’t thinking it, or that you prevent them from thinking about it. But the more we act as if we can’t talk about certain things, the more the people that want to talk about those things will find that information elsewhere including from some extreme people if those are the only people talking about an issue. So it gets to that point of, we need to acknowledge that people do want to talk about these things, that they don’t always accept the liberal explanations of certain things or the liberal framings of things. And the more we can try to talk about that and not treat those people as outcasts, depending on the topic of course.

Guy Burgess: Now one of the lines I use is that we need a more diverse diversity. The basic principles that the left has articulated on how to make a diverse society work are by and large pretty solid. It just needs to be extended beyond the liberal coalition. You could make a similar phrase, we need a more intersectional intersectionality that extends the same sort of respect for differences outside of the liberal coalition as well as within.

Zach: Yeah. You see that a lot with liberal writing off of racial minority conservative views and such and acting like those, it tends to be those views are disrespected or treated as not legitimate views or something. Those kinds of things. Yeah. Maybe you’d like to talk about what are you working on these days. Do you want to talk about any projects that you have in store right now?

Guy Burgess: Well, the next big thing that we’re working on, and this goes back to this notion of massively parallel approaches to problem, that maybe should back up a little bit. There’s a important distinction to be made between what are called complicated systems. And this is what people are really good at. When you build tools, they’re complicated. You understand how they work, they’re blueprints. It could be an airplane, could be something really complicated, computers, the internet, but these are all things that somebody’s designed, somebody has the plans for. You get quick feedback if it doesn’t work. If it doesn’t work, you get out and you fix it and you know what it’s supposed to do. And people are very good at that sort of thing. And then there’s complex systems and complex systems evolve. They’re not designed. They’re better thought of in terms of organic metaphors, ecological metaphors that includes society where you have lots and lots of different people doing different things for different reason, interacting in a complex ecosystem in ways that push the aggregate of society in one direction or another.

Now we tend to think that the way you fix the hyperpolarization problem, as you treat it like a complicated system, you come up with a plan and a set of institutional changes, and if you do this, this, and this, then everything will be better. And it doesn’t work that way, unfortunately. What instead you have is you have this vast gigantic society and with lots of different people trying to do things that in their own way and for their own reasons, they think will make not only their lives better, but with a certain degree of altruism, the community’s lives better. So the solution to the hyperpolarization problem is not to have somebody with the great peace plan. And there are lots and lots of books out there where people say, “Okay, this is the way we fix it.” But instead what we want to do is to identify a very broad range of things that me doing to control these bad faith actors to deal with the inherent vulnerabilities of human society that make us more prone to polarization and conflict to deal with a whole set of objective problems like climate change.

And so what we imagine and this goes back to how today’s modern computing systems have gotten so unbelievably sophisticated, is that they don’t have one super smart processor. What they have is lots and lots of little processors working in massively parallel ways that do big things. So what we’re trying to first of all do is build a catalog of the broad categories of things that need doing to make democracy work. And here we try to focus on democracy, not as a set of political institutions, but the dispute handling system. And it picks up a lot of the insights of the conflict field like a dispute handling system needs to promote mutual understanding across the society. It needs to control escalation. It needs to be able to objectively analyze problems. It needs a common vision that everybody can support. It needs collaborative problem solving, all of these things.

And so what we’re doing is trying to identify things in each of these categories that could contribute to a healthier society. Then we’ve been involved in organizations like the Bridge Alliance, which is an alliance of something like 200 different organizations with something like 5 million members that are all trying to work on helping to depolarize our society in different ways and that they’re affiliated with other groups that are trying to do things in other ways and basically build a catalog of all of the different things that people are trying to do to make things better and to help people identify them, identify where the gaps are, identify, “Hey, this was a great idea, worked in Kentucky, we could do this in Colorado.” So it becomes a matchmaking kind of thing. And sometimes talk of the Google Maps approach to conflict resolution or complex conflict resolution.

And what Google does is they have a map and if you turn on the traffic layer, it highlights all of the places where the transportation system isn’t working. And it will highlight sometimes that there’s actual construction going on to fix these. But the idea in extending this is we need a map of all of the places in which the conflict system that runs our society isn’t working. And then you extend the Google Map metaphor by adding the highway idea. So the idea is that you get people to look at the big picture, find places where things aren’t going right and then adopt or take responsibility for fixing one of them. And that’s ultimately the way that we do big things. That’s the only way humans have ever done big things is you take a giant problem and you break it down into pieces, you get people to volunteer to work on those pieces, and sometimes they have to raise the money to do that and do it.

One of the, I have a slideshow on this on the website that looks at the example of open source software. Our system runs on what’s called a lamp server, Linux, Apache, MySQL and PHP. Those are all open source programming languages. And we use Drupal which is a content management system. And in Drupal it’s fascinating. You can go into the sort of back end of the system and see who volunteered to write every line of code basically in this entire incredibly sophisticated program. And you have this continuing process where people will say, “Well, this program isn’t working right here, I’m going to take responsibility for fixing that.” And they fix it and they upgrade the system and everybody gets a copy of the new upgraded thing. And that’s how the internet works. This open source stuff has a vastly larger share of the internet than the closed source proprietary stuff. And we need to do something like that with the conflict problem. So what we’re trying to do is to start to build the catalog of the things that need doing and the things that people are doing to work on all that.

Zach: Yeah, that’s great. The work I do on the podcast and then in this depolarization, book I’m working on, one of the things I emphasize is I don’t think I have answers. I’m more just somebody who wants other people to think more about these things that I’ve read about and think about. And I think to solve the problem, like you’re saying, we need to reach some critical mass of people even recognizing what the problem is and working on the problem. But I think yeah, we’re pretty far away from that because I think the challenge is that polarization just creates, naturally creates an environment where even discussing the problem of polarization is difficult. And that’s the core problem we face. And yeah, thanks a lot for your time, Guy. This has been great and I appreciate your work and thanks for taking the time to talk to me.

Guy Burgess: Well, thank you. I enjoyed the conversation and we should stay in touch and certainly the kinds of things that you’re doing are just one of the- and an important element of this massively parallel approach.

Zach: That was conflict resolution specialist Guy Burgess. You can learn more and his and Heidi’s work at BeyondIntractability.org. Their recent paper, the one that led to me wanting to interview either Guy or Heidi, was titled Applying conflict resolution insights to the hyper‐polarized, society‐wide conflicts threatening liberal democracies. And just a reminder that on their website they include discussions about their work and about their ideas, if you’d like to see some of those debates. 

In my opinion, it’s very important for everyone, liberals and conservatives, to think more about what they can do on their side to help reduce polarization, and to speak out when they see people on their side behaving in unreasonable and divisive ways. The reason for that is simple: we only can influence our own group; we can’t influence the other group. If we want to solve this problem, we have to focus more on our group, and less on the other group. And that’s something backed up by group psychology research; I recently wrote a piece laying out the arguments and research behind that; you can find it on my Medium blog, which you can find by searching for ‘zachary elwood polarization medium’. 

If you enjoyed this talk, I think you’d enjoy checking out the other past episodes I’ve done on polarization. A popular recent one was a talk with Matthew Hornsey about group psychology and persuasion. For other polarization-related talks, go to my site www.behavior-podcast.com

If you have enjoyed this podcast, please share it with your friends and family. Helping me get more listeners is the main way you can encourage me to work more on this podcast. I also appreciate you leaving me a review on Apple Podcasts. 

Thanks for listening.

 

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podcast

The art of recruiting, with Blake Mobley

A talk with Blake Mobley about the business of recruiting: matching job seekers with companies that are hiring. Blake is the co-founder and managing director of recruiting company Keeper Recruiting (keeperrecruiting.com), which specializes in biotech.

Topics discussed include: what the process of recruiting is like; how Keeper Recruiting learns pertinent details about job seekers; the metrics by which recruiting companies are judged to be successful; the different “core motivators” people can have in their lives and how that relates to recruiting; personality tests; and Blake’s earlier career in the intelligence community and how he sees that relating to his recruiting work.

Episode links:

Related resources:

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podcast

Dealing with anxiety and mental health issues as a college student

I was interviewed on Mahima Samraik‘s podcast Breaking The Facts about my struggles with anxiety and mental issues as a young man, which led to me dropping out of college in the middle of my second year of college. We talk about what that experience was like; recommendations for people dealing with similar problems; and the obstacles that can get in the way of getting help. 

Episode links:

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podcast

Understanding madness, with Richard Bentall

A talk with psychologist Richard Bentall, author of the well known book “Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature,” which is an examination of the psychological causes of the symptoms associated with psychosis, schizophrenia, mania, and other mental issues. Richard Bentall is a Professor of Clinical Psychology at the University of Sheffield.

A transcript of this talk is below. Topics we talk about include: the experiences and mental struggles that can lead to symptoms associated with psychosis and other mental illness; how theories of mental illness have changed over time; pushback and criticism of psychology-focused explanations of mental illness; aspects of madness that most of us experience at some point; the role of feelings of isolation in madness; the difference between beliefs and delusions; and my own mental struggles as a young man. 

Episode links:

Resources discussed in this episode or related to the topic:

TRANSCRIPT

Zach Elwood: Hello and welcome to the People Who Read People podcast with me, Zach Elwood. This is a podcast aimed at better understanding other people, and better understanding ourselves. You can learn more about it at behavior-podcast.com.

On this episode I interview the psychologist Richard Bentall about mental illness, psychosis, and so-called schizophrenia. Bentall is probably most well known for his 2004 book Madness Explained, which is a fantastic book that I highly recommend. It won the British Psychological Society Book Award, and is widely regarded as a groundbreaking work in the world of psychology. When it comes to psychology, for me personally, it’s up there as one of the most important books ever written, alongside Irvin Yalom’s Existential Psychotherapy.

In that book, and in his work in general, Bentall attempts to show how various symptoms of so-called madness are understandable human responses to various forms of stress and anxiety and trauma. In other words, he focuses on the psychological causes of madness, the factors related to the workings of our minds, as opposed to potential biological causes.

In this episode, we talk about how theories about the causes of mental illness have changed over time; we talk about pushback and criticisms to psychology-focused theories of madness; we talk about how it is that mental stresses can result in madness; and we talk about how we might distinguish strange but fairly common beliefs from delusions.

Along the way, I also talk about my own mental struggles as a young man; If you’re interested to hear more about that, I recommend a previous episode where I talked to Nathan Filer about psychosis and schizophrenia. And if you’re interested in mental health topics in general, you might also like a talk I had with Scott Stossel about understanding and dealing with anxiety. I also have a talk about existential psychology and therapy with the psychologist Kirk Schneider.

A little more about Richard Bentall: he’s a Professor of Clinical Psychology at the University of Sheffield. In 1989 he received the British Psychological Society’s May Davidson Award for his contribution to the field of Clinical Psychology. He’s written several books, including “Doctoring the Mind: Is Our Current Treatment of Mental Illness Really Any Good?”, and one titled “Think You’re Crazy? Think Again: A Resource Book for Cognitive Therapy for Psychosis.” A 2021 Guardian article about Bentall was titled “Richard Bentall: the man who lost his brother – then revolutionized psychology”, and it’s a good read if you’d like to quickly learn more about his work and life story.

Okay, here’s the talk with Richard Bentall.

Hi Richard, thanks for coming on.

Richard Bentall: Hi. It’s good to be here.

Zach: So, maybe we can start with the idea that symptoms of so-called madness; the idea that those symptoms can be explained by psychological processes is seen by some people as controversial. And I know that when you first started writing about these kinds of ideas which I think was back in the ’80s you started some of this work, those ideas were more controversial than they are now. Maybe you could give an overview of how the mental health field as a whole has their views of such ideas has changed over time and some of those ideas have become more accepted.

Richard Bentall: Yeah. Okay. That’s actually quite a big topic but I’ll try and deal with the highlights, really.

Zach: Yeah, that’s a big one.

Richard Bentall: So throughout most of the history of psychiatry, research into mental illness is focused on diagnostic categories. So, people have been divided into different groups of patients according to whether they have a diagnosis of schizophrenia, a major depression, or whatever. And that seems superficially quite a sensible thing to do, it’s an idea which goes back at least to the work of Kraepelin in the latter half of the 19th century. So for most research studies, for example, people are divided. You find that there’s a target group of patients who have particular diagnosis, say schizophrenia, versus healthy people who don’t have a diagnosis, and also sometimes a control psychiatric diagnosis. So you might have three groups; you might have schizophrenia patients, depressed patients and controls, and the hope is to find out something about schizophrenia. Of course that’s built on the assumption that the people who have the diagnosis of schizophrenia all have something in common, which makes them different than people in the comparison groups.

And quite early on in my career, it came to me. It wasn’t a particularly original idea, I don’t think. I can think of other people who said things to me which made me think along these lines but it came to me that schizophrenia in particular wasn’t a coherent entity where that assumption could be upheld. In fact when you looked at people who had diagnosis of schizophrenia, they had a wide range of different types of symptoms. And therefore it wasn’t really all that surprising that almost every variable known to influence human behavior at some time or other had been held out as a potential causal factor in schizophrenia, but for none of them it did it seem that the evidence was particularly consistent. That’s exactly what you get if you compared people who according to diagnoses, which were actually masking a great deal of heterogeneity within the diagnosis. So I wondered what you could do about that and the thought came to me that maybe if we couldn’t decide on what the core features of schizophrenia were, we could certainly agree on who, for example, had auditory hallucinations and who had paranoid beliefs. So I started to do research in the mid 1980s which was targeting people just based on those particular symptoms. Initially I started looking at people who were experiencing hearing voices. I was a bit influenced by my PhD which I’d actually done before my clinical training, and which was nothing to do with schizophrenia but it was actually about various aspects of child development, but was very influenced by the ideas of a Russian psychologist called Vygotsky who was interested in the way that children learn to think in words, a process which culminates in what you call inner speech– we all have this inner dialogue in our head. And it occurred to me that, whoa, whatever’s going on in auditory hallucinations is got to be something which is related to that process. And that led me fairly quickly to the idea that when people hear voices, what they’re actually hearing is their own inner speech or inner voice which they are somehow failing to recognize as belonging to themselves. 

So while I was still in clinical training, I carried out my first study of hallucinations to test that hypothesis and actually I generated a result which has been replicated many times since. I think it’s probably my most replicated study, although the way I carried it out back in the day involved some very crude technology compared to the techniques which we have available today. But anyway, from there I went on to think about, well, what could lead people to have paranoid beliefs and so on? And that whole kind of approach became this idea of trying to develop a separate understanding for each of the different symptoms. And the idea is that once you’ve explained each of the symptoms, there’s no schizophrenia left to explain. Once you explain why people hear voices, why they have delusions, why they have what we call thought disorder which is actually a sort of speech disorder, why they have the so-called negative symptoms which is the ones which are associated with loss of motivation and loss of feeling… Once you explained those with separate theories for each of them, there’s no schizophrenia left to account for. And you’re right, it was a fairly controversial idea early in the day. People, I think, varied in terms of the way they responded to it. A lot of the psychiatrists I actually worked with at the time, because I was involved in face-to-face clinical work at the time, I think they thought I was kind of nice but useless– like somebody who had wacky ideas but they didn’t see me as certainly not harmful to put it like that. Whereas some people in the psychiatric establishment, senior people who got very annoyed about the suggestion that schizophrenia wasn’t a coherent entity and they got quite hostile, I would say at times. But as time rolled on more and more psychologists and physicians started to focus on symptoms. I wasn’t the only person I’m sure who kicked off this movement, other people at roughly the same time had also begun to look at individual symptoms. And we’re now in a position where research on symptoms is very well established. It’s a huge industry, in fact. In fact I find it almost impossible to keep up with it.

There’s a lot of research on particularly hearing voices, hallucinations, and there’s a lot of research on paranoid delusions, less research on some of the other symptoms, but it’s still there. So it has become quite widely accepted. And when I first started in that area, my methods were psychological ones because I was a psychologist obviously. But the borderlines between psychology and biology have dissolved in those three decades largely, mainly due to the invention of advanced neuro imaging techniques particularly MRI. Which means that psychologists can now carry out psychological tests on people and at the same time see what’s happening in the brain while people deal with those tests. So you can see using a technique, functional magnetic resonance imaging which I’m sure you’ve heard of. You can see which parts of the brain are active when a patient tries to solve a particular type of problem, for example, and then you can compare the brain activity in patients to other people. But again, you can do that kind of research focusing specifically on symptoms. And so I don’t think it’s controversial anymore to do research on symptoms. It’s still to some extent controversial, the idea that schizophrenia isn’t over meaningful a concept in the way it’s been traditionally used. But even that has become much less controversial in the sense that there are prominent people in main stream psychiatry who would argue that certainly the diagnostic system is not fit for purpose and that the concept of schizophrenia in particular is problematic. And that’s led in the last 10 years to a number of efforts to try and think of ways of developing better ways of classifying patients. 

So, just an important point to add here and then I’ll stop for your next question. The important point to add is that there are some people who don’t like the idea of classifying patients at all. They think that somehow it’s dehumanizing, objectifying, and that each patient is unique. Of course it’s true that in many ways each patient is unique, but in order to make progress scientifically and also in order to have some pragmatic ways of estimating for example how many people are likely to need psychiatric treatment at any particular time in history, which is an important issue for public health people, or in order to find out for example which drugs are going to be most effective for which people, you do need to have some way of putting patients into groups to find groups which are meaningful. 

So I think where we are now is that people accept there’s a very widespread acceptance that, for example, the Diagnostic and Statistical manual of the American Psychiatric Association, the only positive thing to be said about it is that it’s pragmatic and easy to use, but nobody really believes that the categories in the DSM correspond to how nature is.

And there’s quite a lot of search going on for alternatives. There’s some big research programs trying to develop alternative ways of thinking about those of classifying psychiatric conditions.

Zach: So it seems like some of the initial pushback in the– a few decades ago anyway some of that pushback about thinking about the psychological aspects of psychosis and schizophrenia might be seen to be due to some of the more irresponsible psychological theories that happened before that, like the idea of the schizophrenic mother. So I’m curious, do you see that as at least accounting for some of the reason why people didn’t want to delve into some of the psychological aspects of it?

Richard Bentall: Yeah, so it certainly, I think that’s true that if you look at some of the theories you should propose in the 1960s, which tended to put, I think where blame is actually, right. In fact, they tend to locate the blame for the problems of young adults on squarely on parents who were sometimes described in ways which make them almost seem like monsters, the refrigerator mother, for example. So when psychiatry took a biological turn in the 1980s, one of the reasons for that industry was that people thought that somehow that biological theories were less stigmatizing. Actually, they thought that somehow, that if you said that somebody who had schizophrenia had a brain disease, you were saying it was neither their fault nor the fault of anybody in their family.

And a lot of what was at the time called mental health literacy campaigns were based around that idea. And people used phrases like it’s a disease like any other or sometimes you’d hear people say, in fact, you see clinicians saying to patients, you’ve got something a bit like diabetes. It’s a chemical imbalance, I’m afraid like a diabetic person, you’re going to have to take your drugs for the rest of your life. But that’s what’s happened. And actually the situation around that is actually quite complex and nuanced. So what’s emerged is that a lot of evidence emerged that family relationships do affect the development of mental illness in offspring in children who later go on in adulthood to develop psychosis. I don’t think there’s any doubt about that now, and I’m always very careful, however, about how I talk about it, because in my entire clinical career, and I should just say as a caveat that I’ve not been doing face to face clinical work for about 10 years, but I did quite a lot over the years. In my entire career, I don’t think I ever met the parents of a psychotic patient who was a monster.

Actually, they seemed to be very distressed people whose hearts were broken very often by seeing their sons and daughters undergo these profound difficulties, which were, that you could see the grief sometimes in parents, as they could see. Every parent wants their children to have a bright, wonderful, happy future. And to have that stolen, as it seems, by this whatever it was, nobody really understood it. Schizophrenia, it was breaking their hearts. Sometimes it was leading them to do things which actually made things worse. So, this is where we come to the idea of expressed emotion. So, here’s quite a lot of research which shows it’s probably one of the most well demonstrated things in psychiatry. The way that a parent reacts to a child’s emerging mental illness can affect the course of that illness as it goes on.

Particularly if the parent is hypercritical or over controlling, then that tends to mean that the mental illness will persist and will be much less likely to resolve. The thing about that though, is that if you think about those two characteristics of the parents being critical and over controlling, I mean, which parent, in all honesty can say they’ve never done that. I’ve got two kids and two step kids, and I know that I’ve failed to meet my own standards of parenthood on quite a few occasions to be fair to myself, when driven to distraction by teenage behavior. So everybody does those things to some extent. And the other thing about them is that, of course, people sometimes do them more when they see their children in trouble. If you see a child who’s constantly somehow making bad decisions or it looks like they’re making bad decisions, the temptations become highly critical.

Or if you feel guilty about the fact that they’re developing psychological problems and you think, “Oh my God, what have I done to cause this?” Then of course you’ll be over controlling and overprotective. So parental behavior does have an influence on the emerging mental health symptoms of children. There’s absolutely no doubt about that. But often it’s not always because parents do bad things. Sometimes they do bad things for sure, but it’s always for that reason. Sometimes it’s parents trying to do their level best in a way which is actually making things worse.

Zach: These things are just so complex. And I think, there’s often this tendency to look for these simple narratives of good and bad, but it’s like narcissism too. We all have narcissism, we’re all narcissistic in a sense, and we sometimes, even the best of us can behave in narcissistic ways in certain situations, and these certain complex things unfold. And I think that’s what to remember about, that becomes a destigmatizing thing about this, thinking about the psychological aspects, it’s like these are such complex processes and systems and people’s minds can go down rabbit holes. I think of my own experiences where it involved smoking a lot of marijuana when I was in college and leading to me having my mental issues and dropping out of college. And that’s just one factor. And I think when people tend to look for these simplistic narratives about things.

Richard Bentall: Yeah. So I mean, what the research tells us is all these different things interact. So marijuana’s the kind of interesting one. Lots of social circumstances which push young people to take marijuana, and actually most young people try it to some degree, but for some people we know, I think we’re pretty certain high degree of certainty but it’s very bad for them. It produces psychotic reactions. But there are all sorts of social circumstances which will tend to make somebody more likely to take marijuana. And if they do take marijuana, to take it frequently and to use for self me medication. And those might include biological factors, of course, it could be that there’s some genetic, I don’t know, any research you suggest it, but it wouldn’t surprise me that some people are got more for whatever reasons, might have a genetic tendency to put themselves in that situation, if I can put it like that. We don’t know but it wouldn’t strike me as weird if it turned out that that was the case.

Zach: A small note here, if you’re someone who hasn’t heard about the link between marijuana and mental issues and thinks that might be an exaggerated connection, I’d invite you to read up on that connection. There’s a lot of research and writing on it. For what it’s worth, I actually still smoke marijuana occasionally, so I’m definitely not anti-marijuana. But for me personally, I believe it was an amplifying factor in my mental breakdown as a young man in the same way that it seems to be a contributing factor in many case studies you can read. I think I was predisposed to some bad outcomes due to me already being a very anxious young person who had previously suffered panic attacks in high school and such. And in my case, I think it was less about trying to self-medicate than it was about me wanting to feel cool and fit in despite being very unhappy and anxious.

And also, I think some young people can be quite fragile because they haven’t developed a strong sense of self and models of the world to think about marijuana as that it can really amplify our visceral sensation of things in the same way that marijuana can make listening to music or watching a movie more viscerally exciting and captivating. It can also lend a visceral realness to our random trains of thought, including our dark and disturbing and depressing trains of thought. So I just want to clarify that point about marijuana a little bit. As I’ve often seen people express skepticism about marijuana’s role in mental illness, there’s a lot to talk about there. 

Okay. Back to the talk.

Zach: So for me, the idea that there are psychological causes for madness is pretty easy to understand, because I went through some pretty painful mental experiences when I was young in college. It involved me feeling like I was on the verge of madness. I dropped out of college mid-year due to no longer being able to function. So I can relate to much of the things you write about in Madness Explained in a pretty visceral way, because it’s easy for me to remember how easy it is to become distanced from reality, especially when one is socially isolated and suffering. But I think for a lot of people that’s hard to understand just due to most of us taking our so-called normal minds for granted. So when we’re feeling good and feeling like so-called normal people, we have all sorts of healthy narratives going on in the background, like “I’m an independent agent interacting with other independent entities, and I’m able to enjoy these interactions I have with these other people. I have various goals that I can work towards that will increase my happiness.” These kinds of things.

And I think we tend to take for granted those kinds of really complex forms of narratives and modeling and modeling of self and modeling of other people. And as someone who went through basically what seems to me like, it was almost like a stripping away of all those social narratives and so-called normal narratives, and just being left with this real existential terror and shock at the weirdness of life. So I can see the things you write about in your book; I can relate to them and see how there are all these layers of meaning and narratives that make someone normal to other people and seeing those layers of meaning and narratives as just tremendously complex. And I’m curious if you see one of the challenges we face in trying to understand psychosis and madness is just that there are these things that we take for granted about normal life that are much more complex than they seem to be.

Richard Bentall: Yeah. So, I mean, I can’t remember who said it, but somebody said the thing about Freud was that he recognized that nearly everybody’s mad and they’re more aware of another; that’s a bastardization of Freud, I guess. But my point is that actually I think you make a very important point, which is that normal mental life is pretty weird and we underestimate its weirdness a lot of the time. And that comes out in all sorts of different ways. So one of the things for which it comes out with is that people who are going through a psychotic episode, they often feel very alone. They feel alone because they think they’re completely different than everybody else. And they think that nobody else will understand how they’re feeling, and they find it very difficult to express how they’re feeling or what they’re experiencing.

And that’s a terrifying situation to be in. You feel that your own mind is slipping away, but you are alone. Nobody can possibly help you because nobody can understand. But actually, if we look at epidemiological evidence, one of the things we find is that first of all, that these experiences are much more common than people used to think. So for example, it’s been estimated that, I mean, it’s crudely that roughly about 10% of the population at some point in their lives experiences hearing voices in somewhere some way or another. And actually there are quite a few people who had that experience who are living perfectly normal lives perfectly successful lives in the population without receiving or seeking psychiatric health. That was a great insight of Dutch psychiatrists, Marius Romme and I’m sure you’ve heard of. But Romme even went as far as to the MEA formed a club for a society for people hear voices, which was initially called resonance in Holland, and which supported the international hearing voices movement which has been a great force for good, I think, and maybe I can relate an anecdote, which I actually mentioned in my book about that movement because Marius invited me to give a talk to a conference of people who hear voices.

And this is back in the 1990s, and this seemed to be like a pretty strange thing to be doing because I was used to talking to mental health professionals, but not talking to a conference for people who hear voices. So I was a bit anxious about how it was going to go. And as just before I walked into the lecture theater, Marius said to me probably one of the most important things which anybody’s ever said to me, which was he said, “Richard, I really like your research on hallucinations, but the trouble is you do want to cure people who hear voices, don’t you? I want to liberate them. I think they’re like homosexuals in the 1950s. They need liberating, not curing.” And that’s a very powerful thought, I think. But going back to the weirdness of ordinary life issue, it’s certainly true that a lot more people hear voices than most people imagine.

But it’s also true that there are lots of, if we look at beliefs, for example, strange beliefs that there are a lot of people have straight beliefs as well. Now that sometimes it’s quite difficult to tell the difference between what’s a delusional belief and which is how a psychiatrist would define this abnormal belief that the person with psychosis might have. It’s difficult to tell the difference between what’s a delusional belief and what’s a non delusional belief, particularly in an era when there’s, for example, a lot of conspiracy theories going around on the internet. So this has become, that particular question is a preoccupation of mine. And I’ve began to do research specifically comparing the beliefs of the so-called delusional beliefs of psychiatric patients with, for example, very strongly held political beliefs or religious beliefs. One problem in that area, in terms of the way that other people approached it in the past is that people just take mundane beliefs for granted. So, for example, there’s a whole program of research on delusions about the phenomenology of delusions. Phenomenology is basically the experience of having these types of beliefs. Yeah. And phenomenologically inspired researchers spend a lot of time interrogating small numbers of patients about their experiences related to say their paranoid beliefs. And the bottom line is that what they usually end up saying is, behind these beliefs, there is some altered sense of self in the world. So it said, for example, that people who that paranoia is often preceded by a period, which in German is described as [foreign speech], which is this sort of sense that there is something in the offing, something’s about to happen, there’s something not quite right. And that precedes the onset of the paranoid delusion. But actually, if you look at narratives of people who’ve had religious conversion experiences, you find very much the same thing. But that’s been ignored by researchers because they’ve just taken mundane beliefs for granted. Actually a lot of stuff which goes on in the so-called healthy minds, it’s pretty weird.

Zach: Yeah. And the thing I was trying to get at, which I might not have explained, well, it’s something I often think about when I was trying to make sense of my own mental struggles as a young man, the thing I return to often is the idea that there’s just so much bandwidth and complex modeling processing power that’s required to be a so-called normal person. You have to have these models of other people. You have to have this model of your own self. You have to have this model for how yourself is perceived by the others around you. You have to keep all the social rules that dictate what is acceptable normal behavior in mind when you interact with others. And it just seems to me like such a large amount of bandwidth and processing.

And then when you’re in the world of other people if you start to feel bad, you start to feel anxious, depressed, you can start to have all these balls that we usually juggle interacting with other people or thinking about ourselves as social creatures. It becomes harder to keep all those balls in the air. And so you have this cascading effect where our narratives about ourself and our place in the world become more strange and less functional, less realistic, and we can start to have these weird ideas just based on this cascading effect of us not being able to keep all these ideas of others and self in mind at the same time. And I’m curious if is that something, as someone who’s an amateur, I don’t really have a sense of if that makes sense or if people have talked about that in the mental health literature.

Richard Bentall: Yeah. So there’s quite a big American particularly psychological literature on intentional limitations and their role in psychosis. It’s certainly true that people who suffer from psychotic disorders do have reduced attention span. In fact, Kraepelin recognized that in the 1890s. So in his accounts, his descriptions of people with what he called dementia praecox, what was later renamed as schizophrenia. And it’s certainly true that in ordinary everyday life, we have to juggle all these things as you’ve described. So I’m trying to think of somebody who’s formulated it in quite the same way as you have and I’m not quite sort of, nothing’s coming to mind immediately, but what you’ve described doesn’t sound to me particularly implausible actually as an account that if you imagine that if your capacity or working memory capacity, your intentional capacity is impaired, then ordinary everyday situations are going to be much more problematic and stressful.

And I suppose one of the things related to that is that a lot of the social psychological processes which underlie everyday social life are normally automatic. So a good example would be what developmental psychologists misleadingly call theory of mind. Theory of mind is the ability to understand or be able to guess what other people are thinking. It’s called theory of mind because a better term will be mentalizing, actually, because it’s an ability, it’s called theory of mind because the concept was first brought to attention by celebrated paper by David Premack about chimpanzees actually won’t, the title of paper was, does a chimpanzee have a theory of Mind? So we know that certain people find mentalizing or understanding other people’s mental states much more difficult than others, notably people with autistic disorders. And indeed there are some people who argue that that is the central problem in autism, although that’s disputed about whether that is the case. And it’s certainly true, and I’ve done studies myself going back a while now, it showed that when people are acutely ill, that their theory of mind skills, their ability to think about other people’s mental states are impaired. So there is certainly some evidence which fits with our idea, which is, if our processing capacity is handicapped in some way, then it’s going to make social situations much more tricky and actually more frightening.

Zach: The thing that strikes me there is when I was going through my mental struggles, I had this very visceral feeling. When I felt like I was losing my mind, I felt like I was a million miles away from basically other people. I felt like I was almost on like metaphorically another planet and it was losing these, it strikes me that losing these narratives about if we feel that we’re so isolated in our own minds and we, we basically are going into our own minds then we lose these narratives about it even being important to pay attention to the things that other people think are important. So I’m reminded of you open madness explain with your work with the mentally ill women at the mental hospital who you were trying to walk them through these attention paying exercises. But it’s like if they don’t even have the narrative that such things are important, they’re not going to. Their lack of paying attention.

Richard Bentall: What you’re referring to is my first ever work with people with psychosis when I was still a student and was, what can I say? I’m quite embarrassed about it, really in some ways compared to,

Zach: But you were young.

Richard Bentall: Certainly in terms of my understanding of psychosis at the time was very minimal, but so was everybody else’s, I think. Yeah. Now we just had this idea we could actually teach people to improve their attentional skills by getting them to, actually, the ideas came from, it’s linked to this in the speech idea. The idea was that if you get people to talk to themselves while they’re doing whatever they’re doing but to literally instruct themselves, it will focus our attention. We got a change in people’s performance on simple IQ type tests but I’m sure that improvement lasted for about five minutes.

Zach: Yeah. I think it gets back to that idea of the kinds of tests, it’s like the early testing of mentally ill people, having them try to recite things. It’s like, well, if their narratives are not in their world that they’re living in, such things do not matter at all. Whereas we’re in the world of living with other people, and so we care what others think where they’re just not in that frame of reference of the normal test. Just there’s only so much you can learn if their narratives are not matching ours.

Richard Bentall: So I guess one thing which is just reacting to what you’re saying is that actually that this ties in with something which I’m preoccupied with at the moment. I was mentioning earlier on that I’m interested in what makes a belief a delusion as opposed to, for example, if you take something like QAnon, like expressive theory which is associated with the MAGA movement in the United States. I mean, on the surface it seems just as crazy. So I can use that termas anything which you’ll see in the psychiatric hospital. I mean, some of these people believe that there is some vast conspiracy led by the Democrats to sexually abused children worldwide and even drain hormones for their bodies. So I’d say it’s pretty crazy. And yet it’s not usually considered to be a delusion.

One of the things which makes delusions different than other types of beliefs is that they’re generally not shared. So delusion there’s only only one person who believes in delusion, a particular patient. Whereas things like QAnon, they’re shared by lots of different people. And that points to something which is quite important about belief formation in general life, which is most of us get our beliefs in interaction with other people. So belief formation is a social process. You discuss what you think with other people, you negotiate a shared understanding of what’s really going on and beliefs get passed from one person to another. There’s some people like that process to the process of viral infection, but none of that seems to be happening in the case of delusions. And I’ve come to think that in a way psychologists have missed the point a bit about delusions because what we’ve done is we’ve spent the last 20 or 30 years trying to look at reasoning in people with, say, paranoid beliefs.

And there’s not a huge amount of literature which seems to show, well, if you test people on this psychological task, they seem to be reasoning a little bit different than everybody else. It’s usually nothing particularly dramatic. And I think I might be missing the point, it’s more to do with the way that police are constructed in collaboration with other people, which is seems to be the problem in delusions. And that to me would say that even though I think that say QAnon is a pretty crazy theory, I wouldn’t really say it’s a delusional theory in a way, the fact that it’s shared, it’s a narrative developed by lots of people interacting with each other is makes it precisely not a delusional belief. Doesn’t mean it’s a correct belief, by the way.

Zach: Yeah. I think the I mean, and then as society’s become more polarized and more angry, it becomes easier to have these high animosity, strange beliefs that are paranoid about the other side doing things. That those things become more common. So I definitely, I believe you’re working on a book now about those topics and I can see the map over for all of it. And one thing that strikes me too, I mean, one of the takeaways from my own mental struggles was being very skeptical when I thought that I’m now very skeptical when I think I have some sort of truth that other people don’t have which is one of the things that was one of the things that led me down a dark path was thinking like, oh and some of it had aspects of positive things too or feeling positive where I thought I was reaching some form of enlightenment, I was reading books about Buddhist schools of thought and so at the same time as I was becoming distanced in a socially painful way, I was also having these periods of feeling like I was a genius and things like that.

So I think it maps over to some of the experiences so-called normal people can have, where we feel that we’ve reached these realizations about narratives that explain the world or explain our place in it and it’s good to be skeptical of those things because reality is largely defined by our interactions with other people so-called reality. So there can be negative sides to delving off into these other worlds, whether it’s like QAnon or what other unusual or unlikely worldviews. Would you agree that a big part of mental illness and mental struggles maybe in general is when we go off in our own heads a bit and reach these narratives that are not agreed on by other people? Would you largely say that’s it?

Richard Bentall: Yeah, no, that’s in a sense my point really, I suppose that’s normally the narratives, we have to use your terminology, they’re constrained by our social relations. They’re checked by other people formally or informally. Your friend says, “Nah, I don’t think that’s what’s going on.” Or they say”Have you thought about this? That might be.” So on. Those kind of things. And in a coalition, you develop your beliefs in a coalition. But if you’re isolated, if you’re frightened of other people, which of course will increase your isolation, then you can’t form as coalitions. So the whatever’s going on in your head is unconstrained. It isn’t limited, it isn’t moderated by anybody else. We all have, I think, pretty crazy ideas which go through our heads. I know I do, every so often, but what most of us can do is either it gets dismissed for us by somebody else who we discuss it with, or we dismiss it ourselves because we go, no, I think that’s a crazy idea.

I’ll give you an example. I use this example when I’m talking to students. It always creates a bit of amusement, an almost everyday occurrence if you are a academic researcher which is a good model of paranoia. So if you’re researcher, what happens is you write a scientific paper and it takes you ages to do it. You finesse it as well as you can. You stick it in the poor submission portal as it is these days. We used to post them back in the old days. But you put it in the submission portal of whatever journal you are hoping will accept it. And usually you will start out by aiming high, you’ll find some journal, we’ll think of some journal which has got a really high, what we call citation impact, which is otherwise it’s read by a lot of people but they’re difficult to get into because they’ve got a vast number of people sending papers done.

So I send it there, and then you wait and you wait and you wait and weeks go by. And then finally you get this email back and the email says something like, “Dear Professor Bentall, thank you for submitting your paper on paranoia in UK academic staff to the journal of very excellent psychopathology research. At this journal, we have considered your submission very carefully and asked free expert reviewers to review it. The reviewers all identify strengths in your work.” And you’re reading this thing and you’re going, no, come on, come on. What’s the bottom line? And then you get after a while. So sometimes it goes, “But unfortunately, some important weaknesses were also identified, which are,” And then they go, “We can only accept 5% of papers, which is submitted to our journal. So unfortunately we must decline your submission.”

And what’s the first thing which happens to an academic in that situation? Well, I’m pretty sure I’m not alone in feeling pretty paranoid. So what happens is, very often you go kind like, “Who else is working in this area? Who are those three referees? Let me look what they’ve read. Oh, those bastards.” And you get very angry. You could easily develop a paranoid worldview that all the other scientists are against it and so on. And so actually some people do develop that paranoid worldview, but most of us, what happens is we get very upset and then we go and have a cup of tea in Britain, a cup of tea, I don’t know what it would be in North America, probably coffee. But you go and you sit back and you relax a bit and you think, that journal is a pretty hard journal to get into.

Also, what the referees said wasn’t completely wrong. There were some things I could do to improve the research or maybe the way I reported it and so on. And you slowly taught yourself round to thinking, now this is just what happens. It’s just one of those things I need to see if I can learn from the referees reports to improve the paper, but I’ll send it to another journal and get in somewhere. So you talk yourself out of your paranoid episode. And whenever I talk about this to, use that example with either students or in academic conferences, there’s always smiles around the room because everybody recognizes that feeling, the feeling of paranoia when you have a paper rejected. The problem with, I think people are very isolated or with that cognition is compromised for whatever reason, maybe because they’re emotionally distressed and their working memories is limited or whatever, but it’s much more difficult to talk yourself out of a strange belief like that. So, whereas your average university professor can go, hold it, I’m being a bit paranoid. No, I’d be a bit more realistic about this. I need to calm down. I have my cup of tea. Maybe it’s simply the case that a lot of people with psychosis can’t do that.

Zach: Do you want to talk a little bit about what you’re working on right now with your book?

Richard Bentall: I’m still involved in clinical trials and the one thing we haven’t talked about is the role of trauma in psychosis. So one of the things which has emerged in the last 10, 15 years, I think, is that very often people with psychosis have some significant social trauma in the past. Going back to what I said about parents, of course it’s very important to recognize it’s not always the parents who are responsible for those traumas, but it appears that we’ve now got quite a lot of evidence that that traumatic factors are one of the causal factors in what type of causal factor in psychosis, for sure. So I’m involved in clinical trials to develop treatments which are targeting particularly trauma related mechanisms. But apart from that, yeah, no, I’m writing a book. It’s been going on. I’m not going to say how long I’ve been writing it for because it’s too embarrassing.

But a long time ago I came to the conclusion that I didn’t really understand what a delusion was. I’d been doing research on delusions for 20 years. I thought I’d discovered some vaguely useful things, but I thought that the whole area was a bit stuck. That we’re doing, seeing a lot of studies come out where people are doing the same old thing more or less or another with slight variations. And it suddenly struck me that part of the problem was we didn’t really know what a belief is. Which seems a bit strange because beliefs are central concept in all of the social sciences. Arguably you could say that it’s a focus on belief, which is what distinguishes the social from the natural sciences. Sociologists talk about beliefs, anthropologists talk about beliefs, historians talk about beliefs. Psychologists talk about beliefs, but there’s no coherent understanding of what beliefs are.

And it seemed to me that if we could have a better understanding of how beliefs are generated and what they are involved in general, that would inform our understanding delusions. So I’ve been involved in this task of, I basically managed to get a contract quite from a very well known public, well from Penguin, where I said I don’t know what a delusion is, but if you give me a contract, I’ll write a book. And by the time I finished writing the book, I’ll know. And amazingly they did because they were very happy with previous books I published and I had no idea how difficult that task would turn out to be. So I’m currently writing quite a, I’m just polishing off a lot of sections and about political beliefs, for example, and it turns out there’s a lot we can learn about belief systems in general by looking at political beliefs.

And those have some applications to thinking about the beliefs of psychiatric patients. The problem with it’s endlessly fascinating so I found myself today trying to improve a section I’d already written about the left right spectrum where fascist ideology fitted into it and I could end up.

Zach: Going deep.

Richard Bentall: Could end up going down a day. That’s a rabbit hole which I could have disappeared in for three weeks so I won’t. I written a huge long section about Ezra Pound, the American modernist poet who, I don’t know if you’ve heard about the story of Ezra Pound but.

Zach: Not sure.

Richard Bentall: Ezra Pound, put it briefly Ezra Pound modernist poet, fascist and psychotic question mark, because he was somebody who had quite appalling political views really. He was a sport of fascism. He was viral anti semite. He was an American citizen who did radio broadcast on behalf of the Italian government during the Second World War. And at the end of the second World War was arrested by the FBI and indicted for treason, potentially faced the death penalty, at which point it was decided that he was psychotic and he spent the next 12 years in the psychiatric hospital. Looking into the life of Ezra Pound, it really is difficult to, it’s a fantastic story about how difficult it’s to tell what is just an awful political belief or what is a delusion. Just say, I’m finding it’s enormously enjoyable, but I’m spending far much, it’s taking far too long.

Zach: Quick question, if you do have time for them. One thing I’ve been curious about is in mental illness, do you write about at all the idea that sometimes when someone’s not feeling well, they can have a hard time telling a belief from a passing thought? And so like a passing thought can in the way that we shrug it off and say, that was a weird passing thought we had. They might dwell on it and start to think that was it.

Richard Bentall: Yeah. So that is one of the things I haven’t actually written anything about that in the book yet, but I will be covering that. But some interesting ideas from psychotherapists around that, actually, I don’t know if you’ve heard of acceptance and commitment theory?

Zach: No.

Richard Bentall: Therapy, sorry. It’s sort of brand of CBT. I mean, therapists are always trying to invent new brands of therapy which I’m not sure is always a good thing. But anyway, but there’s some interesting ideas in ACT particularly ACT therapists put a lot of emphasis on the idea that people find it very difficult to distinguish their thoughts from themselves. So you have, all of us got these thoughts going through our heads of feelings and so on, and we can become so preoccupied with them that we think they’re reality basically.

And so what ACT therapists try and do is do, one of the things they do is they try and help people to see, to distance from her thoughts with the idea that once they’ve done that, then they can actually pursue aspects of a life which are actually more important and more valuable to them. So, an ACT therapist use a lot of metaphors. So, and I did do a little bit of ACT therapy before I stopped seeing patients. It was a very new psychotherapy then but I found it quite powerful actually. So one of the metaphors will be to ask, say to the patient, well imagine your mind is a chess board and there’s black squares and white squares. But unlike a traditional chess board, it goes on forever. It stretches forever in each direction.

And there are black pieces and white pieces trying to clubber each other. The bad thoughts and the good thoughts trying to clubber each other. Unfortunately if although the white thoughts, the white pieces can win for a while, they’ll always be some more black pieces. And then the therapist says, so where do you think you are in this picture? And I can remember a patient saying to me, well, oh, I think I’m a little gray piece somewhere in the middle. And the answer is no, you’re not. You’re the chess board. The board. And that’s the point that the thoughts are not you you’re just the space where they happen.

Zach: You wrote about this related to your, something you mentioned in madness explaining which was the studies that showed that people that were more intolerant or that the strange actions of their mind bothered them more, were more likely to have issues. Getting used to the idea that our mind can do strange things and that’s not necessarily a bad thing. And that’s even normal.

Richard Bentall: Yeah. So, there’s a whole psychological literature on what’s called metacognitive beliefs, which is your beliefs about your beliefs. And if you have a set of standards for your own mind, if I can put it that way, which your own mind can’t meet, then you’re going to become highly distressed. You’re going to think you’re weird, that you’re different than everybody else and your mind is completely out of control but if you accept that your mind just makes mistakes, does weird things every so often, then that pathway doesn’t have to be followed if it speaks to me.

Zach Elwood: That was the psychologist Richard Bentall, author of Madness Explained and many other respected books on psychology. If you want to know more about him, you can check out the entry for this episode on my site behavior-podcast.com. I’ll put some links to his work there, and some other resources related to things we talked about. 

This has been the People Who Read People podcast with me, Zach Elwood. If you like this podcast, please do me a favor and recommend it to your friends and family. Helping me gain listeners is the best way you can encourage me to work more on this podcast. 

And just a reminder that I have several previous episodes that deal with mental illness and mental health. 

Thanks for listening. 

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podcast

Reading tells in football, with Larry Hart

A talk with Larry Hart (Twitter: @coachlarryhart), a football coach at the University of Houston, and the author of the book The Recruit’s Playbook.

Topics discussed include: common behavioral patterns (tells) in American football that are used to get an edge on opponents and teams; reading signals that opponent coaches give to players; the importance of reviewing game tape; some red flags in the recruiting process; the mental stresses of being a professional athlete; and more.

Episode links:

Resources discussed in this episode or related to the topic:

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podcast

How do we respond when our sense of meaning is threatened?, with Steven Heine

A talk with cultural psychologist Steven Heine (twitter: @StevenHeine4) about how we react to our sense of meaning being threatened. What happens when our mental framework of how the world works doesn’t hold up and things seem chaotic? What happens when our sense of what’s meaningful in our lives is threatened? A transcript is included below.

Topics discussed include: 

  • Heine et al’s Meaning Maintenance Model theory, which proposes that our need for meaning is fluid and that threats to meaning in one area can cause us to try to shore up meaning in another area
  • How ‘meaning’ is defined in this context
  • Existential crises, including mid-life crises and adolescent angst, and how those relate to threats to meaning
  • How our human need for narratives and stories relates to our need for meaning
  • How political polarization might be related to threats to meaning
  • Potentially positive aspects of threats to meaning, such as those that might be present in hallucinogenics-taking and in literature

Episode links:

Resources discussed in this episode or related to the topic:

TRANSCRIPT

Zach Elwood: Welcome to the People Who Read People podcast, with me, Zach Elwood. This is a podcast aimed at better understanding other people, and better understanding ourselves. You can learn more about it at behavior-podcast.com. If you like this podcast, please share it with your friends and family; the more listens and reviews it gets, the more I’ll be encouraged to work on it. 

I think we’d all likely agree that meaning is very important to us humans. We want to feel like we live in a stable world where certain things are associated with certain other things; we like conceptual stability; things being chaotic and unpredictable can be threatening. We also like to feel like our lives have meaning, however we define that; we like to feel like we’re engaged in things that matter. 

On this episode I talk to Steven Heine about how humans react to our sense of meaning being threatened. What happens when our mental frameworks of how the world works don’t hold up and things seem chaotic? What happens when our sense of what’s meaningful in our lives is threatened? 

Steven and his colleagues have proposed a theory they call the “meaning maintenance model”. A 2006 paper by Steven and his colleagues, Travis Proulx and Kathleen Vohs, was titled ​The meaning maintenance model: on the coherence of social motivations. I’ll quote from the abstract of that paper: 

The meaning maintenance model proposes that people have a need for meaning; that is, a need to perceive events through a prism of mental representations of expected relations that organizes their perceptions of the world. When people’s sense of meaning is threatened, they reaffirm alternative representations as a way to regain meaning-a process termed fluid compensation. According to the model, people can reaffirm meaning in domains that are different from the domain in which the threat occurred. Evidence for fluid compensation can be observed following a variety of psychological threats, including most especially threats to the self, such as self-esteem threats, feelings of uncertainty, interpersonal rejection, and mortality salience. People respond to these diverse threats in highly similar ways, which suggests that a range of psychological motivations are expressions of a singular impulse to generate and maintain a sense of meaning.

Here’s some information about Steven Heine from his professor page on the University of British Columbia website: 

He is Distinguished University Scholar and Professor of Social and Cultural Psychology at the University of British Columbia. His research has challenged key psychological assumptions in self-esteem, meaning, and the ways that people understand genetic constructs. He is the author of many journal articles and books in the fields of social and cultural psychology including Cultural Psychology, the top-selling textbook in the field. In 2016, he was elected as a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. 

Steven is also currently working on a book with the working title, ‘Navigating the absurd: The science of existentialism’, to be published by the publisher Basic Books.’

In this episode, Steven and I talk about threats to meaning and how we handle that; we talk about political polarization and how that might be related to threats to meaning; we talk about existential crises, like the so-called mid-life crisis and adolescent angst; we talk about examples of threats to meaning from our own lives; we talk about the anxiety that having a lot of freedom and choice can paradoxically have for us; and we talk about the theoretically positive aspects of having one’s worldviews and meaning thrown off kilter, as can happen when things cause us to update our perceptions of the world, or, for example, with psychedelics. 

Okay here’s the talk with Steven Heine.

Zach: Hi, Steven. Thanks for coming on.

Steven: Hi, Zach. Thanks a lot for having me on.

Zach: So, in your Meaning Maintenance paper from 2006, you start out by talking about a 1949 study that involved switching the colors of playing card suits and seeing how people reacted to that. Maybe you could talk a little bit about that study and how that relates to the Meaning Maintenance Model.

Steven: Sure. That’s one of my favorite studies by Jerome Bruner and Leo Postman back in 1949. They did something very simple in the study. They showed their participants, university students, some playing cards, one after another and they just asked the people, “What card do you see?” They added a key unexpected element to the study. Beforehand, they painted over the colors on these playing cards with a very still hand so that they changed the colors of the hearts and diamonds to black and the color of the spades and clubs to red, at least for some of these cards. And it was very curious what happened when they showed people these, these anomalous cards, because the first reaction of almost everybody was that they didn’t see any anomalies. They just reported the card as they expected it to be.

So if they were shown a red six of spades, they reported it either as a red six of hearts, or as a six of black spades. And so they didn’t even see the anomaly, they just saw the cards as though they were normal. And then after continuing to show people these cards, they noticed something curious. A significant portion of their participants started to get very anxious and they seemed very distressed. They said their participants were experiencing a disruption. And one of their participants even blurted out that, “My God, I can’t tell that’s a playing card or what that is. I don’t know what a heart is. I don’t know what a spade is,” and they really seem quite distressed. And this is a curious reaction because why should people care about playing cards?

But what Jerome Bruner was interested in there was showing how people depend on these meaning frameworks for making sense of the world. That is, we have these expected associations that we expect to see in the world so that we expect diamonds are red and clubs are black, and these are really well transit associations. And so when they’re violated, this creates this distress in us. So this led us to, we include this study to introduce our idea in, uh, what we call a meaning maintenance model. And what we’re arguing there is that people have a need to maintain a sense of meaning in the world. That we’re always trying to feel that everything around us makes sense and that fits according to our expectations of what things mean. Perhaps I should just maybe offer a definition of meaning here because meaning is one of those words that’s hard to know what it means exactly.

Zach: So broad.

Steven: Yeah. And really, I think there’s two useful definitions of meaning here. But one which people usually call general meaning is that meaning is just really expected associations. That is what ideas we expect to co-occur with any kind of event or thing. So if you were to think, what does your podcast mean to you, it would be all of the ideas that, that you associate with it, or what does Joe Biden mean to you? Or what does COVID mean to you? And it’s just all of the different associations that you would have. And so really what meaning is then is these relations between ideas that we expect and we can have many, many different ideas that are associated with any given event. And these are organized into these meaning frameworks.

So in the study with the playing cards, they were taking a very simple meaning framework that playing cards, there’s 13 cards for suits to colors, knowing that those associations are so reliably seen, like you really don’t encounter black diamonds very often. That they were interested in seeing what happens when you violate this sense of meaning. And so in our model, what we are arguing is that because people are trying to maintain meaning, they become really bothered in or experience of disruption when they encounter something that seems meaningless, at least that violates the expected associations that they have with that. So we have argued that there are a few different kinds of responses that people make when this happens. Two of these responses have been very well studied in the literature, and they go back to the 1950s, for instance, 1950s, there was this Swiss developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget.

And he was interested in how little kids go about making sense of the world because in many ways the world doesn’t make much sense to a little kid because a lot of it’s very new to them. So he is interested in, well, what happens when a kid encounter something that doesn’t make sense, that is new to them? And he argued there’s two different reactions that the kids will have there. One which he calls assimilation. I prefer the term faking meaning. And this is when you encounter something that doesn’t make sense, you force it into your existing meaning framework so that it seems to make sense. And this is what happened in Jerome Bruner’s playing card study. That people didn’t see an anomaly. They would see a red six of spades as the six of hearts.

That’s how they would see it. So that’s one reaction that we see the world as we want to see it. And so we have these anomalies out there and we just force them into it so that they-

Zach: Set our model.

Steven: Exactly. And a second response he had, he calls accommodation where I prefer the term making meaning. And that if you have something that doesn’t make sense, you can then change your meaning framework. So that after seeing these playing cards where you have red spades, at some point people were like, “Oh, I understand this deck of cards includes red spades.” That they actually change their understanding of at least this particular deck of cards. So these are these two reactions that have been studied many different ways that they’ve also been studied in terms of how people make sense of traumatic life events.

When things happen to them, they undermine their existing understanding of what life is all about, and that people have to make these changes to their meaning frameworks. But the thing with the second response of making meaning is that it’s really difficult to do. It’s really time consuming and effortful to do. And this paper, 1949 paper by Jerome Bruner, it was picked up, it was noticed by this philosopher of science named Thomas Kuhn, who is interested in how scientific knowledge progresses. What he argues that when scientists have these theories and they encounter new facts that are at odds with these theories, they have to change their theories. But this isn’t something that they can easily do actually. Max Plunk once famously said that science progresses one funeral at a time.

Meaning that scientists will often die with their theories, own theories rather than update them with the new information. That we are just so dependent on these meaning frameworks that recreate, that they’re really hard to change, that we become very dependent on these being frameworks. And for scientists, their whole life might be dedicated to a particular theory that’s really hard for them to change it. So what we’re interested in our models is, well, what happens when people experience this meaning threat something that doesn’t make sense. And if they don’t have the time and resources available to make new meaning out of it, to understand it, what do they do? And what we propose here is that people seek meaning somewhere else. Then the idea is that we need to feel that things make sense.

That’s the default state we feel a need to be in. And when we don’t feel this, we have this deep sense of uncertainty. It’s deeply unsettling and, alienating, creates a lot of existential anxiety. And so what we argue is that another response when people encounter something that doesn’t make sense is that they turn to those other aspects of their life that give them meaning. So they turn to something else that makes sense and they increase their commitment to it. They double down on their existing beliefs, which ground them in another meaning framework that makes sense again. So they can return to that feeling that the world makes sense, everything’s okay. And this can be in something completely unrelated to the initial problem that they encountered. So that’s in a nutshell, what our meaning maintenance model is all about.

Zach: So is there a specific example that comes to mind from a study that is a good example of someone shoring up meaning from one threat into another arena?

Steven: Sure. My favorite study at least one that we had conducted, Travis Proulx and myself, we had conducted this study actually after we had written this paper where we are arguing that so many different psychological phenomena fit this idea that we have. Although a big challenge with our model is that it’s a very abstract model. And that there already exists other theories that have predicted these different responses that people have two meaning threats within the limits of these other theories. So just some example, theories like cognitive dissonance is a theory where when people encounter something that doesn’t make sense in their own behavior, that they change the way that they think about themselves in order for it to make sense. But we wanted to come up with a way of threatening people’s meaning that didn’t fit with any of these other existing theories.

And so we thought about it for a while, and then we thought, we are going to expose people to something that looks impossible. We’re going to expose people to a real life magic trick. What we did is we had people, they came into a lab and they were interacting with an experimenter, and they were completing some questionnaires and experimenter kept handing them the next questionnaire. And then at one moment unexpected to the participants, we swapped the experimenters just outside of their view with another person who didn’t look anything like the original person, but was wearing the exact same outfit.

Zach: Little gas lighting going on.

Steven: Exactly. Some major gas lighting going on. And remarkably, over 90% of our participants don’t notice, at least consciously notice that they’re now dealing with another person. Although from what our results show, that at some level they notice something wasn’t right. And they had this feeling that something wasn’t right, something they couldn’t make sense of. After they had this experience, we gave people this measure that’s been used in many other studies that finds that when people feel this threat to themselves, they become more likely to try to defend the status quo that is in this case here, that they want to punish someone who has broken rules with the idea that if we have rules, we expect rules to be followed. They impose a set of order on the world.

So when people are feeling unsettled here, something’s going on, I don’t know what it is, they can ground themselves again by imposing this set of order here that people who break the rules need to be punished. And that’s exactly what we found in this study. That despite that people had no conscious awareness that anything untoward, it just happened to them, they showed this reaction of wanting to punish rule breakers more. And we show this in three separate studies, it seems to be a reliable effect. And I was really this probably the study that I’ve been most excited about in my career because at the time we thought, there’s just no way this should work out. At least intuitively I don’t have any conscious awareness of ever wanting to react to things like this.

But it made sense according to our theory, and we thought we would gamble and go for it. And it worked out in this way. And the participants just, it was really quite funny how they really had no idea that this person had changed. We had one participant who came in and they actually were friends with the second experimenter, the one that they got changed into. And so we changed into the second experimenter, and the person’s like, “Oh my God, I am so out of it today. I didn’t even recognize you.” And they completely showed this faking meaning response. It’s like seeing a card for the color you assume it to be. Just assuming that-

Zach: Fit their model.

Steven: Yeah. They forced it to make sense.

Zach: So how big an effect is it there? I mean, that’s a relatively minor switch, but I’m curious how big an effect.

Steven: We see a significant change in their attitude. It’s not like a night or day change. It’s not like they’re now responding completely differently than how they normally respond. It’s, people become just a little=

Zach: A little bit more.

Steven: A little bit more. And in general, what we find is that people become a little bit more of an exaggerated version of themselves here, that they double down on their existing attitudes. And people can do it in different ways so that liberal people become super liberals after this kind of experience and conservative people become super conservative. It pushes them more in this direction that they already are in.

Zach: So when it comes to the definition of meaning, we can use meaning in a big sense as in like, our life has meaning, or we feel that we’re afraid that life is meaningless. And I’m curious how you see that as comparing to the small granular definition of meaning being having stability of one’s worldview for specific domains. Is it maybe that the big sense of meaning is the accumulation or combination of the smaller definitions of meaning?

Steven: That’s a great question. Before I was giving one definition of meaning, which is typically called general meaning. The big meaning that you’re talking to here is often called a sense of existential meaning. And I think it’s still based on the same underlying structure of expected ideas going together with the difference being that when people talk about meaning in life and existential meaning, they are connecting another set of meanings to these ideas. And these are meanings that connect us to teleological concerns that transcend our everyday lives. They connect us to ideas about having a sense of purpose is a key element in this existential meaning, to having a sense of significance that we matter in the world. And also just a sense of value, what we desire to have.

And so these are just another set of kinds of meanings, kind of ideas that we link to things. And still, I think it’s a very similar idea that when people have a crisis of meaninglessness in their lives, they’re usually talking about more of these sort of existential concerns and that people have a desire then to reestablish this set of meaning in terms of finding a way to pursue a meaningful life. And so I think it’s a similar idea that it’s just linking ideas together, but when we talk about meaning in life, it’s just these are more transcendent teleological meanings.

Zach: It’s almost like we desire this stable framework and then it’s almost like our existential sense of meaning is like ourself being part of that framework in a big sense. So it seems like there’s something about the self being part of the framework

Steven: Exactly. So I think there’s really three main kinds of meanings that we are aspiring to maintain. One is this meanings of ourselves. I want to understand who I am, why I’m doing the things that I’m doing,. We also care about the meanings in the world. We want to understand what the world is like. And then we want to understand our place within that world, how we fit in that world, how ourselves fit into that world. And we are trying to maintain these key sources of meaning as we aspire for a meaningful life.

Zach: So there could be that the so-called existential crises of various some so-called midlife crises might be one type of that, another might be adolescent angst. How do you see these kinds of crises relating to the threats to meaning?

Steven: Yes. So I think as we go about living our lives that we sometimes encounter these events in our life that just really threaten the sense of meaning. And it’s quite common for people to experience those two key times in life that you just brought up. And so adolescent angst is what I think is the existential crisis that people have at a young age in adolescence or early adulthood. And I’m a cultural psychologist by trade. In addition to studying meaning, I’m interested in how cultures vary in the ways that they go about trying to find meaning in their lives. And one striking finding from the anthropological literature is that this idea of adolescent angst is not a cultural universal by any means. And in most small scale societies, they don’t have this idea that adolescent is a time of chaos and turbulence.

Every society recognizes adolescence as a distinct phase in life. But the idea that it’s a turbulent, chaotic time of a lot of angst is not by any means universal. The kinds of cultures that have more of this adolescent angst are those that are more industrialized individualistic societies where people have a lot of different options about the kind of life they’re going to lead. And in adolescence, this is when you have this first existential crisis, potential existential crisis is trying to figure out what life am I going to lead? And when you have lots of options, it can be overwhelming, and trying to figure out what is the right life that I’m gonna lead. And people might try various sorts of things. People in small scale societies at least in terms of what they’re going to do for a career, this is not something that they have a lot of options. They’re going to do what their parents did and what everyone else in their society does. It’s not something they have to figure out. If you’re from a small scale farming society, what are you gonna do with your life? You’re going to farm? That’s like really the only option. But in individualistic, industrialized societies, what are you going to do with your life while there are so many different possibilities that people can pursue, and in trying to figure out this, what life am I going to lead, that adolescents go through a great deal of angst as they try to figure this out. And this has been getting worse over time as this period of adolescence has been expanding, this period of time when people are in this preparatory phase in life.

Now call it emerging adulthood or failure to launch. And the idea that people are now in their 20s or even into their 30s, still haven’t really figured out what life it is that they’re going to lead. And if you look at that, there’s some common benchmarks that have been used for what is achieving adulthood. And it’s things like finishing your training and education, getting a secure position, moving out of your parents’ home, getting your own place, getting married and having kids, although these last two maybe aren’t universally pursued anymore. And those have just been getting later and later as time goes on, and people are in this longer period of this existential angst where they’re trying to figure out what life are they going to lead.

Zach: Yeah. I’ve heard that referred to as the paradox of choice, that there was a book called The Paradox of Choice that talked about that idea. And I can definitely feel that in my life where we just have so much choice and freedom to make decisions about where are you gonna live? What kind of job are you going to pursue? Who are you going to date? All these kinds of choices. And that can be stressful. Freedom is a stressful thing.

Steven: Yeah. This is something that the original existential philosophers used to talk a lot about. So, like John Paul Sartre would say that life is the choices that you make and that it’s up to you to figure out what kind of life to live. And that sounds exhilarating. So many different choices. I get to choose, that’s so exciting. But at the same time, we’re responsible for all of the choices that we make then. We’re responsible for the life that we lead. And that brings with it a lot of anxiety. And I think if you go back in western history in the past, back to the medieval era, there really weren’t nearly as many choices to be made. That people would largely inherit the occupation of their parents.

That that was really quite common. Arranged marriages were still quite common in Europe and elsewhere around the world. So you didn’t who am I going to spend my life with? And also in at least much of Europe, there wasn’t really much of a competing sense of which God should you worship. It was kind of the town virtually everyone shared the same religion. You didn’t have to figure that out. And now people have to figure out what career, there’s thousands of different possible careers. They’re trying to find a partner and they’re on apps with, again, thousands of different options, so many different ways of getting it wrong. And society has been secularizing in a way that people are turning away from traditional religions.

But interestingly, they’re not that many of them are turning towards atheism. That’s increasing a little bit. What’s increasing the most though is people are becoming what they call spiritual but not religious, where they’re creating their own spiritual set of beliefs, This smorgasboard approach to the hereafter that I’m going to believe in horoscopes maybe and maybe some crystals, maybe I’ll meditate, maybe some yoga, that people will have this potpourri collection of different spiritual concerns. And again, it’s just like all the more things that people are responsible for, that they’re responsible for all these different aspects of our lives, and now they’re even responsible for the hereafter that they are choosing the path that they are going to take. And this brings with it just a huge amount of responsibility and what comes with that is this existential anxiety.

Zach: Do you think it’s true that by having all these choices, it’s almost like we’re drawn to the fact of how arbitrary our choices are and that can feel like a threat to meaning of sensing that ?

Steven: Yeah, I think that’s a great point. I mean, I often look back at life choices I made. So my own adolescent angst experience or existential crisis that I had, it was when I was 19 years old and I had started off at university as a business student. And I lucked out at the age of 19. I got this great internship through this international exchange program where I got to work for a marketing company in Helsinki, Finland. And this had been at that time my dream job. I thought I want to get into this international marketing, and I’m so lucky to have this. And anyways, once I had this job, I immediately had this very strong feeling that this isn’t the right job for me. And I switched to psychology at that point, and I often look back, think, well, what if I hadn’t done that switch that the whole life path that I have been on since then would be changed. I have a very different career. I have a different social network. I would have many more business friends, and now I have more professor friends. I wouldn’t have met my wife. I would probably end up living in a different place. It’s this one decision and I’m living a very different life. And that’s kind of, uh, unsettling to think about sometimes. I mean, how many of these decisions are we making in life?

Zach: What does it mean? What does it all mean?

Steven: Exactly.

Zach: So I’m curious if you have examples from your personal life that you see as related to the Meaning Maintenance Model. And I could give a few examples if you want, but I’m curious if some come to mind for you examples of maybe having meaning threatened in one sphere and then ensuring it up in another.

Steven: Yeah. Well, one example for my own life is when I had my second existential crisis, which was my midlife crisis which I had at 48, and I got divorced. That’s a very unsettling time when life as I knew it– all the different aspects of my life– I’ve interpreted through the lens of being married to this particular person. So that was all very upended. And what I recognized that I was doing a lot of in the immediate aftermath of that was I had become a lot more nostalgic. I found myself visiting a lot of places from my past and reflecting on all these memories from my past. And my reactions actually are not unusual at all. This is a very common reaction that people have when they’re feeling that their lives are disrupted. They seek out nostalgia, and I think what nostalgia does here is that it restores a sense of meaning because you’re reflecting on your life story on who you are as a person and these different events that you had in your past that are part of you and are part of the reason that you became the person that you are today. That’s what you find is that when people are feeling, if they’re feeling lonelier or if they’re just feeling anxious or they’re feeling a little meaningless, they become a little more nostalgic. 

I don’t think it’s a coincidence that right now it said that we’re living in the age of nostalgia, again that everything is retro. We see this on movies that are coming out. There a lot of remakes of movies in the past, whether it be things like Ghostbusters or things like Stranger Things isn’t a remake, but a big part of the show is the setting of the ’80s and revisiting this. I think people are quite anxious these days. This is an anxious time. This is one thing that we’re collectively doing is turning to the past. And in doing so, reflecting on these earlier chapters of our life story.

Zach: A small note here, in a previous episode, I talked to Jannine Lasaleta about the psychological factors involved in nostalgia. We examined why it is that nostalgia is so powerful and why we find it so meaningful. One thing we examined was how our feelings of nostalgia can make us more carefree with our money. That being one reason, companies like to try to use nostalgia in their advertising. Okay, back to the interview. 

For examples from my life, because I can definitely feel the things you talk about in my life. One example was similar to yours. If I’ve had an argument with my wife or if I feel socially isolated for some other reason, I can feel a desire to shift from social things to more intellectual pursuits. It is a need to compensate and put my sense of meaning in other things a little bit. Then the vice versa, if I feel like I’m not doing much on these intellectual pursuits or I feel like I’ve made a mistake or if I feel like I don’t really have a sense of community there, I’ll go back the other way and focus more on social things and… That’s just an example of how we can switch our focus of where we get our sense of meaning from, of what’s important throughout our lives, and even throughout the week or whatever. 

Steven: Exactly. Those are great examples of it. We just need to feel that life has meaning. We can get that through many different ways. It’s just what current thoughts are in our head, that our current thoughts we want to make sense and be some aspect of ourselves that give our lives meaning. That can be satisfied by so many different ways. People are all unique. They all have these unique meaning frameworks, unique things that give their lives meaning. So people turn to different things when they’re confronting these challenges of life.

Zach: Am I understanding correctly that would set your model, your theory apart from some other comparable theories is you’re focusing on the fluidity and the equal nature of where people can find their meaning, that it’s very fluid? Was I getting that right?

Steven: I think what our model is showing is that people can respond to a meaning threat in a very fluid way by turning to a very different domain of life. You don’t have to… For instance, there’s theories about needing belongingness and what a lot of findings show that when people feel lonely so that their belongingness is threatened, they try to seek out other relationships as a way of responding to that perceived lack of interpersonal connection. I think that’s very true that people definitely do that. 

But what we’re showing is that you can satisfy the underlying need for meaning that’s been disrupted by feeling lonelier interpersonal rejection by turning to something completely different, something that gives you feelings of certainty in some other areas or something that just reflects on core aspects of yourself. You can affirm yourself. You can dispel those bothersome feelings that originated from feeling intrapersonal rejection. It originated in this one specific domain, but can be tackled by a very different domain. Yes, that’s what’s unique about our theory.

Zach: A small note here, the meaning maintenance model has been compared to terror management theory, which is a theory that posits that our existential fears around death and mortality play a big role in our behavior and our desire to form meaning. The fluid of the aspect of the meaning maintenance model is one thing that makes it unique and sets it apart. If you’d like to read more about that, I’d recommend reading the Wikipedia entry for terror management theory. It mentions the meaning maintenance model there and how it relates. Also, Steven Heine and his colleagues this year did an analysis of the terror management literature. Back to the interview. 

So when I was young, a young man, I had some serious mental struggles. So I’ve spent a good amount of time thinking about these kinds of topics and about how we build narratives and stories as ways to create meaning in our lives in a kind of way that’s taken for granted. Because we have these underlying narratives about our place in the world that we don’t really examine that allow us to lead so-called normal or functional lives, these narratives around who we are and our relationship to the world, our relationship to others. One thing that strikes me there is it just seems like there’s so many different kinds of stories we can create. There’s almost no limit on the kinds of stories humans can create because we are such storytellers. That’s such a part of who we are. 

I see that as related to the meaning maintenance model ideas in the sense that we can construct so many narratives that give us stability about our place in the world. It’s almost like there’s multiple solutions and a game theory sense of forming different narratives that allow us to feel comfortable and not just swimming in constant chaos and anxiety. We all have that as a major goal to reach that kind of stability and not feel anxious. So I’m curious what you think of all that? Do you see our drive to construct stories and narratives as related to our drive to construct meaning?

Steven: Yes, that’s a great point. I definitely think so. And that these meaning frameworks that we have about the world get can get very complex or the ones that we have about herself get very complex. They often can have some contradictory parts of, if you just think of like who am I, and you realize that well, okay, yesterday I was with my college friends and was acting quite silly. Then today I was at work and acting quite professional. Then I was driving and I was screaming obscenities at the passenger in the car beside me because he cut me off. 

Looking at this, you’ll see, well, what is the common thread here that don’t seem to be very consistent, or even just comparing me now versus when I was in high school or yesterday, I was dead set on losing some weight, but today I’m sitting in front of the TV with some Haagen-Dazs. 

In many ways, we’re not very consistent. I think this is the key value of stories here that we rely on to organize this information about ourselves and about our world that I think there’s a lot of theories in psychology that emphasizes that we experience the world through stories, that we have a story about who we are and we have stories about what the world is like. The nice thing about the stories is that they can simplify, they can connect all these disparate parts together that we can edit our stories, erase the parts that don’t fit in so well and make things fit a certain theme. I think then that people really try to defend these stories, like we’re committed to the stories, like this is who I am, like I’m committed to this idea. 

So yeah, if you encounter something that’s at odds with that, well, you need to defend your story and you need to focus on another aspect of your life story that fits with this theme that you think captures the real you. Yeah, I think we’re doing this.

But when we tell stories about ourselves and when we’re telling stories about the world like what is the world like, we are telling the story and we want it to be consistent. What’s remarkable is just how different people’s stories can be. If you just think like, what are people’s stories about the COVID pandemic? Some people see this as this is a huge threat to their wellbeing and their loved ones and a big challenge to society. Other people think this is all overblown or this is a hoax or billionaires are trying to control us by putting microchips in us. 

People have a story that is trying to connect these different events that are happening to us. Even though really, you would think it’s the same events that are happening in the world, at some level there must be some objective reality. But we perceive these events through the lenses of the story that we’re telling them. We tell very different stories, but we want our stories to be consistent. When you encounter new information, it’s got to be find a way to weave that into the story that we’re telling.

Zach: I focused a good amount on the podcast on us versus them political polarization and one thing that strikes me in that area that seems underexamined is how stressful it can be to have big conflicts and big differences and how we perceive reality and our narratives. Aside from the more obvious and superficial aspects of disagreeing with people and arguing over important topics, I think there’s this more fundamental anxiety around the meaning maintenance type ideas that we look around and we see others around us, our neighbors, the other people in our society is believing such vastly different things and just the knowledge that we see that meaning can be so hard to establish, that reality can be so hard to agree upon. It can be existentially stressful for the reasons that we’ve talked about. It’s like the cards having a different color, but on a really large scale we look around and we just perceive this kind of chaos of meaning around us. 

That to me, it strikes me that that can be feeding into the polarization in the sense that that threat to meaning that we perceive can make us really want to double down on our ideas and be like, oh, we’re going to decide this once and for all. This is the narrative and this is the right narrative. And we latch more strongly on to our narratives and such. That adds to the depolarization session. I’m curious if you agree with that playing a role in the polarization cycle.

Steven: Yeah, I think that’s a great point. I think that this is one underappreciated cost of polarization. Polarization makes it hard to govern. It can lead to violence. There’s a lot of discussion of the familiar parts about it. But I think just as you were saying here that the fact that we don’t all share the same story about things, in some ways we’re not really living in the same shared reality anymore, that this can be really undermining for us. It’s because we want to feel certain, we want to feel that our understanding of the world is right so that way we feel that we can predict things and we can have control over things and we can act effectively. But we never really know what’s right and what’s true. We don’t have any direct access to that, so we have to infer it. 

One thing that makes us feel much more confident that our stories are right is when everyone around us agrees with us. If it’s like if everyone’s agreeing that this is the way things are, then you feel much more certain, I’ve got it all figured out. My understanding of the world is right. I know how to act. I know the rules of the game. I know what I need to do. But when we find out that half of the country has a completely different story for what’s going on, that the stories don’t overlap much at all. And so, here we are trying to feel a sense that yes, I know what’s happening. I know what to do in the world. Now it’s just being undermined by the fact that these other people are saying the exact opposite of what I’m saying. How can I be so sure that I’m right when half the country says the opposite? I think this is contributing to this level of uncertainty and anxiety that’s in the world today. 

This polarization here, which it’s been especially increasing in the US, there’s a number of different ways of measuring polarization so that the US in particular showed this big jump lately, and I think this is contributing to all of the tensions and the underlying anxieties that people are experiencing.

Zach: A note here, if you’re interested in learning more about polarization and how it’s been increasing in the world, the episode before this one was a talk about that. Back to the interview. 

I’m curious if you have any thoughts about how these ideas map over to mental illness. For example, it’s known that immigrants have higher rates of mental illness than average. This can be seen to relate maybe to meaning maintenance ideas and that it can be harder for immigrants to construct meaning in a pretty alien environment, they’re more aware of the kind of the chaos and the conflict conflicts and meaning than other people are who live in more than the social majority, culture and such. I’m curious if you have any thoughts you’d care to share about mapping over of those two things. 

Steven: Yeah, I think immigrants are often experiencing another kind of existential crisis. As a cultural psychologist, my field has a slogan or a mantra that says culture itself make each other up. It’s the idea that we live in this ecology of cultural meanings that tell us what is valued, what is appropriate, what is forbidden, what is tolerated. These are the norms that we live in. And that shapes our psychology. It shapes the way that we perceive the world make sense of it and try to work towards leading a satisfying and meaningful life. 

The challenge that immigrants face is that their selves have been shaped by one particular culture, and then they move to another different cultural framework where the meanings around them can be really quite different and they’re no longer a good match, their self is no longer a good match for the cultural environment around them. They go through what is termed culture shock is the experience that people go through, this distressing experience after they’ve moved to a new place that can persist for up to a few years, this period where one really isn’t a good match with the cultural meanings around one. 

This is something that’s very alienating and it creates a lot of distress so that immigrants have more health problems while they’re going through this culture shock period. This is like undermining their physical health and undermining their mental health. It’s only over time where they self-adjust to this new set of meanings that they are living with that they get over this this period of culture shock. 

The amount of culture shock that an immigrant experiences, one thing that predicts it is just how different are the two cultures that they are moving between. That if you’re moving between two of similar cultures, it’s not that hard to learn this new meaning framework. But if you’re moving between two very different cultures that differ in many aspects, then this is particularly challenging and people from more distant cultures have had more of this culture shock.

Zach: Yeah, they also say that kids who move around a good amount when they’re young are more likely to have emotional and psychological issues, and that seems related to that too. I can just imagine… Well, I definitely remember one of my psychological issues started when I had a panic attack on my first day of high school because I went to basically a new high school system with new people. Then also in college, the stress of going to college and new people and new environment, those are all stressful situations that force us to have to build up new sets of meanings and [inaudible].

Steven: Yeah, those kinds of transitions can create a lot of distress. Mental illness is more likely to be experienced when people are going through the kinds of anxieties that come from experiencing these meaning threats, that if people are feeling that their life doesn’t really make much sense, if people are feeling that their life is low in that sense of meaning, these people are more vulnerable to depression and anxiety and substance abuse and self-harm, that there’s real consequences, there’s a lot on the line for feeling that you’re living a meaningful life. These kinds of big transitions like that are the kinds of things that can pose some challenges for us. 

Zach: When it comes to the best reading you’d recommend for people who want to dig into these concepts more, what would you recommend? Maybe your 2006 paper or what else?

Steven: Yes, in addition to our 2006 paper, I like a 2010 paper that I wrote with Travis Proulx called The Frog in Kierkegaard’s Beer. This paper, the title of it is referring to this observation by Kierkegaard who is contrasting experience of death with the surprise that you would feel if you were drinking a beer and you would discover a live frog in it, just it’s exactly that it’s the same kind of thing, this thing that we can’t fully process and make sense of. Anyways, in that paper we describe a slightly more up to date version of our meaning maintenance model. 

I also like a paper also done with Travis Proulx in 2009 called Connections from Kafka where we were exploring how when people feel threats to their meaning, including by reading surreal stories that don’t make sense. Kafka was a master at that like eliciting this very alienating feeling of like what is going on, that people are primed to seek out meaning and they can actually learn new things a little better, that they pick up on some patterns that they are less likely to detect when they’re not feeling this sense of meaninglessness. 

I’m working on a book right now. It’s not going to be out for another… It’s supposed to be out next year. It’s supposed to be done next year. I’ll need a good tailwind to finish it then. The working title is called Navigating the Absurd: The Science of Existentialism, where I’m exploring really the kind of ideas we’ve been talking about here in this podcast, just how this desire for meaning that we have, how it shapes the ways that we interact with the world and that we try to make sense of things, try to make sense of ourself and we try to pursue a meaningful life.

Zach: Yeah, that you get on the subject of literature changing our worldview and using these meaning threatening situations and narratives to make us see the world in new ways. There’s positive aspects of that. For example, that’s why people like one of the benefits of hallucinogenics is breaking up people’s way of seeing the world and making them see it in new ways. Also on art, like you mentioned Kafka, I think of Flannery O’Connor. One of her things was trying to have these shocking endings to some of her short stories that would make people see the world in a different way. She had a religious goal there because she was Catholic, but the same idea applied where she was basically trying to threaten their meaning a bit and make them see the world as the mysterious and the mind-blowing thing it was in that sense.

Steven: Yeah. Well, I do think art is an especially powerful way for eliciting this feeling, the feeling that we get when things don’t make sense. I like to label that feeling the uncanny, it’s something that Flannery called it too. It’s often described as a feeling of the unfamiliar familiar so that you’re sensing something that feels normal, but there’s something not quite right. This is what the surrealists I think did this especially well, paintings by like René Magritte or Salvador Dali, films like David Lynch, and it was especially good at eliciting this feeling. I think art is just so good at eliciting this emotional reaction. Really, I think it’s stemming from the emotion that we get, that feeling that something’s not right and that’s prompting this. 

Your point about hallucinogenic drugs I think is a great one there. Now it looks like some of these drugs are going to be approved it looks like FDA approval for use in therapy. Why there’s so much excitement around them is because they really do seem to be able to have this enduring change of how you make sense of your life, how you make sense of your world. The existing kinds of meds that people are prescribed when they’re facing mental illness challenges are ones that you need to be regularly taking, these antidepressants that you need to take every day to help people to function at their best. 

Whereas these initial trials that are coming out of these studies with the psychedelic drugs such as psilocybin and LSD and MDMA and ketamine that people are having these lasting changes from having this one very intense experience when they I think are connecting themselves to some new transcendent concerns that they hadn’t realized before. And they are perceiving their life differently. And they have memories for those, that those seem to have provide some lasting changes. So there’s a lot of excitement about the potential that these drugs have in helping people to cope with the many challenges that this new era of anxiety is throwing at us. 

Zach: Yeah, I think the interesting thing about the threats to meaning is it can be negative, of course, but there’s also an excitement and a mystery about it because it opens up these new ways of viewing the world as exciting and mysterious and strange. That can have a negative, you can view that negatively or as scary or you can view it on the other side of the coin as that’s exciting, that’s making the world a wild place now in ways that it wasn’t before for some people. So there’s different sides of the threat demeaning coin, I guess.

Steven: Right, yeah. I think that’s why it’s important that that these new therapies are being conducted in a therapeutic context where there is someone there to help lead people through their experience. Because there is some risk to people just that they talk about in a certain matter a great deal when people are exploring with these psychedelic drugs that if they’re in the wrong mindset, it can be a very frightening devastating experience. So it can go both ways. That’s why I think that all of these trials that are going on are, together with using the context of a guide, [crosstalk] through.

Zach: Yeah, bad trips are a real thing. Okay, well, this has been great. Steven, thanks a lot for your time and I appreciate you coming on.

Steven: All right. Thanks a lot for having me. It was a lot of fun.

Zach: That was professor Steven Heine talking about the meaning maintenance model. 

One of the big takeaways for me in examining this research is how threats to meaning might make us cling more to the status quo: in other words, threats to meaning can make us more intolerant of those who violate the rules of our group, and make us cling more closely to the rules and stereotypical traits of our group. The reason I initially found Steven’s research was that I was interested in that exact idea: how extreme polarization, in making it more apparent just how much our perceptions of reality can diverge from our neighbors, can make us want to cling more strongly to our group’s narratives, and how that itself can be an amplifying effect on polarization. And if you want to read more on that idea, Steven and his colleagues’ 2006 paper on the meaning maintenance model goes into more detail on how threats to meaning can be related to people’s attempts to reinforce their group identity. 

I want to thank Matthew Hornsey, who’s a group psychology researcher and who I interviewed in a previous episode. He answered some questions I had about this topic, and gave me some links to papers that eventually led to me reaching out to Steven Heine. 

If you enjoyed this podcast, I’d recommend checking out some other episodes I have on some related topics. For example, one episode is a talk with existential psychologist Kirk Schneider, and in that one we talk about how the strangeness and mystery of existence can affect us psychologically, and how that might relate to our political conflicts. 

For more information about this podcast, go to behavior-podcast.com. I have entries for the episodes that include links to papers and other resources we talk about. 

If you like this podcast, please share it with your friends and family. The more people listen to it, the more I’m encouraged to do more interviews. 

Thanks for listening,

Categories
podcast

Is the entire world growing more polarized?, with Andrew O’Donohue

A talk with Andrew O’Donohue, co-author of Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization. Andrew has studied how societal conflicts play out in many countries, and the harm resulting from those conflicts. Transcript is included below.

Topics discussed include: common objections people have to thinking about polarization or considering it a problem; what American polarization has in common with polarization in other countries; the common psychological drivers of polarization, no matter where it happens; the potential effects of modern life and social media on polarization; what we can do in our lives to reduce polarization; and more. If you don’t already believe that polarization is an important topic, I do hope you give this episode a listen.

Episode links:

Resources discussed in this episode or related to the topic:

TRANSCRIPT

Zach: Welcome to the People Who Read People podcast with me, Zachary Elwood. This is a podcast aimed at better understanding other people, and better understanding ourselves. To learn more about this podcast, go to www.behavior-podcast.com. If you like this podcast, please share it with your friends and family; that would be hugely appreciated, because the more listens it gets, the more I’m encouraged to do more episodes.

Did you know that research shows that most countries have been growing increasingly polarized since 2005? For this episode, I talk with Andrew O’Donohue about polarization, with a focus on how polarization plays out across the world in various countries, and on the psychological drivers behind polarization. 

If you’re someone who wonders how a divided country might be able to heal, or if you’re someone who is skeptical or uncertain if polarization is really a big problem, I hope you give this episode a listen. I think these are very important topics; to me, they’re literally the most important topics we could be talking about. 

I’d also say if you enjoy this podcast, I have quite a few other episodes on polarization-related topics. If you go to my website behavior-podcast.com and look for the post for this episode, you’ll see links to those episodes and other resources related to this topic. 

Andrew O’Donohue is a political scientist known for his research and writing on polarization and the challenges facing democracy. He is the Carl J. Friedrich Fellow and a Ph.D. candidate in the Government Department at Harvard University, as well as National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellow. His book, Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization, looks at why divisions have deepened in numerous democracies and what can be done to heal them. Previously, he was a James C. Gaither Junior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

In this episode, Andrew and I talk about: common objections people have to thinking about polarization or considering it a major problem; we talk about what American polarization has in common with polarization in other countries; we talk about the common psychological drivers of polarization, no matter where it happens; we talk about the potential effects of modern life and social media on polarization; we talk about what we can do in our lives to reduce polarization; and more. If you don’t already believe this is an important topic, I do hope you give this episode a listen and be willing to think about these topics. 

Regarding Andrew’s book Democracies Divided: I interviewed Andrew’s co-author, Thomas Carothers, for this podcast about some similar topics, with more of a focus on what leads to democracy breakdown and authoritarian regimes. So if you enjoy this talk, you will probably enjoy that earlier one. 

Okay, here’s the interview with Andrew O’Donohue.

Hi, Andrew. Thanks for coming on.

Andrew: Hi, Zach. Thanks for having me. It’s a pleasure to be here.

Zach: So I’ve talked a good amount about polarization in this podcast in the past, but maybe a good starting point for people who don’t have that context would be to try to define what we mean by polarization, because there can be different categories of polarization such as ideological and then more emotional us versus them polarization. Then there can be the point that some amount of polarization is normal and even helpful in many cases because it’s normal to disagree and things like that. So would you be up for explaining a bit about the usual context and meaning when people talk about extreme polarization being a problem?

Andrew: I think this is the perfect place to start because one thing that I think is really crucial to understand about polarization is that in many ways it’s a Goldilocks problem. So on the one hand as you pointed out, you can actually have too little polarization. And I think one thing that surprises many people is that in the 1950s, the American Political Scientist Association– a group of political scientists– came out and said the main problem with American political parties is they’re not polarized enough. So, as you pointed out, one essential feature of a democracy is that citizens need to be given meaningful choices. And so I think the key place to start is that on the one hand, you do need a certain amount of policy or programmatic differentiation between the parties. But on the other hand, where polarization becomes really dangerous and often deadly for democracy is when polarization takes on an affective dimension. And by affective, I mean a really emotional basis that’s rooted in people’s social identities; a feeling not just that I disagree with the other side, but that I hate the other side, that I wouldn’t want to be friends with someone from the other side. Then that, I think, is when we think about polarization that can be deadly to democracy, the polarization that tips into this, the category of too much polarization.

Zach: So I’m someone who believes that the effect of the emotion-based us versus them polarization is the biggest problem we face. And I’d say not just in America, but across the world. I just see us humans as having such a huge flaw on our psychology that makes us so often come to hate each other and see each other in distorted ways and it becomes this cycle that so often happens. And I see it as not just dangerous on its own and how it leads to violence and wars, but also it makes us spend all of our energy and focus on these fights and creates this gridlock that prevents us from solving other serious problems that are huge threats. But there are many people who don’t see polarization as a problem, and some of those people will even scoff that it’s a problem at all. Some of those people will have views like, “Well, of course we’re polarized. The other side is just so horrible and we can’t bargain with those people or negotiate with them.” That view is a pretty common one I hear from people on both sides and that’s just the nature of polarization. And some of those people are very polarized. Some of those people want a lot more polarization who they feel like they’re in a good versus evil war. They really view the other side with moral scorn and a lot of hatred and fear. And then there’s other people that simply just aren’t aware that there’s anything that unusual going on, and that kind of response from them would be something like, “Well, we’ve always been divided. It’s not as bad as people think.” And imagine that you’ve heard all sorts of these types of arguments that get in the way of people acknowledging or thinking about polarization as a problem. And I’m curious, is there an elevator pitch that you have about why should people care about polarization, especially for the people that think the other side is bad so polarization’s not a problem, it’s not our problem.

Andrew: I think that one of the key insights that we came away with and here I’m drawing on a book project that I did with my co-editor, Tom Carothers, is that polarization often takes on a life of its own and becomes self-reinforcing and escalates much faster than people might expect. So to start with the people who say polarization is not really a problem, I think that what that perspective often misses is that polarization often becomes this intensely escalating cycle where tit for tat gestures escalate beyond what people ever intended. That what was once a normal partisan battle can escalate to the point where democratic institutions, societal cohesion is under threat and even political violence begins to break out. And that once this cycle of polarization begins, it’s extremely difficult to reign in once you have episodes of political violence.

We’ve seen this in the United States, but also in other places like Kenya in 2007, India today, it’s extremely hard to get polarization on check. So I would say to those people, the polarization is almost like a forest fire, that it can grow out of proportion extremely quickly. To those who say that the other side is so horrible that no redemption is possible and that this is a good versus an evil struggle, I think there are really two key problems with that view. And the first is that that ignores the possibility of working with people who are on the other side, who are willing to work with you, the people in the United States, for example, that we might see as Liz Cheneys or Joe Manchins. But there are genuinely certain people who occupy a center position and that often working with those people, they casting it as a good versus evil struggle, ignores the possibility of collaborating with those people.

But secondly, I think that another problem is that when that kind of polarization sets in, you often find that the dynamics within one side become toxic in themselves. The people are afraid to call out the people that they sort see are leading their side and they become willing to tolerate undemocratic behavior even by the person on their side in the name of sticking it to the other side, beating the other side at all costs. And I think a really interesting study of this was done by two political scientistsMatt Graham and Milan Svolik from Yale, and they find that when candidates are very starkly polarized on the ballot, ordinary Americans are willing to vote for politicians who enforce decidedly anti-democratic positions. And it’s because they see themselves as locked in a struggle versus good and evil, and because they think I need to vote for my side because the other side is even worse. So I think that the key problem is that that good versus legal relationship can lead to you even excusing a certain amount of evil behavior or anti-democratic behavior to be more precise from its own side.

Zach: And one argument I make about polarization in trying to get people to see it as a big problem is that seeing it as a problem doesn’t mean you can’t work very hard towards a political goal. And it doesn’t mean you can’t criticize people who you think are doing bad things. I think for many people they think that acknowledging polarization as a problem somehow hurts them noodles then in some way, makes them weaker or makes them forced to negotiate in ways they wouldn’t otherwise. But I think the big point there is that you can still work very hard towards a political goal, but it’s about recognizing the divides of us versus them language that really plays a role in these dynamics. And I’m curious if you would agree there that it’s about seeing how the language we use and especially about the entire other group and like you mentioned, the distorted views we can have of conflating everybody in the other group as being all the same as the worst people in that group and how that plays into the dynamics and makes the other group more angry and so on part of that cycle. So I’m curious, do you think I’m getting at a good point there that it’s about focusing on how we contribute with our language to these divides?

Andrew: I think that’s a great point and that often the framing of these debates is part of what makes issues that otherwise would not be extremely polarizing, quite polarizing. But I think that this is one thing that is difficult is that often for ordinary citizens, the framing of these debates feels like it can be outside of our control. And part of that is because political leaders in many ways set the agenda and set the agenda deliberately in terms of stark us versus the minor race because they know that that is effective towards rallying their political base, rallying political support, making their side feel like they’re under attack. So I agree that I think a lot of it is, and in many ways it’s often possible to reach consensus on certain issues by avoiding that us versus them framing. But part of the problem is that political incentives often lead politicians to frame it in us versus them terms on a very narrow basis as a matter of political survival more than it is about achieving a concrete policy goal.

Zach: Right. I think that’s a good point about the leaders, the people that can either be the most polarized people in the group, the political leads, or else they’re trying to to use polarization, harness it for their own power and such or to get things done. I think it can be important to separate how we talk about our fellow citizens from how we talk about the political leaders or specific people. And I think that’s a big part of how our language plays into this because, for example, say we’re angry at Trump and we speak in ways that insult the entire other group and vice versa too for both groups we speak in. And so these people, the people that are amplifying the polarization are really in the midst of the us versus them battle can make us speak in ways that insult the entire other group which leads into these vicious cycles of us versus them thinking.

Andrew: Absolutely.

Zach: And one specific example that came to mind for that, I was reading a book aimed at healing America and aimed at depolarization by David Blankenhorn, who was the co-founder of the depolarization group, Braver Angels. He also happens to be a scholar of Abraham Lincoln. And in that bookwhich I can’t actually remember, I think it’s called something about our better angels, our bravery angels, the book title, but he talks about how Abraham Lincoln, even when he made very forceful choices, very hard, tough choices, he never used dehumanizing language about his political opponents. And Blankenhorn gives examples of that about how even in the midst of that extreme conflict, he was always cognizant to speak, attempt to appeal to make rational arguments, make persuasive arguments, and not dehumanize his opponents before and during the Civil War. So I thought that was a really interesting example of what the point is here. It’s not like you can’t make tough decisions and work hard towards things, but it’s about recognizing how your rhetoric and the way you behave and speak about the entire other group really play into these things. And I’m curious if you think that’s a good example.

Andrew: I think that the evidence is extremely strongly supportive of this idea that both political rhetoric matters, but also the media of communication makes a huge difference too. So to start with the first point about Lincoln, I think unfortunately what we’re seeing right now is the precise opposite or the mirror image. So in one case study that we conducted in this book, Democracies Divided on polarization globally, we looked at the case of polling and what we saw was that when the ruling Law and Justice party, a populist right wing party, chose to make immigration one of their major campaign issues and started really digging in on an antimigrant message. Public opinion polling on immigration just changed almost overnight. I think that resistance to refugees increased by 30% points in the span of a few months. So the key thing here is that often these attitudes are extremely malleable and that political leaders who whip up antagonism or often hatred against minority groups, end up changing people’s attitudes very quickly. But the second thing is that, as we know, these political messages aren’t just being communicated in a vacuum. So I think there’s certain media that actually lend themselves very well in the modern era to depolarization and to your credit, I think podcasting is one of them. There’s not really, in the same way that you could have a clickbaity headline, it’s very rare to have a clickbaity podcast because we’re getting into these issues and they’re nuanced. Of course, they’re, but the problem is that oftenand this will be a familiar argument to youis that social media organizations often amplify the most divisive or angry or emotive messages. And we’ve seen this in studies where people are actually randomly assigned to delete their Facebook. They’re paid to delete their Facebook. And what we find is that these individuals, they become less polarized just by virtue of having been assigned to delete their social media. What’s interesting too is that they also become less informed because they no longer can rely on Facebook as a source of information, for example. But so I think that the other key change from Lincoln Zero is that the incentives are all structured the wrong way to reward in many ways this polarizing rhetoric.

Zach: That’s a good point about how quickly the views in society can change. It’s almost as if once we have a certain level of us versus them feelings in a society, it’s almost like things can change overnight as far as how that emotion is expressed, which helps explain why things can change so quickly because it’s just such a turbulent environment. So it’s like, look over here, here’s another thing for you to be polarized around. One big obstacle I’ve seen when it comes to polarization and the people who don’t want to consider it as a problem, or even offended that people talk about polarization as a problem, I think people will feel threatened by that because the implication is that there’s something for both sides to work on in a polarized environment that you’re basically acknowledging that both sides can be contributing. And when you do that,it feels like you’re helping the other side or hurting your side. So when attempting to talk about polarization, you’ll hear a lot of criticisms like that’s a false equivalency. You’re making a both sides argument. One side is much worse, that you can’t compare these groups. So even trying to talk about polarization can trigger these tribal emotions and it seems like polarization creates an environment where it’s hard to even talk about polarization. And I see that as the reason polarization is just so hard to combat despite it being so ubiquitous throughout history and throughout the world. Currently, it’s like our tribal instincts make us unsuited to even talk about the underlying emotional causes out of fear of hurting our side or helping the other side. And an argument I’ve made for that is to try to overcome that obstacle is that you can continue thinking one side is much worse than your group while still believing and trying to see how us versus them polarization is a problem and thinking about how these things contribute and thinking about how to reduce it. So I’m curious if you would agree with all that or have anything to add there.

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Andrew: Well, I do think that one thing that is a background condition is really crucial, and that even before we talk about this issue of the blame game, both sides do need to factually agree that polarization is a problem. And sometimes that’s not even possible. So in the case of Turkey today, an extremely polarized society where a very illiberal president, Tayyip Erdoğan, has relentlessly polarized society in particular through tactics of repression. One major problem is that his supporters,specially parliamentarians politicians, systematically deny that there is polarization in Turkey society. And they say, this is just the opposition complaining, but there is no polarization. And in those kinds of situations, it’s extremely hard for any reform to occur that in cases where you are actually able to make progress on polarization, often unfortunately there needs to be some cataclysmic event that leads both sides to just shake out of it, like a fever for the fever to break. One example of this that we looked at in the book is Kenya after the election violence in 2007, which killed more than 1,000 people, where civil society, parties from both sides got together in a really serious way to draft the 2010 Constitution, which has not been perfect, but has created some institutions in Kenya as in particular really powerful Supreme Court to moderate that violence and to moderate that polarization. To your point though, I do think that you’re very right that both sides often end up playing the blame game and trying to prove that the other side is at fault, but that that’s really not a path that leads to anywhere productive. In the first place, it’s almost impossible to get politicians to admit that they’re at fault. They have no incentive to do so. But second, when you make the argument that the other side is the one to blame,ften you end up giving up hope that there are people on the other side that you could work with. And for example, I see this because a lot of people in the United States claim, especially liberal commentators, of course, that the Republican Party is to blame or the Republican Party has radicalized. And what I worry is that those people often give up hope of working with moderate Republicans, the people like Liz Cheney, and they instead target their arguments almost exclusively at liberal or democratic audiences. And I think that that’s the wrong approach, and I think that it’s something that often comes out of the idea that polarization in the US is asymmetric, that there’s no one on the other side that we could work with.

Zach: Yeah. Getting into that idea of one of the common obstacles or criticisms is the idea that we can’t negotiate with these people, and for an example, like on the liberal side, you’ll hear, we can’t negotiate on voting rights. And on the conservative side, you might hear, we can’t negotiate on trans issues with liberals who want to allow mutilation of kids. And to be clear, these aren’t my beliefs, I’m just quoting what I hear from both sides, these kinds of things. But that elides over a lot of nuance because the truth is that unless you want to enter a war, at some level, you do have to negotiate. You do have to reach negotiations because the truth is just that our fellow citizens do believe such vastly different things than us, and we do have to coexist with our fellow citizens. And I think the idea that, you know, negotiation isn’t possible or dialogue isn’t possible is impossible, is exactly part of the problem because if you start believing that, then the only option left is basically some sort of war. I’m curious if you have any thoughts on those kinds of we can’t negotiate types of statements.

Andrew: Well, Zach, I think this is one of the most difficult moral dilemmas that polarization poses, which is that often, especially in democracies, polarization results in significant anti-democratic behavior. And the question becomes whether or not we can, or within a society, people who stand up for and believe in democratic values should negotiate with decidedly anti-democratic figures. And different societies have struck this balance in different ways. In Latin America, after some extremely bloody and repressive and brutal military dictatorships, civilian governments often thought that the only way that they could rebuild democracy was to give some level of impunity to military torturers effectively. And there’s an argument that people in the left on the United States might make that voting rights should be non-negotiable. The other side is anti-democratic if they’re trying to make it harder for people to vote. And I think that that’s a balance that different democratic societies strike in different ways. There’s no one right answer to that question of whether or not it’s appropriate to negotiate with a side on the other side that is flagrantly violating democratic rules is and potentially in cases of dictatorships engaging in human rights violations.

Zach: A small note here in case it came across that I was acting like voting rights were trivial or something that we could easily compromise on, it’s definitely a serious topic, but I think there’s a lot more nuance even in that area than many people are aware of. For example, the fact that with all the anger around Georgia’s voting laws, it’s still easier to vote in Georgia than in quite a few other states, including some Democrat majority states. This is not to say that voting restrictions are not a problem and there’s nothing to worry about, but just to say that it’s possible to see some of the rhetoric around that topic as exaggerated in a way that makes it harder to have helpful conversations. And for another example, a majority of people, including a majority of Democrats, are shown in surveys to support requiring ID to vote. This is just to say that sometimes the issues we think are clearly a case of good versus bad can have a lot of nuance and a lot of room to make both sides happy, or at least both sides equally unhappy. And the more we talk about these issues as good versus bad and binary, and the more we act as if the other political group are completely irrational and incapable of discourse, the more we’ll accentuate our divides. But obviously there are no easy answers, especially the more polarized and high conflict as society becomes. Okay, back to the interview.

Zach: Yeah, there’s definitely no easy answers. The more these things get worse, I think that’s what makes these things just so hard to talk about because there’s always gonna be a range of responses and views of what the proper responses are.

Andrew: And can I add one, one point on this? I think that I wanna be extremely clear here, which is to say that I don’t think that reducing polarization is necessarily an end in itself. That reducing polarization should always be the goal of democratic activists and organizers. And I think that the best example of this is that pushing for democratic change, especially bringing new groups into politics, is often highly polarizing. And the US is a fantastic example of this, that during the civil rights movement in the 1960s, people that we now think of as rightly as American heroes like Dr. Martin Luther King were extremely polarizing and often hated figures. And so this is a pattern that repeats itself in other democracies that have serious democratic deficits, but often overcoming those deficits, especially of exclusion can be a tremendously polarizing process and often violent.

Zach: Yeah, it’s definitely not easy to talk about these things. And I would say when it comes to practical takeaways, if I had to sum things up about how I see it, it’s like aiming for depolarization is about thinking about the distorted ways that we speak about the other group and looking for ways to reduce that. It doesn’t mean not criticize or not working towards things. I think it’s just thinking about all the distorted things that we say, like on social media, like, this group is X and being aware that we can often make the same arguments but make them in a way that is more persuasive to the other side or towards the people in the middle. I think that’s the practical thing to me is focusing on like how we speak and really thinking about how we might be contributing.

Andrew: I think that’s a valuable framing that polarization, it certainly in those cases should not be gratuitous as you’re pointing out that conflict is not necessarily bad in a democracy, but it shouldn’t be in this way that distortedly demonizes the other side.

Zach: So you’ve studied polarization around the world and how it happens in many countries, how it plays out. And I’ve read that polarization has been rising in most countries since 2005. And maybe you could give a brief overview of that research and tell me if that’s an accurate summary of the way things are in the world currently.

Andrew: And I think that this is a key argument that my co-editor Tom Carothers and I make in our book Democracies Divided, is that polarization isn’t just an American problem, it’s a global one. That in many ways polarization in the United States stands out in terms of how old it is that we argue that polarization has been really gradually intensifying since the 1960s. But that if Americans take a broader view, we have a lot to learn from other countries because polarization is genuinely tearing at the seams of democracies globally. Countries like Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Poland, Turkey, Venezuela, all of these countries have experienced really sharp affective polarization around deep identity divides. So to your first point, I think it’s absolutely true in sort of survey data run by The Varieties of Democracy Project that polarization appears to be an increasing trend. Scholars have of course debated the causes of that, whether it’s globally applicable forces like social media or more particular domestic forces like the rise of populist or illiberal leaders. But one thing that I would point out thinking in global terms is that the more– in the book we looked at the experiences of other divided democracies– the more we realized that US polarization is extremely unusual and extremely worrying. 

The first thing that was unusual, and I’ve mentioned this, is that polarization in the United States has been accumulating for a very long time. Today’s divisions date back at least to the 1960s, so 60 years. And most other cases of polarization are much more recent in origin. Another thing is that the US effect of polarization is extremely distinctive and that it combines a combination of ethnic, religious and ideological divisions. In many other countries, polarization really hinges on one of those key identities. 

In Kenya, it’s the division between the Kikuyu and Luo and Kalenjin and other ethnic groups that often drives polarization. In Turkey, the polarization is in particular rooted around Islamist versus secularist conceptions of Turkish national identity. But in the United States, this is something that we as Americans don’t often think about because it’s the air that we breathe. Ethnic, religious, and ideological divisions really interlock in a very powerful way that we call the iron triangle of polarization in the United States. On the one hand, the US is part of this global picture, rising polarization, but there are reasons to be in particular very concerned about the United States.

Zach: So obviously, every country is unique with its own issues and different types of governance and different personalities to name a few factors. But I’m curious if you see the underlying human psychology, the group versus group psychology that arises, do you see it as being pretty much the same?

Andrew: I do think that polarizing leaders often appeal to very similar types of social identity divides and that this division between ingroup and outgroup is deeply rooted in human psychology. I think that the social or emotional bases that leaders appeal to is often different. There are different kinds of ideologies for example that leaders appeal to on the left or on the right. Polarization isn’t of all the same flavor, you could say, in every different country. But I think that these divisions appeal to deeply rooted human impulses. You need to look no further than how much people love sports teams, how much we get emotionally attached to a sports team. The stakes are so low in practical speaking terms for me whether or not the Yankees win, but we’re just emotionally attached to our group. 

So I think that this desire for this group has a tendency in human life is just an incredibly powerful force. And mobilizing that into political conflict, of course, supercharges this us versus them divide. Because often so much is at stake in terms of policy resources and status in a country when these polarized divides are mobilized.

Zach: Would it be accurate to say that if there are a good number of people in a country that have high poverty and don’t have much to eat, that seems to me like it might be a separate emotional, psychological thing going on like a different class of polarization if you’ve got those kinds of things leading to polarization versus like countries that are doing better financially and such that they come to be very polarized. Is that accurate to say?

Andrew: That’s very interesting. Actually, in this book Democracies Divided, we looked at nine different countries that are along a very broad spectrum of the income distribution, so extremely wealthy countries like the United States, more middle-income countries like Poland and Turkey and then also lower income countries like Bangladesh and India. We didn’t find actually that poverty or the relative level of income in these countries made the difference in terms of shaping the variety of polarization. 

What we did find is that often it’s not the amount of income that makes a difference, but rather a sense of relative deprivation that precipitates in a cycle of anger against the political class, which is not the same as polarization. But two great examples of this are Turkey in 2002 and then Venezuela in the late 1990s. Just to briefly summarize, I think that in cases where a massive economic crisis really undermines the standard of living, people often revolt against the political class and that this creates an opportunity because the political parties are so weak for a polarizing figure like a Chavez in Venezuela or an Erdogan in Turkey to come to power. 

So I think that really the key is often a relative decline in living standards brought about by an economic crisis. It doesn’t necessarily cause polarization, but it can weaken and debilitate existing political parties and create the opportunity for a new polarizing force to come to power.

Zach: When it comes to comparing the polarization in the United States with other countries either up today in countries today or countries in the past, are there certain countries, other nations that you see as somewhat similar in terms of how polarization is playing out here?

Andrew: Absolutely. To begin as I mentioned, I do think that US polarization is extremely distinctive. But I think that as the US starts looking for ways to manage our divisions, we need to be thinking about comparative cases. Two countries in particular come to mind. The first perhaps surprisingly for many Americans is the Latin American country of Chile during the 1970s. 

Chile, many Americans may not know, was the model poster child for democracy in Latin America in the 1960s, the 1970s. It was seen as having one of the most effective rule of law systems, the most stable democracies, one of the most prosperous economies. Polarization ripped Chilean democracy apart. In the specific case of Chile, actually, the United States was involved in fomenting the 1973 coup d’état. 

Second, I think that other countries that are similar are often Eastern European cases like Poland and also Turkey that combined this ideological polarization often with religious or ethnic tones. I think that in these cases, one of the unfortunate lessons is that polarization can often totally overrun the rule of law institutions that we think will keep political competition in bounds. Poland is a really sobering example of this that the constitutional court in Poland, basically the tribunal ruled that the incumbent government populist far-right government couldn’t appoint certain justices to the Supreme Court. The president of Poland just refused to listen and obey what the constitutional orders. In Turkey as well, judicial independence is basically been driven into the ground. 

I think that what’s really sobering about these comparative cases is the sheer extent of democratic erosion that’s been experienced in the Chilean case where polarization destroyed a very old democracy that people thought would be able to withstand it and in places like Poland and Turkey where institutions are not as deeply rooted as they are in the United States. But nonetheless, they’ve been extremely weakened in their capacity to constrain the government.

Zach: One thing I’ve wondered is you hear a lot of examples of right-wing authoritarian countries that have resulted from polarization. I know it can be hard to exactly quantify things in those terms, but I’m curious, are there well-known examples more associated with liberal or left-wing polarization and authoritarianism? Hugo Chavez is my understanding he would be categorized as a left-wing populist. Is that accurate? If that’s true, are there other examples like that?

Andrew: Yes. In fact, perhaps surprisingly, the Latin American political scientist Sebastian Mazzuca has argued that polarizing left-wing populist parties are in many ways more dangerous for democracy than populist right wing parties. That is to say given the fact that you have a populist party that’s come to power and wants to erode your democracy, would you rather it be a far-right party or a far-left party? 

Perhaps counterintuitively, Mazzuca’s point is that left-wing parties that came to power like Chavez in Venezuela but also the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Evo Morales in Bolivia, that because these left-wing parties centered their political message on expanding state programs, expanding resources, including cash transfers to the poor, built up the state apparatus in many ways by investing in new social programs, these regimes turned out to be quite durable in terms of staying in power because they were providing lots of resources to voters. Those resources ultimately became a certain form of clientelism or a tit for tat we the Chavez guys are going to give you the resources in exchange for votes that this became a mechanism through which they stayed in power. I think that there are certainly examples of left-wing governments that have moved towards authoritarian politics. 

The other thing I would say is that I think many Americans misunderstand the right-wing governments in places like Poland and Turkey. We often think of these people as being right-wing in the sense of perhaps economically conservative when in fact it couldn’t be further from the truth that the Law and Justice government in Poland, the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, both of these right-wing parties are conservative on religious issues, for example, but they spend a ton of money, they dole out patronage, they provide support for new families, child allowances, these kinds of things. That is a huge part of their appeal, which is that they give a lot of money to ordinary citizens, and especially to their supporters. 

I think that there’s a mixed picture here. The story isn’t totally one of right-wing governments eroding democracy, that in many ways it’s a more complex one.

Zach: I’ve been pretty surprised and maybe even shocked at how little polarization as a concept is discussed by politicians and journalists and pundits and such. As we’ve discussed, it’s such a super common human dynamic and happens to so many countries and yet it barely seems talked about outside of academic world or a few people that are interested in depolarization. I think that gets back to what we were talking about how polarization creates an environment where it’s hard to talk about polarization. But I’m curious if do you think if we took the approach of trying to get more people to talk about it and treat that as a valuable thing to promote and got more people talking about it, do you think that’s one way to combat and lower the temperature on these things?

Andrew: I think that is very important, because I think that in many ways politics generally suffers from the problem, and I’m not just talking about the United States but more broadly, the problem of extreme motivated voices dominating the conversation. Just take a very concrete and tangible example, gun rights in the United States. There is a very broad majority of Americans who support universal background checks or some form of background checks before purchasing, especially the most lethal firearms, but you very rarely hear from the ordinary Americans… I might say, let’s put you in that position, Zach. You may be a gun rights advocate or a gun control advocate. I don’t know. 

But my point more broadly is that on issues where there is actually mass agreement on an issue, one problem is that the extreme voices tend to dominate. This is, for example, groups like the National Rifle Association, or NRA, which is a very loud voice speaking up for the maximalist position on the right to own and bear arms. 

I think that part of the problem that you’re very astutely pointing out is that these voices in the middle, people who care about the polarization, who care about a more central politics are often drowned out in conversation by people who have very specific policy demands. Because people who care very deeply about a specific policy, whether it’s for example a total ban on abortion or a total ban on a specific type of legal firearm, those voices tend to dominate the conversation much more than people advocating for lowering the temperature in the room.

Zach: And it might be obvious, but even aside from the depolarization attempts, the people aimed at depolarization, it seems just even trying to have that conversation is so hard even just to broach a subject. I guess maybe it’s related. It’s all related. You can’t talk about depolarization. You can’t talk about polarization. But it’s just so strange to me that it’s such a common human dynamic. And so obviously inside of us, for us to behave this way is so common, but it’s like why don’t you see people talking on the news about journalist talking more about all this is similar to other things that have happened throughout history or are happening now throughout the world. 

We have this almost like some people have said it’s due to our sense of American exceptionalism that we’re different, but I almost think it’s just due to how polarization works. Because we in a polarized environment, a polarized society will always see its own issues as being unique and important and not really related to these other things that have happened to other people, then that’s what’s so pernicious about polarization because it feels the thing you’re going through is so important, it’s so life or death or whatever. That is what makes it so powerful that it’s not relatable to these other things, even though they’ve happened a million times.

Andrew: I think that’s a crucial point that in many ways, every country is dealing with its own struggle over national identity. What we find looking across different cases of polarization is that really often the core of the issue is fundamentally different conceptions of national identity. So different ideas of India, for example, is India a secular country or is it a Hindu nation? In Turkey, is Turkey an Islamic country first and foremost or is it a secular state? In the United States, what should the rule of religion be in public life? These are very… The specific context and history of course plays out in a different way, but there is a clear pattern of differences fundamentally related to national identity and to brilliant scholars of polarization. 

Jennifer McCoy who you’ve hosted on the podcast and her colleague Murat Somer find that this is what they call formative rifts that often in the process of creating a country, there are unresolved divisions about what that national identity should be like. That is something that every country grapples with in its own unique way, but it’s a common pattern that we have a lot to learn from other cases, especially the United States where we’re often closed to that kind of comparative perspective.

Zach: It’s my own belief that many liberals are a bit oblivious to the ways in which liberals can contribute to polarization. I think for me, the obliviousness from some people is just due to the fact that liberal thought and perspectives dominate so much of mainstream media in the form of TV, news, shows, movies, educational institutions. And so, this can make it pretty hard to really understand other points of view, even reasonable and well-meaning points of view on the conservative side, and to really see how some liberal rhetoric can be seen as divisive. So basically, the idea that it’s a bit of a bubble basically.

A small note here, if you’re looking for an example of what I mean by some liberal rhetoric being divisive, I’d recommend a previous episode of mine where I interviewed Leonie Huddy on the topic of liberal side perceptions of racism in America. I’d also recommend checking out John McWhorter’s book Woke Racism, which examines some of the divisive aspects of liberal side stances on racism. 

One politically liberal political researcher I corresponded with said that he believed that more than half of our challenge with polarization was getting liberals to see the ways in which they contributed to polarization. To take another example, and a recent paper by Heidi and Guy Burgess about applying conflict resolution strategies to polarization, they said the following, “The objective of the progressive left seems more ambitious. To cancel and drive from the public square, anyone who has ever expressed the slightest doubt about the merits of any aspect of the progressive agenda.” Those are just a few examples. 

I think it’s important to understand how it is that rational and well-meaning people can see liberals as being divisive. This doesn’t mean you have to agree with that, but I do think making the attempt to see those points of view can help us understand our fellow Americans a bit better and make dialogue more possible. 

Okay, back to the interview.

What’s your take on that? Do you think the more we talk about these problems do you think more people will be aware of the ways they might be contributing?

Andrew: I think in any context to polarization, whether willingly or consciously or not, both sides are contributing to polarization. I think that the biggest way you see this is often certain kinds of purity tests that take place in terms of the willingness of individuals to engage in conversation in good faith dialogue. That often part of the problem is that certain people perspectives are seen as immediately disqualifying, that there’s no need for further conversation, that that’s the end of the story. But I think that this is a problem too that often both sides live in a certain form of echo chamber, that certain types of media should have constantly exposed individuals to one perspective even if they try to be balanced in terms of the issues that they prioritize and otherwise. 

But I think what’s difficult is that in any polarized society, there’s not really a neutral position. So the best that you can do is try to incorporate as a collectively as possible different perspectives to listen and to avoid that kind of critique. So I think you’re absolutely right that on both sides, people are often not fully conscious of the ways in which they’re contributing to polarization.

Zach: I’m curious if you have any thoughts about the idea that the modern world in making us more isolated from each other, more lonely as shown in studies and such has created a situation that is conducive to more polarization? Because it seems like the more lonely we are, the more isolated we are from each other socially, the more we’ll look not to the people around us for meaning, but the more we’ll look to these big distant fights, these more conceptual fights about who we are and these fights that give us a sense of meaning. I’m curious if you think that our increased isolation in the modern world could be a big factor here in explaining what seems to be almost like a modern pandemic of polarization?

Andrew: That is a fascinating question. I think the world is going through a huge test of this right now as we look at the political aftershocks of the COVID-19 pandemic, that increased isolation and loneliness due to people’s political preferences? I think that there is evidence, as you pointed out, that loneliness can shape political preferences in that way. But polarization and loneliness can also be deemed mobilizing. It can demobilize people politically, people become less politically active. Or in terms of political science, they have a lower sense of efficacy or a feeling that they can change the world, get involved in politics, for example. So I think that the jury is still out on that question. 

One thing I will point out though, as you’ve said, is that often that polarization is deeply entrenched in human psychology in many ways, these kinds of us versus them divisions. I think that what has changed is not necessarily perhaps that people are more lonely, but that they have much greater access to people who are willing to spread deeper polarizing messages. So if you think about this in a variety of contexts, it seems that political establishments that previously represented centrist political positions have been losing ground. This is partially because of media contro,l the way that social media has increased the ability of new politicians like a Trump or a Bolsonaro in Brazil to spread polarizing messages and circumvent the new usual channels of the media like TV. But it’s also the way that people like Trump and Bolsonaro are able to crowdsource funds as part of their campaign. So I think that part of the modern world’s effect has also been that political parties that were once moderators of the democratic discussion are becoming less powerful and less capable of shielding us from or constraining the most polarizing voices in the system.

Zach: Yeah, that gets into something I think about a good amount, which is we often talk about the role of social media or the role of media or whatever. I think it’s a mistake to view social media as like this separate thing from all the other technology and media that’s been in process for decades cable TV and all this stuff, the internet in general. To me, it’s like it’s just this amplification of information load, these messages flying all around us. We’re bombarded in the modern age with messages with information. It’s almost like all these things are just an amplification of what humans do in the first place. We already clearly have the capacity to be polarized pre-high technology. But then you add in basically like this accelerant, this amphetamine of human experience, these messages flying everywhere around us and it allows us to build these perspectives, these narratives, these us versus them narratives just that much more quickly because we’ve got these messages flying around. So it’s almost like I really see these things as just an accelerant of human social interactions, whether that there’s good aspects of that obviously and there’s dark aspects of social psychology. That’s how I view it. I’m curious if you have any thoughts there?

Andrew: No, I think that’s exactly right that in many ways social media is the intensification of a previous trend toward the diversification of the media landscape, that the rise of new cable channels like Fox TV, for example, are represented in the late 1990s and early 2000s and a broader symptom of a world in which political establishments have much less control over who is going to be on the ballot, who’s going to be the president.

Zach: This is great. I think we covered a lot of things. Is there anything else you’d like to mention that we haven’t mentioned?

Andrew: Just that I think podcasts are a great medium for deconstructing or rather pushing back against polarization. It’s great to have a long thoughtful conversation. So thank you, Zach.

Zach: Thanks, Andrew.

That was Andrew O’Donohue, co-author of Democracies Divided. And just a reminder that I interviewed Andrew’s co-author, Thomas Carothers, in an earlier episode. 

And just a reminder that I have other polarization-related episodes. If you go to my site behavior-podcast.com and look at the page for this episode, you’ll find some links to those. If I had to recommend one episode, I’d say check out the recent interview with Thomas Hornsey, where we talk about group psychology and polarization, and persuasion. 

I also wanted to say that it’s hard to talk about these topics. It is hard to talk about polarization because by talking about it, you touch on such controversial and emotion-producing topics. It’s a bit like walking through a minefield, because no matter how careful you are to speak in persuasive or bridge-building ways, in a polarized society there will be a good number of people on both sides of an issue who will take offense at the things you say, who will hear something that angers them and say “these depolarization people are clueless, they don’t really understand what’s going on.” Personally I’ve experienced people on both sides filtering the things I say through the worst possible interpretations, essentially sifting my language for signs of insults to their group, or signs of having hidden, malicious motives, or just of being clueless and oblivious. 

I mention this just to say that hopefully you can see how for a society to get better, it might require more people to try to overcome our emotional reactions a bit more, and listen to more viewpoints, and try to see the well meaning motivations and goals of others, and examine their ideas. And sometimes those ideas will at first seem strange or insulting or oblivious to us, but sometimes they’ll make more sense the more you think about them and see how they can be practically applied. 

This has been the People Who Read People podcast with me, Zach Elwood. Again, if you like this podcast, please share it with your family and friends. 

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Are eye movement patterns related to personality traits?, with Sabrina Hoppe

A talk with research Sabrina Hoppe, who specializes in machine learning and cognitive science. Hoppe was part of a team who worked on a 2018 paper titled Eye movements during everyday behavior predict personality traits. Transcript of this talk is below. We talk about that research and what was found. Topics include: how that study was set up; how strong the correlations were; the possible reasons why there might be relationships between eye movements and personality; and other research in that area.

Episode links:

Resources discussed in this episode or related to the topic:

TRANSCRIPT

Zach Elwood: Welcome to the People Who Read People podcast with me, Zach Elwood. This is a podcast about better understanding other people and better understanding ourselves. You can learn more about it at www.behavior-podcast.com

There are quite a few studies that have found connections between people’s eye movements and their personality traits. These studies typically take the form of having subjects wear eye tracking hardware while performing various tasks, and then looking for correlations between the eye movements and the subjects’ rankings on various personality tests. 

In this episode, I talk with Sabrina Hoppe; her last name is spelled HOPPE. Sabrina is a researcher who specializes in machine learning and cognitive science. Sabrina has worked on several research projects related to eye movements. A 2018 paper she and others worked on was called Eye movements during everyday behavior predict personality traits, and that’s the one we’ll focus on in this talk. 

To quote from the abstract of that paper: 

Here we show that eye movements during an everyday task predict aspects of our personality. We tracked eye movements of 42 participants while they ran an errand on a university campus and subsequently assessed their personality traits using well-established questionnaires. Using a state-of-the-art machine learning method and a rich set of features encoding different eye movement characteristics, we were able to reliably predict four of the Big Five personality traits (neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness) as well as perceptual curiosity only from eye movements. Further analysis revealed new relations between previously neglected eye movement characteristics and personality. Our findings demonstrate a considerable influence of personality on everyday eye movement control, thereby complementing earlier studies in laboratory settings. Improving automatic recognition and interpretation of human social signals is an important endeavor, enabling innovative design of human–computer systems capable of sensing spontaneous natural user behavior to facilitate efficient interaction and personalization.

It makes some instinctual sense that our personalities, how we experience and interact with the world, would relate to how we move our eyes. Our eyes are how we explore our environment, the things and people around us. 

For me personally, I’ve noticed that when I’m more anxious, my eye movements are more restrained, more frozen. And that’s just what I’ve noticed; it wouldn’t surprise me if there were other patterns I haven’t noticed. And it wouldn’t surprise me that some of those ways I move and use my eyes are not just situation or emotion-based, but are part of the way I interact with the world, part of my personality. 

When it comes to poker, one important poker tell can be how someone’s eyes move when they’re bluffing compared to when they’re betting a strong hand; often people who are more anxious will tend to be more frozen in general, and this can manifest in how they move their eyes. A player who makes a big bet and whose gaze travels around to various places, who has more dynamic eye movement; that person is likely to be relaxed and have a big hand. 

I mention these things just to give some of the specific reasons I’m interested in eye tracking research. And I hope to do more episodes on this topic in future. 

Okay, here’s the talk with Sabrina Hoppe.

Zach Elwood: Hi Sabrina, welcome to the show.

Sabrina: Hi, thanks for having me.

Zach Elwood: So you’ve done a good amount of research involving eye tracking and psychology. Was eye tracking something you were interested in early on? And if so, what was your interest in that?

Sabrina: I started my studies actually in computer science, and a bit later I discovered that I was also interested in psychology. And then eye tracking seemed to be a very nice area where I could use my computer science knowledge, but then apply it to psychology because eye movements are so nice to be recorded, and then you can do a lot of data analysis and stuff that this computer science part of me would be interested in. And then of course, additionally, I found that you can have so many interesting questions to answer like looking into concepts like personality, which we will talk about later, and I just thought that this was a really nice area then.

Zach Elwood: Yeah, one thing that struck me looking at the raw data was just the huge amount of data that was gathered by the computer, and it seems like that would be pretty hard to do without computers. Am I getting that right?

Sabrina: Yes, definitely. This type of study wouldn’t have worked without a computer for sure.

Zach Elwood: So maybe you could give a little bit of summary on the existing research that was around before you did the study on eye movements and the correlation with personality. Was it pretty widely accepted beforehand that eye movements were related or correlated with personality states?

Sabrina: Yes. So it was widely accepted that there is a correlation in laboratory settings. Meaning if a person comes in and then you sit them or you let them sit down in an kind of isolated room, no audio distraction, no other people, and they have this one clear task, which would be look at specific images which have been pre-selected to show them, so in this very, very restricted setting, there it was well accepted that there would be a connection between personality and some measurements that you could take from the gaze. But what was new about our study was just taking this to the real world. So we really just sent them go shopping on a campus and maybe they met other people on their way, maybe they had some everyday life things to do on their way, and yet we could still detect this link between gaze and personality, and that was the new part.

Zach Elwood: Do you see your study as strongly contributing to making the case of that link between eye movements and personality or do you think that that was already a respected idea and your work was just part of it?

Sabrina: I think the idea was respected, but we made it stronger because we showed that you can really detect this pretty much no matter what the human is doing or at least it far less matters what the human is doing than we originally thought. So if you think about it, there’s so much that could come up in the real world. Your attention could be somewhere entirely different or you look at something, at other people and so on. And through all of this, we can still detect personality. I think that was a new idea, we really contributed to showing how strong this impact of personality on your gaze is.

Zach Elwood: And if I was correct on my understanding, it wasn’t based on the situation at all, it was just purely an analysis of eye movements, regardless of the situation. They were going out in the real world and going to the shop and such, but the analysis was just purely on how their eyes moved and the traits of how their eyes moved. Is that correct?

Sabrina: Yes, exactly. So we only know kind of in a 2D setting how the eye moved, and we don’t even know what they were looking at. So we don’t make a distinction if that was a face or an object or the way, whatever.

Zach Elwood: Maybe you could talk about the specifics of what you found, what were the most interesting findings to you and how reliable were the findings and such?

Sabrina: So we looked into the big five, which would be five different personality traits. And then out of those five, we could actually detect four in the gaze. That was surprising, I would say, at first, because four out of five would be relatively broad. So it’s not just one specific trait of a human that you can detect, but actually kind of a range of potential personality traits. Plus we also looked into curiosity, which we could also detect, and the performance of our classifier, so of this machine learning method which we applied in the end was above chance. So quite clearly it’s not a finding that would have happened just by kind of random influences on the data, but the performance is not as great as you might expect. So if you just pick a person now and we apply the method on this one person, actually we would achieve at most something like a 50% chance to be right in what we do. However, why this is still interesting is that we took the personality scores for each person and we divided them into three classes. So we had people with a low score, a medium score and a high score. And then kind of chance level if you were guessing would be one third, and we reached something which is up to roughly one half, so it’s above chance level. And that’s basically the exciting part for this data science perspective and just the statistics, but it doesn’t mean that it’s actually super accurate for a single person.

Zach Elwood: So there were three classes of each personality trait. And chance would’ve been a third, but for the ones that predicted well, it was picking those at a 50% chance instead of a 33% chance. Is that basically what was happening?

Sabrina: Yes, exactly. Most of the scores were between 40 and 50%.

Zach Elwood: So what are the specific traits it predicted? Which ones stood out for you as being the most interesting and are you able to say what the actual eye movements were like for those traits?

Sabrina: So the big five that I just mentioned would be neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and contentiousness. And we could detect four, and the one we could not detect is openness. Now, I’m not sure I can make sense of that to be honest, I mean, it’s purely the finding just of our data. It does make sense to me that you can find extraversion, because as a human I would have this intuition that that is something I can see in other people. The way they look at me, I feel like I could judge if they would be willing to talk to new people and you know.

Zach Elwood: Right, they look around more, things like that.

Sabrina: Yeah. So that’s not a very scientific way to approach this, but intuitively to me, it makes sense that you can see extraversion in a gaze movement, in eye movements. On the other hand, somehow that’s also very related to openness actually, and you cannot detect openness. So certainly there would still be lots of room to look into what exactly now makes the difference between extraversion and openness. Why can you detect one but not the other?

Zach Elwood: I know in some machine learning studies there’s a bit of what they call the black box aspect, where you’re not really sure what exactly it’s finding. But I’m wondering if that’s true of this research, are you able to say exactly what it was finding that was correlated with these personality traits? For example, for neuroticism, are you able to say, what was it finding in the eye movements or otherwise that was correlated with neuroticism?

Sabrina: I guess with machine learning approaches, there’s always a little bit of this black box effect, but the method we chose at the time has it less than other methods at least. So normally in machine learning, there is the concept that you have the raw data, that would just be all this data that we recorded as you said. And then we extract something that we call features. So that would be you first analyze the gaze and you try to identify periods of time when the person executes a fixation, which would be gaze at one place for a longer period of time, typically in order to get information from this one place, and then there are saccades in which the person just jumps to the next point, those are like super rapid movements. And so there are different kinds of these movements, you analyze these. And then you extract numbers from them, how long did fixation on average take? What peak velocity did the quick movements reach? I don’t know, hundreds of them really. And afterwards we throw all of these measurements into our machine learning approach. And so at least we know what we extracted. So maybe for some reason because of prior work, for example, you could have a hypothesis that exactly the duration of fixations or something else has particular impact. And then we would be able to verify whether or not this was an important feature in our analysis. But the other way round, so just coming from what the classifier does in the end, it’s really hard to understand entirely what it’s doing, because it’s not based on a single feature, it’s this combination of hundreds of things and then they have some waiting factor and it’s really hard to tell after all. So what is it? It’s not like I as a human could say, “I try to learn this technique now, and I’m going to analyze exactly that.”

Zach Elwood: So is it accurate to say my understanding is for a lot of these machine learning studies, it’s kind of accurate to say that the machine knows something that we can’t know or find out. Is that accurate?

Sabrina: Yes, because we somehow cannot process so many small pieces of information which are seemingly maybe seemingly irrelevant or seemingly unrelated, we can’t process them together as a human, and the machine obviously doesn’t care.

Zach Elwood: If I want to know what the various data was, the specific movements and such related to neuroticism, for example, I can’t really know that, is that basically what you’re saying?

Sabrina: You can do an analysis in the end, so I could give you a ranking of which features were most important. You can know, yes, but it’s still not this one feature. It’s not like the algorithm selects one thing and then says, “That’s it, that makes a neurotic, but it’s always about this combination and that’s hard to grasp, but you could write down the math if you wanted.

Zach Elwood: Have you done that with the various personality traits? Have you shown which eye movements and such and kinds of eye movements were what it was finding in the analysis?

Sabrina: Yes, we did that. But that’s quite hard to decipher as a human.

Zach Elwood: Yeah, it’s pretty hard to… That was the challenge I was getting through. It was hard to find the summary, because like you’re saying, it’s taking into account so many things basically is what you’re saying.

Sabrina: Yes. So if you would check this table in our publication where we did this analysis, a lot of it is about what we call [n-gram] analysis. This would be sequences of eye movements. So if you think we have fixations, blinks, and saccades, then you could combine them in different ways. So it could go blink, saccade, blink or if it was linked three, you can do all sorts of combinations. And then there we just counted them and we analyzed which of the combinations of movements was the most frequent. And now you can say in the end that the most frequent movement which is consisting of three parts somehow seems to be more linked to openness than to others. But that’s very unintuitive I would say. So as a human, you go out of that and you’re like, “Okay, that’s the math, but what does it tell me?” And I think that’s where this black box effect comes in that you talk about. We can write down the math and we can show you what exact analysis we did and then we can score it, and we can tell you this was important, but it’s still not an explanation that a human is…

Zach Elwood: Right. It’s not easy to make sense of.

Sabrina: Exactly.

Zach Elwood: Probably getting into the realm of opinions and conjecture, but do you have opinions about what might be… For example, if we take neuroticism, it seems to be possible to imagine someone being neurotic and having a lot of eye movements or also having very little. For example, one can imagine different patterns existing, one can imagine scanning around for threats and such and being nervous in that way versus someone being kind of overwhelmed by sensory input or threats or whatever, the sense of threat, and kind of shutting down a bit and moving their eyes less. And I’m curious if you have any thoughts on the kinds of nuance and variations that might be involved in these kind of broad personality traits. We sometimes tend to give a general term to things that contain a whole lot of nuance.

Sabrina: Yes, definitely. I think this already starts with what these traits mean. I mean, how did we come up with the fact that there are these five factors in psychology, which is a quite widespread model for personality traits. And still the way that they were defined is basically just by looking at how we describe people. And I think in every language of the world, there are millions of words that you could use to describe another person. And then the research is around the, I think, 1950s or so, they try to figure out which of these descriptions typically come together and then try to identify only a few dimensions in which humans would typically differ. So this is somehow the collection of things which we now look at when we talk about one of these traits like neuroticism which has emerged from these verbal descriptions of people. But of course, it’s still because humans cover such a big variety and neuroticism–

Zach Elwood: And [unintelligible 19.04]

Sabrina: Yes, it’s such a collection of things that just by itself even the category we have there, detecting neuroticism, means all sorts of things. And then additionally, if we picked one, still I believe that it’s entirely possible that different people with this, let’s say, symptom of neuroticism exhibit a different case pattern, because for somebody it leads to slowing down, for the other person speeding up, who knows?

Zach Elwood: Yeah, and you can imagine the same for the PCI which I think is the perceptual curiosity index. And I think they called it perceptual curiosity because kind of in a similar way you can imagine there being different kinds of curiosity. You can imagine there being someone who’s curious about concepts and internal ideas, and that wouldn’t necessarily manifest as someone who seems more visual curious whose eyes move around to different places and such. Would you agree with that, that that also contains a lot of nuance there?

Sabrina: Yes, definitely. You’re right. So curiosity is a very broad term as well, and that’s why psychologists have invented subcategories such as perceptual curiosity. And then still perceptual curiosity could also just be directed towards sounds, and then why would that show up in your gaze? So even there we’re actually only targeting a subcategory, but I’m not aware of a default way to assess only the visual part of perceptual curiosity.

Zach Elwood: We talked about this a little bit, but what were the findings from this specific study that stood out the most to you as being interesting or surprising?

Sabrina: I think the most surprising one to me is just on a very high level that even if people just go out and follow some everyday kind of task, we can still do some prediction about their personality. I think it’s stunning that that works. And then we also checked if we look at the two ways, so the way to the shop and the way from the shop, but we cut out the shopping itself, do these measurements correlate? And then we compare the two situations, so the recording inside of the shop versus the recording on the way there and back. And actually they do correlate which means that even inside the shop or on the way, we’re kind of able to detect the personality traits. Now there are differences, the way there correlates better with the way back than with the time inside the shop. But still it’s there, and you can detect these personality traits sort of independent of this situation. And I think that’s quite interesting to see because there’s so much that changes, just the scene that people look at and you have to use your eyes in order to do the shopping and select your item you want to buy, there would be a person to talk to pay, maybe you meet somebody and so on.

Zach Elwood: Yeah, it is interesting that, and it makes sense instinctually that the way we experience the world would play out in how we look at things. There is an instinctual element to why these findings would exist.

Sabrina: Yes. And there are also studies for other types of how we perceive the world. So I know that there are studies about optimism. So optimists have a significantly different gaze at certain images than pessimist people.

Zach Elwood: Right. If I remember correctly, they were more likely to look away from bad negative images. Am I getting that right?

Sabrina: Yes. So I only recall one study in particular, probably there are more out there. But there is this one study where they presented skin cancer images to optimists and non-optimists, and then the finding was indeed that optimists tend to look less at the negative images while there’s no difference in sort of more neutral face images.

Zach Elwood: And there was another one that stood out to me, it involved doing trivia questions. And people who ranked as more curious, their eyes would look more towards the source, the incoming source of where the answers would come from later. And so there was this correlation between anticipatory eye movement basically and curiosity.

Sabrina: Ah, yes. That’s actually a good example for a well-controlled study. So it’s just participants who look at a specifically designed interface, and it’s designed in such a way that the answer would come from somewhere where there’s nothing else to see. So basically in the end you can really derive something about who was looking there and why would they look there.

Zach Elwood: And you’re saying, because it was so simple and there were so few factors to study, that it really was a well-designed study.

Sabrina: Yes, exactly. And then so maybe it’s a little less surprising that it works, so it seems more obvious that you can detect something. But this type of study makes it much more easy to derive thorough statements in the end. You really know it’s this anticipatory gaze, for instance. Maybe this occurred in our study, but actually we don’t know to be honest, because all sorts of things could have happened.

Zach Elwood: Right. It’s almost like yours is studying everything which includes all these minute things that people can find in these very specific studies, but yours is grouping all these various things together which makes it hard to disentangle.

Sabrina: Yes. And that’s then also this kind of computer science data analysis challenge which I personally like which would be, given this enormous mess of effect, can I still come up with something that would be able to detect one of them in the end?

Zach Elwood: So when it comes to maybe the more practical aspects of these kinds of studies, what do you see the practical aspects as?

Sabrina: We already discussed that actually the performance for you human that you would pick and where you try to detect which personality they may have is relatively low. So therefore I think the main application, if you would call that application, which is [B science], I would hope that it just inspires more people to look into eye movements or understanding humans in general which would just be research, basic research. And then if one day these methods would work better, I think there’s also wide range of applications where you could use them, just we’re not there yet. So this could just be something like smart gadgets that we have. It could be a household robot which is able to detect what personality does my owner have and then react to that. Maybe you need to talk more to an extrovert person as a robot than you would need to talk to somebody who’s less extrovert. Or maybe it’s about teaching scenarios. So if there is a remote tool that students are supposed to be using in order to learn something, then it would be useful probably if the tool could automatically realize what kind of kid is it sitting in front and how could I motivate them in order to learn. Because there, again, maybe you need to talk differently to them depending on their personality. And finally, I think probably there are also opportunities for clinical usage. So being able to understand gaze more holistically I think would also enable us to kind of filter out the relevant information for specific gaze-related symptoms that clinical patients would have. So normally of course, we don’t look at their personality so much, but there I’m more thinking if you record gaze from a patient who has some symptoms which are gaze-related, then it would be nice if you could kind of subtract the impact that their personality has in order to be left with only the signal that you’re actually interested in.

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Zach Elwood: Yeah. It makes me think of futuristic therapy scenarios where somebody walks into a therapist’s office and they get scanned in various ways. And it’s almost like it would pick up some pieces of information from their eye movements, some from their tone of voice, maybe some from their actual content. And it just makes me think of these scenarios where all these things combined could be a quicker way to get started and diagnose what people are suffering from theoretically.

Sabrina: Right, yes, I could imagine that as well.

Zach Elwood: Very far off obviously, but just thinking about potential future applications.

Sabrina: Yeah, and slightly scary.

Zach Elwood: Yeah, a little scary.

Sabrina: I’m not sure that’s the kind of setting where I envision myself to be proud of, “Oh, see, look, that’s where it led us.” I guess it would be possible.

Zach Elwood: Yeah. I think there’s a lot of risks of even if it’s done well, those kind of things are exactly the kind of things that make people nervous, the kind of people suffering from those things. So it’s kind of a catch 22, even if it was very well done. Feeling like there’s some machine analyzing you is exactly what many people suffering from delusions think. So there can be some problems with that. So I was curious, with the kinds of correlations found in your study and other eye tracking and personality studies, do you think some of those things it finds are pointing to things that people know kind of instinctually that we may just not know consciously? For example, we sometimes get a sense of how people are and what their personalities are from interacting with them, and maybe some of those things that we’re gathering from people in an instinctual social way are some of the things these studies are finding in a more explicit way. Do you think that’s possible?

Sabrina: Yes, I would agree to that. So I also have the impression that we do have a lot of knowledge just as human very implicitly, in particular about other humans, that’s kind of our daily business dealing with them. And I think looking somebody in the eye or watching other people is a very good example. Humans are really trained to have some impression of another person. It’s like this first impression just within a few seconds you have made so many decisions about the other person. And none of us can put into words how we would do that. It’s actually quite an incredible skill. And we are very, very far away from doing this with something like artificial intelligence or with… So just being able to say what it works like, but then also building something which does the same analysis is near impossible. But I think you’re right that with a lot of studies, and in particular with these more controlled, well designed studies, researchers try to get closer to understanding what exactly it is.

Zach Elwood: I think the uncertainty and the noise in the data, the ambiguity in the data, from the other side it helps explain how badly our human instincts can go wrong too. For example, we sometimes have these mistaken assumptions about other people, these kind of stereotypes. So if someone’s not looking us in the eye or their eyes seem shifty as we call them, we can have the instinct that they’re not trustworthy or such, but it could just be that they’re nervous and they’re completely trustworthy and completely friendly. But just in that moment, these instincts can go bad. So there’s kind of like this flip side. I guess the practical takeaway might be just recognizing how much nuance there is and how much complexity there is in human behavior.

Sabrina: Definitely, yes, you’re right. And there’s also quite a lot of research on machine learning where a system tries to learn something which humans are already able to do or which humans have done in the past, and then it’s actually a problem that this AI if it just learns from human behavior will also learn negative aspects on this human behavior. So for instance, if you’re thinking of building some autonomous hiring tool which some human resource department could use to decide if this is the right candidate or not, if in the past all the decisions that the system sees in order to learn from if they were somehow racist or sexist or have any other kind of bias which is actually unwanted, the machine learning methods are really good at picking them up unfortunately, because they just look at these statistical relations. And if the numbers point to most likely this person would not be hired, then they’re not going to be hired in the future as well.

Zach Elwood: Right, it’s just learning from our patterns. Yeah, exactly. It’s like the studies that show people who have racial minority associated last names are less likely to be hired or whatever it is. It’s going to learn from our bad habits or whatever.

Sabrina: Yes, exactly. So there we need to be really careful because on the one hand, of course, it’s very fascinating what humans can do and how there are amazing people out there who know which person would be good at a job or not. But then if you just collect any data, it’s also quite likely that it inherits flaws that humans have in their judgment.

Zach Elwood: I’m curious, with your work on eye tracking and psychology, do you feel like in your personal life you’ve become a better reader of people? And if so, how has that played out if at all?

Sabrina: So I think the biggest impact was actually thinking about personality or psychology in general, that has definitely affected my personal life as well. But this particular work that we have talked about in doing these data analysis, I don’t think that really had an impact. Because as we discussed before, the types of eye movement, characteristics that we looked at are not very intuitive. So I don’t think any precise knowledge there made it into my personal perception. What does happen more likely is actually that you realize much more about your own gaze. So after spending hours of analyzing where people would look or not look, I did have some episodes in my life where I’m just walking along somewhere and then suddenly I become aware and I’m like, “Oh, see, now you looked at this and that and here, and why did you not look at this stimulus?” That’s more this self-observation maybe.

Zach Elwood: Which is interesting, I think that’s where a lot of ideas for research comes from, it’s examining your own instincts and being like, “Oh, maybe there’s something here.”

Sabrina: True, yes.

Zach Elwood: Yeah. I think a lot about eye movements and gaze just because I’ve suffered from anxiety and depression in my life. So I sometimes have thought about how the eye movements relate to that and how I’ve sometimes felt self-conscious because I felt like my eye movements were restricted and that was an indicator of… My eye movements were very locked down and anxious seeming in the sense that they were more frozen, and I’ve sometimes felt self-conscious of that as an indicator of anxiety. So I’ve had a lot of reasons to think about that and dwell on it maybe a bit more than I should, but yeah, I have had similar experiences of thinking about how those relate to personality.

Sabrina: Yeah. And there are quite some studies which look at links between eye movements and anxiety, so definitely you’re not the only person who had this idea.

Zach Elwood: I should look into that. That’s one area I didn’t look at at all. Any other things that we haven’t touched on that you think would be interesting to this audience maybe about that study?

Sabrina: One thing I found quite interesting is actually also on the data analysis side, and that is that I told you before that we discriminated people into three classes. So for each of the scales that we looked at, there would be people with low scores, medium, and high scores. And then actually one thing you always have to keep in mind with these studies is that in the world’s population, kind of medium personality traits are most common, far most common. And so actually these classes are designed such that they roughly have the same number of samples, but this actually also means that the middle class is really narrow in comparison to relatively large ones for low and high scores. And somehow this is an inherent effect because how would you recruit people with a really extreme personality? It’s very hard to get. But I think it would be interesting if somebody managed to get these participants to look at what really extreme personality leads to in terms of eye movements.

Zach Elwood: Do you want to share about other… Are you working on other work related to eye movements or other psychology work in general?

Sabrina: No, unfortunately, no. I changed a bit. So my field of research at the moment is more in robotics and data analysis, so kind of back to my computer science roots. So I have to say no, but I think my co-authors, all of them, are still in the field. So definitely there’s a lot of interesting work going on.

Zach Elwood: So I was curious, it seemed like you had 42 maybe subjects in the study, and I could just be pretty ignorant on scientific studies, but sometimes I think about these studies is that the sample size seems small, but am I just off base on that? And maybe you could talk a little bit about the sample size and why that’s an okay number to get a statistically significant finding from.

Sabrina: So on the one hand, I think your iteration is entirely right, that more people would’ve been better in any case. But this is probably true for every single study ever. As long as it’s data-driven, the more samples you have, the more reliably you can detect something. And then also the more subjects we have, the more we actually cover the scales of personality. But the other aspect to consider is just practicality. So you really need to find these people, they need to volunteer to participate in your study, and then they come in and you need to set up the eye tracking machinery, and then they need to fulfill the task, they need to go through some questionnaires. So it really just causes hours and hours of work. And so in practice, you need to find a balance somewhere. Now, if you wanted to do one of these restricted studies in the lab, there are actually statistical analysis that you can do beforehand. So if you have particular assumptions like let’s say I assume the personality score is actually following a Gauss distribution and I want to detect some hypothesis with a particular significance level, so I can set this to some percentage and I expect the effect to be of a certain size. In this particular setting, you can actually do the math and you would get a number. You need at least, I don’t know, 50 people in order to detect your hypotheses with 90% probability if the hypothesis is true. So this exists, but in our case, since it’s one of the more exploratory, just sending people out into the world and then we apply machine learning, which is a slightly different setting, this is not possible or I’m not aware of how you could derive this number mathematically. So basically what we do is just looking at previous studies, how many participants that they have, and then what’s our experience with past studies we did, so we somehow set the number.

Zach Elwood: And for your study, if I was understanding it correctly, you were actually doing multiple runs where you would choose one set of the subjects as the analysis group and then another set of the subjects as the ones that you would try to predict for. Was I getting that right? That basically you were making multiple runs to both train the algorithm and make predictions for the remaining subjects?

Sabrina: Yes. So the way we train the algorithm in computer science is called cross-validation. And this means that we divide all the data that we have, and in particular the people that we have into these different sets. But if you only said, “Okay, I take, let’s say, the first 30 people as my training set, I train my algorithm on this data, and then I evaluate on the other 10,” you would actually run into trouble if these 10%, if these 10 people in your test set are somehow not representative. So I mean, by chance maybe no person with high neuroticism is among these 10 people, so to correct for this effect, what you do is you do multiple of these splits. So let’s say once you really take the first 30 people for training and you evaluate on other people, and then in the next round, you actually take people 10 to 40 and you would test on the first 10 and so on. So you shuffle the data multiple times.

Zach Elwood: That’s great. I think we’ve covered a lot. Is there anything else you want to mention about work you’re doing or things you’re excited about?

Sabrina: No, actually I can’t think of something right now.

Zach Elwood: Well, thanks a lot Sabrina for coming on. This has been very interesting and thanks for taking the time.

Sabrina: Yeah, thank you.

Zach Elwood: That was Sabrina Hoppe. You can learn more about Sabrina’s research by looking at her Google Scholar page. 

If you’d like to see some of the studies discussed in this talk, go to my site behavior-podcast and look at this episode’s entry. 

This has been the People Who Read People podcast, with me, Zach Elwood. If you like this podcast, please leave it a review on Apple Podcasts. That would be hugely appreciated. 

Thanks for listening.

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Questioning if body language is useful for detecting lies, with Tim Levine

A talk with communication researcher Tim Levine about nonverbal behavior and deception detection. Tim Levine is the author of Duped: Truth-Default Theory and the Social Science of Lying and Deception. His work was featured in Malcom Gladwell’s book Talking to Strangers. Transcript is at bottom of this post.

Topics discussed include: what the research tells us about the usefulness of nonverbal behavior for detecting deception; why it’s so hard to find indicators of deception; common myths about nonverbal behavior; why we expect others to tell us the truth and why we tend to tell the truth; Paul Ekman’s work, including micro-expressions and “truth wizards”; the differences between analyzing verbal content and nonverbal behavior; the TV show Lie to Me; poker tells; and more.

Episode links:

Resources discussed in this episode or related to the topic:

TRANSCRIPT

Zach Elwood: Welcome to the People Who Read People podcast, with me, Zach Elwood. This is a podcast aimed at better understanding other people, and better understanding ourselves. You can learn more about it at behavior-podcast.com. If you’re interested in deception detection, I have several related episodes; for example, I have an episode where I talk to David Zulawski about interrogation techniques, and one where I talk to Mark McClish about analyzing statements for hidden meaning. And quite a few others that are related.

As humans, we tend to think that we’re pretty good at spotting when people are lying. But research shows that almost all of us are quite bad at telling when people are lying. The existing research shows that, as a group, we’re slightly better than chance at detecting deception.

We also tend to think that there are certain behaviors that are associated with lying; for example, not making eye contact and having shifty eyes, or being physically fidgety or stumbling over words. But research shows that there’s almost no reliable information in such behavioral cues; there’s a lot of variation.

Tim Levine is a communication researcher who has studied deception detection for more than 30 years. He has a book called Duped: Truth-Default Theory and the Social Science of Lying and Deception. In that book, he criticizes some of the more popular theories of deception detection – for example, some of Paul Ekman’s well known ideas – and he presents a new theory called Truth-Default Theory, which he says explains a lot of the findings in this area that other theories can’t explain.

To quote from his book Duped:

My objectives here are ambitious and radical. I want to start a revolution. I seek to overthrow existing deception theory and provide a new, coherent, and data-consistent approach to understanding deception and deception detection. For more than twenty-five years, I have seen a need for a new theory of deception and deception detection. Ekman’s idea of leakage was hugely influential, but the deficiencies were apparent almost immediately. His focus shifted over time from the leakage hierarchy to a focus on the face and micro-expressions. But my read of the ensuing literature reveals more excuses for why the data do not seem to support his theory than solid, replicated, affirmative scientific support. Interpersonal deception theory is even less viable. It is logically incoherent, and I knew it to be empirically false four years before it was eventually published. The new cognitive load approach in criminal and legal psychology does not seem to be the path forward either, for the theoretical reasons identified by Steve McCornack, as well as weak, inconsistent, and just plain odd empirical findings. The need is clear. Existing theory does not cut it. A new perspective is needed. [end quote]

If you’re someone interested in understanding behavior and detecting deception, I think Tim’s book is a must-read. If you happened to have read Malcolm Gladwell’s 2019 book Talking to Strangers, you might recall that Gladwell talks about Levine’s theories in that book.

A little more about Tim: he’s a Distinguished Professor at the University of Alabama at Birmingham, and the Chair of Communication Studies. If you’d like to learn more about him, just search online for ‘tim levine psychology’ and you’ll find his website and his wikipedia page.

If you didn’t already know, my own main claim to fame is my work on poker tells. I’ve written three books on poker tells, and I have a video series. I’ve also worked at analyzing tells for several high-stakes poker players; two of them were World Series of Poker Main Event final table players who were playing for millions of dollars and wanted to look for behavioral patterns in their opponents or in themselves. And my work has been called the best work in this area by many poker players, and that includes some professional high-stakes poker players.

And some people might assume that, because I’ve worked on poker tells, that I’d disagree with Levine’s work, or find it disappointing. But I don’t: I’ve always been skeptical about the idea that there’s much value from studying behavior in real-world situations like interviews, speeches, and interrogations. When people have asked for my takes on such things, I will tell them I think that it’s mostly a waste of time to concentrate on such things, and that I have very few opinions on such things, because there’s simply just so much variance. There’s many reasons why, for example, someone who’s innocent might be or seem anxious. I do think there’s a lot of interesting patterns when it comes to verbal behavior, the actual content of what someone says, but I’m pretty skeptical about getting a lot of value from nonverbal behaviors, although I think there’s a lot more use for such things in games and sports.

And I also think that poker, and most competitive games, are completely unlike the scenarios studied in most deception detection setups; and also completely unlike interrogations and interviews. Many of the reliable tells in poker are not even related to deception detection, but more just related to the tendency people have to leak their level of relaxation when they’ve got a strong hand, which isn’t related to deception but more just about people sometimes feeling good and having fun, and not being as fully stoic and unreadable as they could be. To take another example: some tells in poker are related to being mentally focused or unfocused, and those kinds of tells are also not related to deception detection. And for another example: some tells in poker are about someone not wanting to draw attention to a strong hand, in a similar way that people in competitive situations don’t like to draw attention in general to their “treasure”, so to speak, and that can manifest as, for example, a player being less likely to stare at strong cards and more willing to look away from strong cards, things like this. There’s just a whole lot of differences I could name. And all that said, I always try to make it clear that tells are a small part of poker; I think they can add at most something like 15% to a poker player’s win rate, but for most people it’ll be significantly less.

In this talk, Tim and I do talk a little bit about poker tells, but if you’d like to hear more about that, I’ll add some more thoughts at the end.

Another reason I find Tim Levine’s work so interesting is that we are surrounded by a lot of bullshit when it comes to reading behavior. I’ll give a specific example, as I think it’s just such an egregious example; there’s a so-called behavior expert named Jack Brown, who’s main credential seems to be having a lot of Twitter followers. As I’m writing this, he has 167,000 Twitter followers. You can find him often making extremely confident claims on Twitter about people’s behaviors that are just so off-base from what real research and even common sense would tell us. And people eat this stuff up. He is regarded by many on Twitter as an actual expert in behavior, despite just being so clearly wrong and irresponsible in so many ways.

To take one example: Jack Brown promotes the very debunked idea that you can tell if someone’s being deceptive or not based on the direction of their gaze. So that’s a pretty big giveaway right there of the quality of his analysis. He also makes very confident pronouncements about what people’s behaviors mean, based on very ambiguous and high-variance behaviors that just simply don’t contain any interesting or meaningful information. To give one example: he once confidently proclaimed that Trump is quote “a severe, long-term drug abuser” end quote, and that he believed that Trump had a hole in his hard palate from cocaine abuse. He often confidently states that public figures are exhibiting signs of deception and shame and guilt in interviews, based on them exhibiting very common and very ambiguous behaviors. And the long story short of why so many of the behaviors he draws attention to aren’t reliable or interesting is that there are many reasons people can be or seem anxious that have nothing to do with guilt or deception.

So-called behavior experts like Jack Brown are basically trying to squeeze blood from a stone. They want you to think they have this amazing secret knowledge that gives them amazing insight into people’s motivations and what they’re hiding. If you’d like to read a piece I wrote about this guy and see some examples of what I’m talking about, just search online for ‘jack brown behavior’ and the piece I wrote should come up pretty prominent; you can also find it on my readingpokertells.com site, on my blog there.

And so Tim Levine’s work is important for making us more skeptical of such things, and drawing more attention to how little we’re able to read people. People interested in reading behavior should recognize the uncertainty present in these areas; they should avoid trusting the Jack Browns of the world. We should be skeptical of people who make confident pronouncements that, for example, public figures are lying or hiding something based on reading their nonverbal behavior. Because often those ideas, if we absorb them, will just be reinforcing our biases about people and actually make us worse at navigating the world. For example, when people listen to Jack Brown and think that they can now read these common and ambiguous behaviors and tell that someone is lying, people will use that to filter the world through their existing biases, while feeling that they’re doing something sophisticated and smart. It lends a veneer of respectability to our biases. And this stuff lends itself to, for example, police interrogators or job interviewers being highly confident about someone’s guilt or abilities when they really shouldn’t be; these things have real-world negative effects on people’s lives. And such things even add to our us-versus-them polarization, in terms of someone being more likely to see a political leader speak and think something like ‘oh, see, Hillary Clinton lowered her gaze at that question; I saw Jack Brown talk about that; I know she’s lying.’ These bullshit ideas lend themselves to what I see as one of our biggest problems: being too certain about others and too certain about the world. I think uncertainty and humility are needed more than ever.

I think combating bad and simplistic ideas about behavior is important. I think that drawing attention to nuance is important. And so I think Tim Levine’s work is important.

Okay, here’s the interview with Tim Levine.

Zach: Hi Tim, thanks for coming on.

Tim Levine: Oh, happy to be here.

Zach: So maybe we could start with how I first learned about your work which was a study you did about the show Lie to Me. Could you talk a little bit about what that study found?

Tim Levine: Sure, that’s a fun study. First to lay out just the general experiment, research participants come in, they do a standard lie detection task where they have to watch several interviews, some of which the people are lying, some of which the people are telling the truth. And those interviews are scored to see how well they do, scored just like a true/false test. In the experiment part of it, people either just did the task normally or one third of the people, based on random assignment, watch the TV show Lie to Me, which is about a psychologist who can detect lies based on nonverbal communication, it’s based on the work of Paul Ekman. And another control group watched a different crime show called Numbers in which people solve crimes through, it’s a math professor who solves crimes through math. And then the third control was just not watching any show at all. What the findings were is there wasn’t really much difference between the two groups. If anything, the people who watched Lie to Me were a little worse at detecting deception, and the show tended to make them more cynical, but it didn’t make them any better at lie detection. And the reason is because nonverbal things just really aren’t very useful in lie detection.

Zach: One of the things you talk about in your paper was the show makes a claim, I’m not sure if it made it once or if it keeps repeating in the show, I’ve only seen one episode of the show, but the show repeats the claim that people lie really often, I think it says three times in 10 minutes. And can you talk a little bit about that and what they got so wrong about that idea?

Tim Levine: Yeah, they actually used that in their promotional materials and it was on their website. And unlike some claims about how often people lie with the implication of people lie all the time, this particular claim actually has a basis in research, but totally taken out of context. So the experimented question was people had to come in and they were told to make a good impression on somebody else. People presumably took that instruction as make an unrealistically good impression on other people. So if you come into a lab setting and you’re told what you understand to be make an overly good impression, then people follow instructions and do that and as a consequence say up to three false things in 10 minutes. On the other hand, if you’re just normal… So in the first 10 minutes of this podcast, chances are there won’t be any lies probably during the whole thing.

Zach: Yeah. If you were to ask me how many lies I’ve told recently, I mean, I would be hard pressed to think of a situation where I lied recently. So yeah, I think it’s a very pervasive misunderstanding. It kind of reminds me of the common myth that’s so often repeated that nonverbal communication makes up most communication. For example, I was just Googling now and saw one of the top things was most experts agree that 70 to 93% of all communication is nonverbal.

Tim Levine: Oh, false. Oh, that is so wrong. I mean, it says that in books, it says that in textbooks.

Zach: Exactly, yeah. It’s wild. It’s just wild how pervasive these myths are. Do you see these kinds of things as related and are there other things in this area that you often see repeated even though there’s no good reason for them?

Tim Levine: Oh yeah. But before we get there, let me give your listeners a little background on where that most communication is nonverbal finding comes from.

Zach: Yeah, that’d be great.

Tim Levine: So the actual finding was when what we’re doing nonverbally contradicts what we’re saying verbally, then people will often believe what is done nonverbally over what people do verbally. But that most communication is nonverbal is just ludicrous because how could we possibly do this podcast nonverbally? I’m making all these great expressions, communicating very expressively and using all this body language, and you can’t see it. Now you can get the tone in my voice, but if we stripped out the content of the words and you’re just hearing the tone in my voice and you’re hearing me get a little bit excited about this topic, you could take that away, but that would be just a tiny, tiny, tiny little bit of the message. Most communication is conveyed through the words.

Zach: Yeah, and that totally relates. And I almost didn’t realize how much it relates to your truth default theory until talking about it now, and we’ll talk more about that later. But getting back to one very important point you make in your work is about how important it is that lies are rare and understanding that point. So when you’re trying to determine if someone is good or not at detecting deception, it matters a whole lot how many lies are in the mix. And I think you relate this to something you call the veracity effect, and maybe you can talk a little bit about that angle.

Tim Levine: Sure. So one of the oldest findings in lie detection research is something called truth bias. My good friend, Steve McCornack, coined the term in his undergraduate research. He now works with me at my university. The idea is that if you see a bunch of communication and you’re asked to guess, “True or false? Do you think they’re lying or telling the truth?” People guess true more often than lie completely independently of whether they’re seeing a truth or a lie. And so this is called truth bias, people guess true more often. So the veracity effect is an idea by a professor named Hee Sun Park, who saw rather obviously. But before she saw it, people didn’t really tune into this, that if you think most things are true, then you’re going to be right when they are true, but you’re going to be wrong when they’re lies. So for example, the average across hundreds of studies of lie detection is people are just 54%, a little bit better than 50/50. But if you break it out by truth and lies, people are better on truths. And the more truth bias, the more better they are in truths and they’re worse on lies, so accuracy is below 50% for lies. And the more truth bias, then the worse they are at detecting lies per se. And the veracity effect is simply the difference between your accuracy for truths and your accuracy for lies. The consequence of this is it the best predictor of whether you’re going to be right in deception detection is the honesty of the person you’re talking to. So if you’re talking to somebody who’s honest and you believe them, you’re going to be right. Not because you’re good at this, but just by chance. But if they’re lying, you’re going to be wrong about this. Well, now, if most communication is honest most of the time, then people are right most of the time. And lie detection experiments create a very unrealistic portrayal because lies are much more prevalent in deception studies than they are in the actual world.

Zach: Yeah. And to tie this back to your Lie to Me study, one of the points you make in your book Duped and elsewhere is that simply if you’re in a test situation or just the fact that we are so prone to believe people, if you give anyone any sort of education no matter how bad it is about deception training, it will make them detect lies more often simply because we are prone to believe people. So for example, if you watch Lie to Me, even if the information is bad, you’re going to increase your ability to detect a lie a bit just from being more skeptical. And maybe you could talk a little bit about that and how that ties into maybe the perception that doing any sort of detection training or education can make it seem like you’re actually becoming better at detecting deception.

Tim Levine: Yeah, but it almost always comes at the cost of getting more errors about–

Zach: Exactly, you’re not getting better, it just seems that way if you’re in an environment where you’re being made to find lies like in a study environment where they’re giving you more lies than you find in your everyday life. So it seems like you’re getting better at it, but you’re actually getting better at the cost of detecting accurately when people are telling the truth.

Tim Levine: Yeah. So cynicism only works well in an environment where there’s a big risk of being deceived about something important.

Zach: Right, which isn’t the case for our day to day lives, which is the basis of the truth default theory that there’s reasons for why we have a bias for finding things true. Maybe you could talk a little bit about what sets the truth default theory apart. That was one thing that was a little bit hard to understand how this was such a revolutionary idea differing from the previous ideas.

Tim Levine: So we already talked a little bit about truth bias and the veracity effect. So let me now talk about how defaulting to the truth is a little different. So in the standard deception detection experiment that’s done in the social sciences, people see some collection of truths and lies and then they’re asked, “Do you think this is lie or do you think it’s truth?” Now, the second I ask you to judge or to make that assessment, now you know this is a lie detection task. But in everyday communication situations like you’re just sitting around listening to a podcast, if the podcast isn’t about deception and maybe even if it is, is that true isn’t necessarily coming to mind unless prompted. So the idea of the truth default is unless there’s something to get you thinking about it, the idea of truth, falsity, honesty, deception just don’t even come to mind. So if I’m showing you now I do the study a different way and I’m showing you interaction between two people, and I’m just asking you open-ended, “What are you thinking about?” The idea that one of them might be lying to the other just doesn’t come to mind. People are thinking about what they’re wearing, they’re thinking about their mannerisms, their idiosyncrasies, they’re thinking about the content of what’s said, and they just kind of accept it at face value. It’s remarkably difficult in a lot of circumstances to knock people out of their just passive belief and get them to be skeptical. Now, there are times when we can be skeptical, we know somebody’s trying to sell us something, we’re hearing people we disagree with or unpopular ideas, then suspicion can be triggered. But in much of our daily life that just doesn’t happen. We’re on this communication autopilot where what we say is honest unless we have a reason not to be honest, and we believe people unless we have a good reason, strong reason not to believe.

Zach: So if I’m understanding it correctly, Hee Sun Park’s big contribution, big awareness, the revolutionary thing was that she realized that all of these studies that were being done were basically biasing the experiment by getting people skeptical from the beginning by the questions. So basically it was throwing off all the results. Is that accurate?

Tim Levine: I think the statement’s accurate, I think that’s more kind of a later implication of her idea. I think she had two really big ideas. First was the idea that accuracy’s different for truths than for lies, which is the veracity effect. Related to that, what matters is the ratio of truths and lies in the environment, that’s one of her really important things. And she had another really important thing which we haven’t talked about yet, which is that most lies are detected after the fact. So most of the times we do actually detect lies in real life, we’re not detecting them in real time based on how people are coming off, but the truth tends to come to light at some later point in time.

Zach: Yeah, it’s kind of you might have a suspicion once you get into the skeptical realm of thinking someone might be lying, but you’re not going to really know it’s a lie until you actually confirm it with real evidence or something.

Tim Levine: Yeah, exactly.

Zach: So let’s talk about the nonverbal behaviors, and you obviously take a very skeptical stance on the idea that there’s much relevant or reliable information to study when it comes to nonverbal behavior in the realm of detecting lies, detecting deception. Can you talk a little bit about the main reasons for why you believe that, for example, based on the meta-analysis studies and other things?

Tim Levine: Sure. Well, first off, my position is that nonverbal things are incredibly important in how people are perceived. What I doubt is the diagnostic value of nonverbal things, that is that they have a set fixed meaning, especially when it comes to truths and lies. So almost everybody everywhere believes that you can tell when somebody’s lying because of some set of nonverbal things. The most common belief, folk belief, is probably that liars won’t look you in the eye. And that’s been found pan-culturally.

Zach: That people believe that.

Tim Levine: Yeah, people everywhere believe that.

Zach: The shifty eyes thing.

Tim Levine: Yeah. It just has no validity at all. Last I saw almost 50 studies of this, and the average difference in eye gaze between liars and telling the truth is zero. So there’s been decades and decades and decades of research trying to find kind of the magic tell for deception and either linguistic behavior or more commonly nonverbal things. So there’s all these studies that look at what liars are doing and what honest people are doing and looking for differences in them. And a lot of studies find that this difference or that difference happens. The trouble is the next study finds the exact opposite thing or nothing at all. So when you plot out findings of all these studies over time, they just don’t hold up. And the more they’re studied, the less difference, the less the average difference between truths and lies. So you reference meta-analysis, for the listeners who don’t know, a meta-analysis is simply a study of studies, so we’re looking at trends across a whole bunch of different studies. And what I noticed when I was looking at meta-analyses of nonverbal cues and deception detection is that the more a given nonverbal behavior was studied, the less difference it made in research. Which suggested to me that the findings that were there were probably smoke and mirrors.

Zach: Right, it was reverting to the mean kind of idea.

Tim Levine: Yeah, where the mean was zero.

Zach: Another common conception or maybe it actually has some truth is the voice pitch thing, but it seems very slightly reliable or do you think that’s not reliable either?

Tim Levine: It depends on reliable in what sense. So if we analyzed a couple hundred people who are telling the truth and a couple hundred liars, on average liars have a slightly higher about two-tenths of a standard deviation higher vocal pitch. But to use it as a lie detection tool in any one person it’s just completely useless.

Zach: If it’s there, it’s just so small.

Tim Levine: Yeah. So maybe a baseball analogy, somebody who has a 0.3 batting average is more likely to get a hit than somebody who has a 0.2 batting average. But that doesn’t mean that the person with 0.3 average is going to get a hit and the person with 0.2 isn’t if that makes sense.

Zach: Yeah. And if I was understanding this correctly in your book, I think you were making a point about the difference between something… We talk about something being statistically significant, and sometimes that seems to be people will interpret that as being actually significant. Was I understanding that correctly that there’s some like confusion or language confusion there that people talk about things that are statistically significant as if they’re very meaningful or something?

Tim Levine: Yeah, that’s an unfortunate term. Statistically, what it means is that a finding of absolutely no difference across a large number of people would be sufficiently improbable to presume that there’s something there. So it’s a statement of probability, but it’s even worse than that because the math behind it presumes that you’re only testing one hypothesis. And the trouble that with modern research is people are using a probability statement for testing one hypothesis when they’re actually testing a whole bunch of things statistically. So that probability doesn’t have that meaning anymore. But that’s way too statistically nerdy probably.

Zach: Is it accurate to say that some people, say lay people, will see something about significance and think like, “Oh, it’s significant,” which might explain how some of these misperceptions about nonverbal behavior gets started in the common audience. Do you think that’s–

Tim Levine: Yeah, that’s accurate, I think, but it’s also accurate that 90% of professional researchers or 95% also think that.

Zach: Okay.

Tim Levine: So it’s not just lay people and it’s not just the media, these kind of misunderstandings are more widespread than that.

Zach: Does that get into the replication errors area of people interpreting the results of things too confidently or mistakenly?

Tim Levine: That’s my read on it. So social sciences are undergoing a huge replication crisis where findings in the best peer review journals just aren’t holding up at a really disturbingly low rate, and findings are almost always small. It is not just deception cues, findings are generally smaller when they’re studied again. My read on why that’s the case is this opportunistic use of statistics. They’re using this statistical idea of significance in a way that really is not justified probabilistically.

Zach: A small note here, if you’d like to learn more about what Tim was talking about, you can Google the research replication problem. Long story short though, what Tim was referring to was the fact that if you collect a whole bunch of data, you’ll end up finding some correlations in the data that may seem interesting, but may just be due to randomness and the fact that you’ve gathered so much data that some random correlations are likely to be present. And that aspect can help explain why some findings are hard to replicate later. I actually talked to a previous guest about this if you’re interested. I talked to Brandon Shiels about his poker tells research, and we spent some time talking about the problem of finding illusory correlations in data and how one way to combat that is with pre-registering your research, which requires you to write down your predictions beforehand so that any correlations found are things that were theorized about and less likely to be a random illusory thing. Okay, back to the interview.

So getting back to why it is so hard to find reliable nonverbal behaviors tied to deception, I mean, I think basically it’s not surprising to me because humans are just good at deceiving. I mean, it’s not surprising that we have control over our behaviors in a pretty good way most of us. So I think that helps explain it. I think the question that you sometimes see the question, well, why is it so hard to detect deception? It’s almost like, well, why would it be easy to detect deception? I’m curious if you have any thoughts on that.

Tim Levine: Yeah, I think that’s half the answer. So I think for most of us, but not all of us, by the time kind of we get through high school we’re pretty good about telling a lie if we need to. I think there are probably a few people out there who can’t lie well. I know just anecdotally if you ask people, some people say, “Nah, I can’t do this.” And I suspect they can’t and they don’t lie very much because they know they can’t. But I think there’s another reason too, and this really gets at the heart of the idea of the truth fault is that there’s probably no single thing more important to humans than our ability to communicate. Humans are able to share information and pass down knowledge which makes all our technological and scientific advances possible. We are able to cooperate and work together which enables all kind of modern production. And it enables us to make friends and form good professional, social, personal relationships, which is incredibly important to our wellbeing and physical health. Communication only works if you can trust what’s communicated. If you have to second guess everything, you can’t really learn anything because everything’s uncertain. You can’t work together because you don’t know that you can trust the other person you’re supposed to work with. You can’t form relationships because you can’t trust this person. So if we can’t trust other people and what they say, and if communication loses its functionality, and this is just way, way, way too important to us, we have to believe other people. Because if you did the kind of thought experiment of what it would be like if we didn’t believe anything we communicated, we would absolutely absolutely be lost. If you can’t trust, you can’t get on a plane, you can’t get in your car. You can’t drive through a green light if you don’t believe the people on the red light are going to stop. Functioning requires this. So I think it’s not only that people can tell good lies, but it’s that we have to believe them as the business as usual. It’s not that we can’t, suspicion can be triggered. But as our kind of business as usual default mode of working, we have to have to have to take things at face value because otherwise we just immediately get bogged down. It has to be this way.

Zach: To get off topic a little bit getting into the fake news and misinformation area, so many people focus on the idea that like, “Oh, we need to get people to believe the right things, the things that we believe.” And I think that’s actually a mistaken goal. I mean, for one thing, it’s never going to happen. But the second reason is I think we actually just need more people to be as equally skeptical of everything as they are of the things that they perceive as biased. For example, for people who doubt the mainstream media and think it’s mistaken and biased and corrupt or whatever, we need those people to not trust random theories they see on Facebook or whatever. We just need more skepticism and less truth default for things across the board. I’m curious if you have any thoughts on that.

Tim Levine: No, I could not agree more.

Zach: So to get back to the people who aren’t good at lying, which is a very important point in your work too when it comes to explaining the slight ability across meta-analysis, the 54% ability to detect deception in these studies, the general average, the slightly better than chance average, you point out that some of that is just due to some percentage of the population being pretty bad at lying, at deceiving. Would you say that’s basically because they’re portraying the stereotypical behaviors that we have that we associate with lying like not being good at eye contact or stumbling in their words, those kinds of things?

Tim Levine: Yeah, I think that’s exactly what’s going on. There’s also another group of people who just come off, what I would call the transparent liars. They’re transparent. When they’re telling the truth, you know they’re telling the truth, but they just can’t lie. So there’s some people who are kind of the opposite of poker face people, you know exactly what’s in their hand. And we tend to get those people right. But there’s this other group of people which is probably larger which I call the mismatched folks, and they come off differently than they are. So if you think about people who are perfectly honest but who have social anxiety or maybe they’re a little bit on the autism spectrum. So they’re doing these things that people associate with deception, but they’re honest. So people tend to systematically get those people wrong, and that’s part of the thing that pushes accuracy down towards chance. So there’s these transparent liars that makes accuracy better than 50/50, but then these people who are mismatched who keep us from being very good at it.

Zach: Yeah, and the interesting thing too is for the people that are bad at lying, that have the stereotypical behaviors and are more easily caught in these kinds of studies, it’s actually almost meaningless to judge them on a case by case basis because in a practical sense the only way you would actually be able to catch that person lying in a meaningful, reliable sense is if you studied how they behave when they’re telling the truth and how they behave when they’re telling a lie. So in other words, in a study environment, you might correctly guess that someone’s lying because they’re seemingly bad at lying, but that could just as easily have been a person telling the truth. So it’s almost meaningless in a practical sense.

Tim Levine: Yeah, and it’s even more complicated than that because then you have to have a lot of other people watching them lying and telling the truth over multiple instances to see that there’s regularity in how other people are seeing them.

Zach: Right, you really need a statistical sample size to know that like, “Oh, this person’s actually bad at lying, and I’m actually finding something,” versus like, “Oh, they’re just one of the mismatched people or just they have random variations that make some people think they’re lying when they’re not.” It’s so much more complex and requires more study than it seems on the surface. And we have these simplistic ideas of how this stuff works in the popular culture and in our minds about this stuff that’s spread through media and such. So one thing I wanted to ask you about was Ekman’s truth wizards thing, which seems to be another popular idea that’s in Lie to Me and other places that there are people amongst us who are exceptionally good at detecting deception. Do you have any thoughts on that?

Tim Levine: Yeah. So generally, if you don’t work with Paul Ekman, who’s maybe kind of the biggest name, most famous researcher in the topic area, most academic, modern academic, deception theorists and researchers are deeply skeptical of the idea of the wizards. That said, I’m not a hundred percent sure what to think about them. If the claim is that there’s kind of maybe one in a thousand people who can do this, modern social science isn’t very good at dealing with the super rare disease or the super fluky sort of person. It’s hard to study. It’s very hard to study kind of very rare events or very rare people, because how do you go about finding them? How do you know it’s not just kind of fluky? I will say I had one of Ekman’s wizards contact me one time, and I did test them on some of my deception detection materials, and they did amazingly well. But I don’t want to say because of this one person and this one instance that, “Oh, now they exist,” that wouldn’t be very good science of me. But at the same time, I’m reluctant to be as critical of it as some people are just because I think, it’s easier to test ideas that where you can find examples of them easier if that makes sense.

Zach: So one thing in that area, it seems like, correct me if I’m wrong, but someone can be… We’ve been talking so far about nonverbal behavior, and that’s a lot different from reading logical inconsistencies or what people call statement analysis, which is just examining language for evidence. And I’m wondering, could that have played a role, for example, in the test you did or was that only nonverbal?

Tim Levine: In the test I did, if you know what to look for, you can do better than 54% if you’re really familiar with the context. The content can help you, but it probably couldn’t help you enough to make this person as good as they were. On the other hand, somebody wins the lottery, so chance fluky things happen. I don’t think people appreciate how lumpy randomness can be.

Zach: Right. And then we form perceptions based on those outliers.

Tim Levine: Yeah. If we flip enough coins that really truly are fair, there’s going to be some point where long streak of heads comes up in a row. And it’s just hard to sort that out.

Zach: I’ve read that there hasn’t been much evidence for people being consistently truth wizardy over time. Am I wrong on that? And why haven’t people studied that more, that a person is consistently good?

Tim Levine: Well, it’s hard to do overtime studying. And you’re right, that is the evidence. My best thinking is there might be people who are good, but it’s because they know a whole lot about the particular circumstances. So my guess is that a really experienced financial forensic accountant is going to be much better at spotting lies about financial issues than you or I. Particular type of criminal investigators might know a whole lot about this particular genre of crime in this particular area, and that knowledge really helps them use what is said in a useful way. Similarly, people who have really good critical thinking skills are going to be better at spotting logical inconsistencies than people who are less critical thinkers. But if I’m right about that, what it means is the financial forensic accountant isn’t isn’t necessarily going to be good about detecting the honesty of their spouse about non-financial things.

Zach: So getting back to that idea of the nonverbal versus the verbal and the statement analysis actually analyzing statements and logical inconsistencies and sort of psychological aspects of people’s language, do you have much thoughts on… Because to me, for example, personally, I’ve read Mark McClish’s book, I Know You Are Lying, which is about statement analysis, and I’ve written a book about verbal poker tells called Verbal Poker Tells, and that stuff to me is so much more reliable because it’s about how people communicate. And there can be so much hidden information in how people communicate and what they avoid talking about, for example. So it’s not nearly as ambiguous as nonverbal behavior, it’s not to say it’s very reliable either, but it’s just to me so much more meaningful and so much more there than nonverbal. I’m curious if you’d agree with that.

Tim Levine: I’m not sure if I do or don’t. So one of Ekman’s ideas that I really like is the idea of the hot spot, which is something that doesn’t seem right. And hotspots could be nonverbal. So somebody might be reacting in a particular nonverbal way, or let’s say at the poker table, they might be doing something nonverbal that strikes you as off or might mean something or it might be verbal. So if we view these as not as, “Oh, they’re lying or oh, they’re bluffing,” but instead as, “There’s something that I need to dig deeper on or explain or pay attention to,” then I think these things have real utility. So in the statement analysis, if it is being used then to go into an interview and ask deeper questions about these areas, then I think that’s a fabulous idea. If you were saying that, “Oh, they seem to be dodging around this issue, that means they did it,” then I think that’s tenuous because it could mean a lot of different things.

Zach: Right. And to be clear, it’s not like you can ever, even if something’s seems very obvious in the verbal things, it’s not like you could ever be like, “Oh, I’m very certain about this.” I mean, you might feel you’re certain, but you’ll still need some evidence. Which gets into how almost unimportant some of these things are when it comes to interrogations. For example, if you’re bringing someone in for interrogation, you probably have a reason to interrogate them. And your approach probably won’t be that much different. You’re just going to keep plugging away at them using the traditional interrogation techniques and do your thing. You spotting some nonverbal or verbal thing that makes you think they’re guilty probably doesn’t make too much of a difference because you probably already have good reason to think they’re guilty anyway. So I think that gets into almost the practical low value of them in practical interrogation and interview situations. Would you agree with that?

Tim Levine: Let me phrase it a little differently. There’s actually two things I want to jump off on. First, I think the best practice in the interrogation room is what you try to do is if you don’t have evidence already, you want to ask questions where you can kind of nail them down in ways that you can go do more investigation and check if that makes sense. So what I’m trying to do if I’m trying to question somebody is I’m trying to get information out of them that I can then use later to investigate and that I can check. Because if I already have evidence, then I don’t need to be really talking to them. But I’m talking to them because I don’t have enough evidence right now. So I’m trying to figure out what I need to go investigate and what I can check. But about the earlier point, let’s say, so as a deception researcher, I notice perhaps to a fault when people are leaving things out or when they’re changing the topic on me, and I have this kind of ongoing debate with another deception researcher who does political deception. And so he’s thinking you got a reporter who’s talking to a politician, and the reporter asks a question and the politician goes off topic and talks about what they want to talk about. So the question is, is that politician, they’re definitely being evasive, but are they being deceptive? This other researcher thinks, “Yes, evasion is deception. They’re being deceptive.” And I want to say, “Well, wait a minute, who gets to set the topic of what we’re going to talk about? Why is it that the reporter gets to say, ‘Here’s our agenda,’ and the politician has to stick to the reporter’s agenda?” So to this point of you need to pay attention when things are being left out or topics being shifted or people are being ambiguous, but you also want to really contextualize that.

Zach: Yeah, to be specific about interrogations or even poker because I think that one of the most meaningful tells in interrogation and in poker actually too is the conciliatory behavior from people who are guilty or bluffing. So for example, one of the most prevalent things, one of the most telling things in interrogations is when the interrogator makes an accusation directly or indirectly, and the person being interrogated basically just acts neutral and acts conciliatory and is not. An innocent person would understand immediately that they’re being accused and would be defensive. But you see this kind of subdued conciliatory behavior from someone who’s guilty just because their instinct is to be subdued and not arouse anger or more anger from the interrogator. And similar in poker too, you can find these things of when someone’s bluffing, they’re less likely to act in an irritating or aggressive manner either verbally or nonverbally to their opponent. This is interesting because it’s kind of a mix of both verbal and nonverbal. It’s just a demeanor almost, it’s a collection of things. And so I wanted to throw that in there to say it’s not as if we can’t get information from these things, but I guess the real question is if you’re in an interrogation spot, for example, I guess that can be very valuable for the investigator to feel that they have the right person, but obviously that’s not evidence, it might help you in feeling like you’re questioning the right person. I wanted to throw that in there to say there can be meaningful things, I think, in these areas.

Tim Levine: Absolutely. But at least in the interrogation point of view, I really urge caution and jumping to conclusions based on that at least in my own kind of deception tapes I’ve created which mimic interrogation situations pretty well, I think. Honest people respond all different kinds of ways, and so do deceptive people. Some deceptive people definitely go figure best defense is a good offense. Not everybody responds the same. There might be these patterns over large numbers of people. And if you’re playing the odds, you’re more often right than wrong, let’s say in poker, but you’re going to get some wrong because not every person responds the same.

Zach: Right, for sure. And I guess that gets into the impractical aspects of it because if the only thing you have is your feeling based on this person’s conciliatory behavior that they’re guilty, unless you have much else, that’s not really a reason to follow someone as a suspect for very long if you don’t have much else going for you. So I think that gets into the impractical aspects of it. It’s like how much is it meaningful really when you get down to it?

Tim Levine: Yeah, there’s this huge, huge, huge variability in how humans respond in given situations.

Zach: Very high variance lot as humans, yeah.

Tim Levine: Yeah.

Zach: A small note here, one thing that stands out to me as being pretty consistently meaningful behavior in interrogation situations is the tendency of guilty people to answer pretty straightforward questions with long meandering stories with way too much detail and divergences when innocent people will tend to answer straightforwardly. And this can be seen to be related to conciliatory behavior because we can see that guilty people can have a motivation to attempt to seem likable and cooperative, whereas innocent people just don’t have that desire, they just want to answer the questions. I wanted to elaborate on that a little bit more as a way to emphasize the point that what people say and how they say it can be interesting to study and pay attention to, even if we can debate how meaningful or actionable specific situations really are. Okay, back to the interview.

So I’m pretty skeptical about microexpressions and I’m sure you probably are too. I see that people often bring that up, people ask me about microexpressions and poker and such, and I’ve basically never based a decision on a microexpression and I don’t find them generally in poker. And so I’ve always been skeptical of them in terms of genuine. There are some things where people do like weak means strong and strong means weak things in poker where they’re basically conveying the opposite of what they feel and sort of a duping aspect. But that’s different from the idea of microexpressions as a leak of genuine emotion or feeling. I assume you’d just be very skeptical about that too, but I wanted to ask about that.

Tim Levine: Yeah. So the research community is very skeptical of microexpressions, there isn’t strong evidence. I would guess that microexpressions if they even exist and if they are useful, they might be more useful in poker particularly among novice players than in lie detection. The reason is because the emotions you’re expressing, the link between those and truth telling or lying is pretty tenuous, but I could imagine, do you ever see somebody who’s got like a really good hand who just lets this little smirk out when they first look at their cards? I’m sure professionals have got this under control, but–

Zach: Well, I think there is something to that for the very beginner level people. And I think, interestingly, we could talk about that for a while, but the more experienced they are, the more the opposite things leak out where they’re slightly trying to convey the opposite of what they have. But I think you’re right, at the very beginner level stages, there are those kinds of genuine leaks.

A note here: when I was talking here, I was focused on microexpressions. There are larger macroexpressions of genuine emotion that occur pretty regularly from all types of players of all skill levels. For example, it’s pretty often a player who makes a big bet with a strong hand will have genuine smiles and things like that. I’ll talk a little bit more about that at the end. I just wanted to emphasize that I was attempting to talk about just microexpressions here. Okay, back to the talk.

Tim Levine: Yeah. So there might be a kernel of truth to the microexpression thing, but I don’t think they’re going to be useful at all in lie detection.

Zach: It’s so different, it’s just such a different environment.

Tim Levine: Yeah. And so poker, can people fake microexpressions?

Zach: Well, that’s a really interesting question because when I’ve thought about this in the past, and I should probably write something up about this, but the thing I’ve have seen is that there’s actually these small, what people might consider microexpressions, but they’re the opposite. So for example, someone who’s betting a strong hand would have a very quick expression just briefly pass their face of having like an irritated look or their brows would be furrowed, almost like a confusion or an irritation microexpression. But it’s the opposite because they’re strong, and it’s almost like they’re not even trying to purposely, consciously do that, which is the interesting thing, because I don’t think the people who do these things are always planning to fool their opponent. It’s almost like because you’re in such a deceptive realm, poker is such a deceptive realm and most games are, you’re automatically just trying to almost subconsciously convey the opposite of what you have. So it’s almost this instinctual trying to do the opposite of what you have, weak means strong, strong means weak, which is interesting because I think a lot of people would think like, “Oh, they’re trying to fool me.” But the fact that a lot of these things are microexpressions, they just briefly… And actually in my video series on poker, I have a lot of examples of this, and you just don’t find that from bluffers because bluffers are very much aware of what they’re portraying. So they’re going to have a much more neutral, stoic thing. So it means that you’re pretty unlikely to detect these things from a bluffer, detect meaningful things from a bluffer, because they are trying to be so stoic and so neutral and that’s how most people behave. But some people with strong hands will leak out these small, opposite emotion things that give them away really. They’re really highly reliable because a bluffer is not likely to leak out these small things of uncertainty or irritation, these small expressions. So yeah, it’s an interesting area and it’s very interesting. I should write something up about it more official.

Tim Levine: I’m not an experienced poker player, but so one strategy is to just be poker faced or stoic and be unreadable.

Zach: Right.

Tim Levine: So what I would call zero transparency, there’s just no signal there. The other strategy would be try to be very unreliable and throw other people off their games. So you mix in some real things and some false things and some stoic and just convince everybody else at the table that what they think they’re seeing could mean any number of different things.

Zach: Yeah, and the interesting thing about that is that that would actually be good, but in practice it’s like most people are afraid of looking stupid. And this actually plays a big role in poker, we could go on for a while about how poker and other games are so different from interrogations and interviews. But one of the things in poker is you might think that’s a good strategy, but in practice you’d be like, “Well, what if I do something and that person reads it as a weak hand and calls me and then I’d feel stupid for trying all these?” So in practice that explains why people just try to be stoic because it’s more effort, more conscious, mental load and thought, and you have to think about, “Am I being balanced on all these spots if I’m trying to be high variance, for example, and throwing out this noise?” So that just helps explain why the best approach is to just be as stoic as you can. We got a little bit off topic there, to get back to your work, one thing I heard you say in a talk, I think it was a podcast was the nuance you’re bringing to this discussion isn’t the most exciting thing because people do love the sexiness, the excitement of tells in general and the idea that we can read people. And I think the thing you said was you’re not likely to be invited to do a TED Talk anytime soon. I’m curious if you can talk a little bit about the public’s perception of we have this kind of love affair with behavioral cues, people love shows like Lie to Me or other shows or even poker tells. There’s this perception in the public eye that poker tells are really important and they play a big role in poker when I emphasize in my work they’re a very small part of poker. They come up occasionally, you might just use them once or twice a session that actually changes a decision. So it’s a pretty uncommon thing. But in the public eye, we have this kind of love affair with behavior and reading people. Do you have thoughts about what attracts us so much to those ideas that we can read people well?

Tim Levine: In part, people always like the little secret, get rich quick ideas. And to some extent maybe the idea of reading nonverbal communication is a lot like a little mini get rich easy solution. It has appeal. Again, getting into poker, I’m sure there’s all these little, “Here’s the secret to being a great poker player, and you’re going to learn it in 10 minutes.”

Zach: There’s a lot of bullshit, yeah.

Tim Levine: Yeah, but there’s a market for it. So I think there’s probably some of that.

Zach: Yeah, you’re right. It’s like if people feel like they have some secret knowledge that’s going to make them better at their jobs, make them better in their intimate relationships or whatever it may be, they feel like they’re getting an advantage on society. I think you’re right, there is some aspect of that.

Tim Levine: Oh, I just went through a job training thing where the consultants come in and they’re going to teach us how to do difficult communications, and they’ve got their little consultant soundbites. I don’t know how much money they soaked out of my university to do this, but it was just all junk. They would never let them in the classroom teaching real communication skills to real tuition paying young adults. But there’s a market for this and they’re selling it. People want the easy path to something that takes a lot of skill and learning and practice.

Zach: Yeah, there is just so much junk out there to name a couple examples. I was watching some podcast where they were having an FBI behavior expert weighing on things, the behaviors in interrogation. I just thought most of the things he was saying were just so not meaningful and just could easily have been found in an innocent person. And compared to the things the person was saying, it was just like, “The nonverbal stuff is just so uninteresting and non reliable.” I’m just like, “Why even focus on that?” Just watching interrogations in general, I’m like all the things that stand out as interesting are just based on what the person is actually saying, not the non-verbal stuff. But let me change direction, I think one really interesting thing to me, one surprising thing to me is just how much people dislike lying. We have a real aversion to directly lying to people. And this helps explain some of the verbal behaviors, verbal indicators in interrogation situation and in games like poker. For example, even someone who’s murdered someone often doesn’t seem like they want to come right out and say, “I didn’t kill that person,” or directly lie, and they instead use hedging language or avoid making a direct statement. And you can see some of that in poker too, people don’t like to directly lie about their hand strength when they know it might be exposed later. For example, someone who actually has a pocket pair of eights is unlikely to say, “I don’t have pocket eights,” they’re unlikely to make these direct statements, it’s just very rare. And so it’s kind of been wild to me that in areas where you think lying would be completely understandable considering the situation, whether it’s poker where you’re allowed to lie or when someone’s committed a serious crime, you’d think they would have no problem lying, but it seems like people still don’t like to lie. And I’m curious, do you see that? If you think that is there, that tendency to avoid lying, is that related to the truth default idea and is it possible that the reason that we so instinctively trust others is that there is some serious deep down aversion for us as social creatures to lie? Is there something to that?

Tim Levine: Yes and yes. So part of the truth default is that we are honest. Most of us are honest unless we have reason not to be. Because most people are honest, then this makes believing other people very functional adaptive. But the thing to remember too is that lying behavior is not normally distributed across the population. There are people out there that lie a great deal and seem to have no problems with it at all. I’m currently working on an essay on something I call bold and shameless lying. So bold lying is when I lie even though I know the truth is easy to check. And shamelessness is when you call me out on it, I’m going to double down and just keep asserting the falsehood. And maybe we can think of people in public life who do this, but they are out there. So I think your observation is true for the vast majority of people, but there are a few people out there that just are not tied to the truth at all and seem to have absolutely, absolutely no problem saying complete obvious falsehood and are completely without shame when people try to call them out.

Zach: And presumably those would be people with the more narcissistic or psychopathic traits, is that fair to say?

Tim Levine: Yeah. I think both of those could account for that, maybe some Machiavellian traits too could produce something like that.

Zach: And probably the context and the motivation for lying would… Well, I guess that wouldn’t explain why they’re lying frequently. Yeah, nevermind.

Tim Levine: So when I teach deception classes, people keep a deception diary, and I pay attention to my own too. But what I’ve discovered in these diaries is some people who lie a lot do it in a particular situation. So they have a particular job that requires them to tell a particular lie in a particular circumstance. And they do it a lot, but this is the only time they lie. They don’t lie to anybody else in their life, it’s just this kind of one place where the truth doesn’t work. Then there’s this other group of people who just lie a lot. In the extreme case, we’ve got the pathological liars who lie when the truth would work better for them. And there’s not many of those people out there, but boy, if you meet one, once you figure out what’s going on and that there’s just no pattern to their honesty or deception, it’s really unsettling.

Zach: Yeah, it is. I think it’s so unsettling for the fact that we do have such a tendency. The truth default, it’s like if that’s our logical default stance to the world and then we stumble across people that just have no problem lying, that is disturbing at some existential level, I feel.

Tim Levine: Yeah. And I think this is why bold and shameless lying actually works because most people think nobody would do that.

Zach: Yeah. They’re like, “It can’t be happening. No, it can’t.”

Tim Levine: Right, it doesn’t make sense. It doesn’t make sense.

Zach: Yeah, exactly. No, that explains a lot I feel like of people’s trustworthiness. So one thing I had a question about, I haven’t delved into the research enough to know this, is it common to set up a study where someone rates not just whether they think someone is lying or truth telling, but also rates their confidence in whether they’re correct?

Tim Levine: Yes. I wouldn’t say it’s super common, but it happens enough that there’s a good amount of research doing that.

Zach: Okay. I might ask you afterwards if you have examples of that, because the thing that strikes me there is say if you forced me to guess a bunch of poker spots, for example, if you put a bunch of different poker behaviors in front of me and said, “Guess all these things,” I think I would have a very low ability to tell bluffs from value hands from strong hands. And that’s in fitting with how I say the times you’ll actually spot something that’s meaningful, that is reliable are actually pretty rare. So in other words, if you put all these spots in front of me, I would have low confidence for most of them, but occasionally I would have very high confidence. And then if you just judge me on the ones I was highly confident on, I think you’d see a significant difference. I’m just curious, it seems like such a rather obvious way to try to detect the people that are good at detecting deception in whatever situation. And I’m curious if you think is that a good idea and maybe people should do more of that in these kinds of tests?

Tim Levine: I think it is a good idea when people have some degree of expertise in the context and when there might actually be kind of real tells or real signal there in some proportion. So when there’s signal variability and when there’s expertise, then that can help. So in the literature as a whole, there’s really no correlation between how white people are and how confident people are. But those generally come from your standard deception to text experiment where there’s no real signal there.

Zach: Yeah, there’s no signal if they’re just saying, “Yes, I did this or no, I did this.” There’s not much signal to these very simplistic ones. It’s like the more context there is, the more verbal stuff there is, whatever. The more signal there is, the more likely you are to get something.

Tim Levine: Yeah, so when there’s a variable signal and you have enough expertise to kind of understand that, then I think confidence becomes very important. So my colleague, Pete Blair, and I designed this lie detection task and we had it run, and we didn’t know who was lying and who was telling the truth. But we built it, so we thought there would be a signal there. And so we’re both trying to do lie detection in this with this new set of materials, it was a few years back. What we found is we both got 86% on them. The ones we missed were different, but we were sure about the vast majority of them, but there were four particular interviews that we were uncertain about. And we went exactly different ways on the ones we were uncertain about, but we agreed a hundred percent on the four we were uncertain about if that makes sense. And it was absolutely what you were saying. We knew the ones we might be missing, and we knew the ones we were probably right about, and we were absolutely chance at the ones we just didn’t see a signal or we saw mixed signals. But where the signal we were looking for was there, kind of we knew it and we got all this right.

Zach: So is there anything you’d like to add here that we haven’t touched on that you think would be interesting to throw in?

Tim Levine: I think we’ve covered a lot of ground.

Zach: Yeah, this has been great. Thanks a lot, Tim. And thanks a lot for your work, very interesting. Your book Duped was great, and you were mentioned in Malcolm Gladwell’s book Talking to Strangers, which must have been good for you to get some extra attention. That must have been exciting.

Tim Levine: Yeah, Malcolm Gladwell’s been very kind in dropping my name around.

Zach: Okay. Thanks a lot for coming on, Tim.

Tim Levine: My pleasure, I really enjoyed it. Thanks for having me.

Zach Elwood: That was deception detection researcher Tim Levine. He’s the author of Duped: Truth-Default Theory and the Social Science of Lying and Deception. I highly recommend that book if you are interested in behavior and deception detection. 

To come back to the discussion of how poker tells differ from general deception detection scenarios: one anecdote of mine can help us see how different these areas are. In 2013, I was watching the final table of that year’s World Series of Poker Main Event as it was being broadcast. I was live-tweeting it. These were players playing for millions of dollars; they’d outlasted thousands of other players. First place was $8 million. At one point, a player made a big bet and another player was thinking for a long time. Based on the bettor’s demeanor, specifically their genuine-seeming smiling and laughter, I was very confident they had a strong hand; bluffers can smile but it’s rare for them to have more exuberant and genuine-seeming smiles; these are smiles that affect their eyes and that are more dynamic with more movement and looseness. I was so sure about this that I tweeted “If Jay is bluffing here, I’ll eat my hat. No way.” His opponent ended up calling. He was wrong and I was right; the bettor did have a strong hand. 

Now clearly, with my poker tells books and work, I have a lot at risk to make a public guess like that. And it’s seldom that I would make such a pronouncement. As I emphasize in my poker tells work, it’s seldom that you can be very confident in a tell. But sometimes I will see spots where I’m highly confident, almost certain, that someone is strong or weak. Some of these can be cold reads; some behaviors are very unlikely with certain hand strengths, even not knowing anything about a player. In other cases, the confidence might come from seeing how someone behaves over several hands, to have more player-specific knowledge.

And so for this example of me correctly and confidently reading that player in the World Series of Poker, we can see that it doesn’t have much to do with deception detection. A lot of tells from players making big bets have to do with them leaking information about how relaxed they are, and some of that has to do with the fact that players who have a strong hand can just be feeling really good about things; they could be savoring the moment; they could even have some tendency to goad their opponent a bit, which can manifest verbally or even with just more direct eye contact, or with more irritated or belligerent-seeming facial expressions. But these behavioral patterns are not about deception. And there’s no equivalent to this in an interrogation or interview scenario; most people being interrogated don’t suddenly feel great about the situation and happy to be there, whether they’re innocent or guilty. 

To take another example: another class of tells in poker are related to a player’s level of focus or lack of focus. For example, early in a hand, a player who gets a strong hand, let’s say pocket Aces, will have a tendency to be more mentally focused, because they seldom get a strong hand and because they don’t want to waste it; they want to play it as well as they can and know they’ll be in the hand for a while. But a player with a weak hand who makes a bet or raise early in a hand, is often less mentally focused. They know they have the option to fold if someone raises them; they know they can always check and fold; basically they haven’t invested much in the hand yet. And these dynamics means that the more loose and ostentatious behavior, whether verbal or nonverbal, early in a hand when the pot is small, will be more linked to weak and medium-strength hands and not to strong hands.

And those are tells that also are not really related to deception; they’re just tells of focus versus lack of focus. 

And another different thing about poker is that players are constantly going into and out of these highly emotionally polarized but also short-lasting situations, and that means there’s a chance to look for imbalances over time. And a lot of people just aren’t that good at being balanced and aren’t even trying that hard, especially when it comes to doing that over many situations over many hours, or even days or weeks or months when you play with someone regularly for a long time. 

And finally, in poker, behavioral information can be valuable even when it’s slightly reliable. In poker, you’re often put in spots that could go either way from a fundamental strategy perspective. In other words, leaving aside any behavioral stuff, it’s often a toss up whether to call a bet or fold to it. So if you see a behavior you think is slightly more likely to mean one thing than another thing, that can be valuable in the long term, because you’re making so many small decisions in poker. So small edges can be valuable. And there’s just no equivalence in interrogation; interrogators aren’t going to change big decisions based on one small behavior they spot. And this aspect of poker doesn’t even map over to most other games or sports, and that’s because poker involves so many decisions that are based on low-information; for example, in chess, there’s no equivalent to this, because all information is on the table and is known, whereas in hidden information games, especially versus skilled players, you’ll often be put in spots where your decision could go one of two or even three ways. And that’s one big reason skilled poker players find tells valuable; the cumulative effect of small edges over time.

I could talk about this for a while, but I just wanted to help make the case that reading poker tells is quite different than deception detection and real-world situations like interviews. And part of the reason I wanted to do that is to encourage any behavior and psychology researchers listening to do more studying of poker tells, to show that there is still much to study in poker that hasn’t yet been studied.

If you find this stuff interesting, check out my poker tells site, readingpokertells.com. I also have videos on youtube on my Reading Poker Tells youtube channel. You can sign up for a free email series on verbal poker tells at readingpokertells.com. 

I wanted to give a shout-out and thank you to Alan Crawley, who goes by the online handle SinVerba, which is Spanish for nonverbal. Alan does youtube videos and classes on behavior. I was recently talking to him and he got me thinking again about comparing interrogations and poker and that was what led to me finding Tim Levine’s work and what led to me doing this podcast. So thanks for that, Alan. 

This has been the People Who Read People podcast, with me, Zachary Elwood. If you like this podcast, please leave it a rating on Apple Podcasts. That’s a great way to show your appreciation. And of course please share it with your friends if you’ve liked it; that’s also hugely appreciated. 

Okay thanks for listening.

Music by Small Skies.

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podcast

How do doctors read “drug-seeking” behaviors?, with Dr. Casey Grover

A talk with addiction specialist Dr. Casey Grover about behavioral indicators of so-called “drug-seeking behavior,” which is when people try to deceptively convince doctors to prescribe them drugs. Grover hosts the podcast Addiction in Emergency Medicine and Acute Care. We talk about: why Casey thinks “drug-seeking” is a bad, unhelpful term; what behavioral clues doctors use to determine if someone might be “drug-seeking”; why most behaviors aren’t that reliable; America’s drug problems (opioids, fentanyl, methamphetamines).

A transcript is below. 

Episode links:

Resources discussed in this episode or related:

TRANSCRIPT

[Note: transcripts will contain errors.]

Zach: Welcome to the People Who Read People podcast, with me, Zach Elwood. This is a podcast about understanding other people and understanding ourselves. You can learn more about it at behavior-podcast.com.

If you’ve enjoyed this podcast, would you be willing to give it a review? If you’re willing to do that, please leave it a review on Apple Podcasts; if you don’t know how to find that, there’s a link to Apple Podcasts on my site at behavior-podcast.com.

In this episode, I talk to Dr. Casey Grover about so-called drug-seeking behavior, which is the term used for when people who have drug addictions, for example, to opioids, attempt to deceive doctors in order to get a prescription.

I learned about Dr. Grover when I read a research paper from 2012 that he was a part of; the paper was called How Frequently are “Classic” Drug-Seeking Behaviors Used by Drug-Seeking Patients in the Emergency Department?. That study looked at a population of patients who were flagged as being likely to have so-called drug-seeking behaviors, and found that the behaviors that were often most associated with drug-seeking were pretty uncommon in these people’s emergency department visits. To quote from that study: “The most prevalent classic drug-seeking behavior was complaint of 10/10 pain, followed by complaint of headache, and then complaint of back pain. The least prevalent behavior was complaint of lost medication.” end quote. That paper also pointed out that such behaviors were pretty common genuine complaints of people in emergency departments, which pointed to the general unreliability of using such behaviors for the basis of making decisions.

Dr. Grover is also the host of a podcast about addiction, which is called Addiction in Emergency medicine and acute care. To quote from the podcast description: “A practical and evidence-based podcast on how to think about, diagnose, and treat substance use disorders in the Emergency Department and Acute Care.” end quote

In this episode, we talk about the reasons why most of the well known drug-seeking behaviors aren’t strong evidence of addiction; we talk about some behaviors that can be meaningful; we talk about the pressures doctors face to both give patients the care they need while at the same also trying to avoid giving drugs to people with drug abuse problems; we talk about America’s drug problems, including our problems with opioids, meth, and fentanyl. One of Casey’s recent podcast episodes included his thoughts on why the phrase ‘drug-seeking behavior’ is not a helpful one and should be retired, and we talk about that, too.

A little more about Dr. Grover: he’s the Chair of the Division of Emergency Medicine at Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula. He graduated from medical school at University of California, Los Angeles as one of the top three students in his class. He completed his residency at Stanford in Emergency Medicine, and was chief resident. He’s also currently in the process of becoming board certified in addiction medicine in addition to being board certified in emergency medicine.

Okay, here’s the talk with Dr. Casey Grover.

Zach: Hey Casey, thanks for coming on.

Casey: Thank you so much for having me. I’m very pleased to be here.

Zach: So maybe we can first talk about, maybe you can explain a little bit about what the term drug seeking behavior means, and maybe also why you are not a fan of that term.

Casey: I. That is a fantastic question to get us started. And I think the definition and understanding of what the term means has changed over time, kind of in my understanding and also in the understanding of the general medical community. Um, so I graduated medical school in 2010 and at that time, drug seeking really, we associated with people trying to seek prescription opioids.

And at the [00:04:00] time, really kind of what we all did was. When we identify this behavior is we as doctors said, you patient have a problem. I’m not gonna prescribe you anything you need to be discharged. And that really was in part, um, what drove the movement from the first part of the opiate epidemic of prescription opioids to the illicit.

Opioid market, which was the second wave or the second part. So I personally, by telling someone who is asking for a refill of their, you know, oxycodone, you’re drug seeking, you need to be discharged. I pushed people personally from prescription opioids to heroin. I. And at the time it, it was kind of just what we thought made sense.

This was a new phenomenon of overprescribing opioids. This was a new phenomenon of seeing young people coming to the emergency department or their primary care setting, asking for opioids. And over time I now realize that we really missed the mark. [00:05:00] Drug seeking is a symptom. Just like nausea, it’s not a diagnosis and that’s really where the problem is and why I initially researched drug seeking behavior ’cause I wanted to learn more about it.

And over the last 10 to 12 years, I’ve really began to understand it better and the nuances that drug seeking behavior is a symptom that must be further investigated by us as doctors and healthcare professionals.

Zach: So if you think someone is addicted and you don’t wanna push them away, obviously for the reasons you mentioned, what is the, the proper path?

Is it to ask more questions and, and maybe try to get them into a program, something like that?

Casey: A absolutely. So, you know, kind of if you break it down. Drug seeking behavior may be one of several things. Number one, it is what is called a use disorder. I think people are used to the term addiction, but I now think of the term as a doctor opioid use disorder.

They are functionally addicted to [00:06:00] opioids. For those people, I’ll often actually offer them medications to help treat their opioid addiction. People may recognize either Suboxone or methadone. Um. But it may be more complicated. They could be in withdrawal, meaning they’ve taken opioids regularly and when they stop, they get withdrawal symptoms.

They might be afraid of withdrawal. They’re on their last dose of oxycodone, they’re about to run out and go into withdrawal. Or this person might have addiction and real pain, or they might just be having pain. It becomes so nuanced. But to come back to your question, specifically for so-called opioid addiction or opioid use disorder, I now offer my patients in the emergency department medications.

Counseling and I often recommend them to follow up with a drug treatment program, whether that’s residential or sometimes just following up with a mutual support group like Narcotics Anonymous. Um, but my goal is treatment. When I [00:07:00] identify this behavior in somebody who has opiate addiction, I.

Zach: I imagine that must be a, a kind of touchy, awkward subject, especially if they’ve been, you know, trying to be deceptive about, uh, why they want the, the drugs.

Is, is that a difficult conversation to, you know, to segue into?

Casey: Yeah, I mean, unfortunately, um. You know, we’ve seen such devastating effects of the opiate epidemic that things have really changed. So in 2010, I often felt like I had to play detective at work. Um, you know, somebody would come in with back pain.

And I was trying to guess, is this real? Is it not? Now, um, generally the medical community has really tightened down on the number of opioids that we prescribe. Mm-hmm. And with the arrival of ultra cheap fentanyl. If patients have an addiction, they’re usually buying it on the street. So for me, I tend to not have to have those difficult conversations as much as I did say 10 years ago.

Which is tragic because you and I both know how much fentanyl is killing America and the rest of the [00:08:00] world. And you know, I. A couple of times we’ve kind of joked in a kind of a dark humor way of, gosh, I miss when people were coming to the ER for pills. ’cause at least they were safe. Mm. You know, if it was five milligrams of oxycodone that they got, it was actually five milligrams of oxycodone.

Now if you buy five milligrams of oxycodone on the street, it’s probably fentanyl, or who knows what else? So, you know, I think the, the, the most difficult conversation I have is when someone doesn’t recognize that they’ve got a problem. That they’re developing addiction or developing an opioid use disorder, and I have to sit down and be non-judgmental and really engage them to say that there’s more here than I think you realize and I’m worried about you.

Mm-hmm. Um, but yes, over the years I’ve had plenty of very difficult, confrontational conversations when patients want an opioid and I don’t feel comfortable as the treating doctor.

Zach: This topic usually seems to be around opioids and and painkillers, but is there some percentage of [00:09:00] so-called drug seeking behavior that is about uppers, like Adderall or Ritalin or other classes of drugs?

Casey: Well, I, I’m gonna try to make a joke here, and I wrote about this. I have asthma. When I ask my doctor for an albuterol refill, I have albuterol seeking behavior.

Zach: Hmm.

Casey: So in some ways, drug seeking behavior is what it is. A person’s trying to obtain a, a medication or, or therapeutic drug,

Zach: bad term. To

Casey: your point, I think the.

The kind of the connotation of drug seeking is usually of addiction or the so-called use disorder. And for that, people can be addicted to many different substances. Opioids, sedatives like benzodiazepines. People really like Xanax. Unfortunately, that’s a very highly addictive drug. Sometimes it’s muscle relaxants, sometimes it’s stimulants.

We even sometimes see people, uh, who have addictions to other medications that are not as common, such as, um, [00:10:00] Gabapentin, which is a nerve pain agent, or even sometimes medications for severe mental health. So, to answer your question, people can so-called druge for many different therapeutic classes. Um, I think we are most aware of it simply because of what we’ve all seen with opioids in America.

Um, but it, it’s many different drug classes.

Zach: So I was reading some in preparation for this. I was reading some papers and articles and listening to your podcast too, and looking at the research paper you did on these topics. And the thing that really stood out is just how difficult it is to determine if someone is seeking drugs for addiction related reasons versus other reasons.

And it totally makes sense because detecting deception is just so hard in general. And then if we’re talking about opiates, OPI, opioids, you know, pain is so. Subjective. And so it makes sense that it would be pretty easy for people who have a use disorder to emulate that behavior and for no one to know.

So all that’s just to say it [00:11:00] makes sense that it would be a pretty hard task to, uh, differentiate someone who. Has a use disorder from someone who doesn’t? And am I getting all that correct? That summary?

Casey: You said it beautifully. It is exceptionally challenging and when I did research in the early 2010s on this topic, that was what I was trying to answer.

But again, at that time it was predominantly patients getting prescription opioids and often addicted to those opioids. Or fearful of withdrawal or in withdrawal. And I, I didn’t really understand the topic well enough, nor did really anyone at the time, um, kind of like with COVID, how we had to kinda learn on the fly with America’s opiate epidemic.

It was very similar. No one had ever really seen kind of what would happen if you distributed a potentially addictive medication widespread across, across the country. So. My preliminary research, I wanted to try to figure out are there certain things that we can pick up on as doctors [00:12:00] that suggests this person might be having a problem with their opioids.

And I don’t know how much, um, you spent reading the papers, but my statistics really weren’t that strong. But it’s really some of the only research that’s ever been done on the topic to try to quantify it. And to your point, it’s. Just so hard to confirm that a person has an opioid use disorder unless they admit it.

And if they’re trying to be deceptive because of all the shame and stigma that comes with addiction, you know, you might not get that answer, so. Mm-hmm. It’s really hard. Um, and for me as a doctor now, and I’m. Soon to be board certified in addiction medicine. Um, it’s really time with the patient being non-judgmental and really being willing to listen and ask some difficult non-judgmental questions and make a therapeutic alliance to say, you know, sir, even if you have a problem, I’m still gonna take care of you.

But yes, you said it beautifully that it’s, it’s a very nuanced and challenged diagnosis to make, if you will. And I just wanna [00:13:00] clarify again. Drug seeking isn’t a diagnosis more of a symptom, but to really make that final diagnosis of the person who came in saying they have back pain only to realize that they have a, uh, an opioid use disorder and they’re trying to obtain prescription opioids.

Zach: And I’d, I’d imagine it’s can be a blurred line too. Uh, right, because some people. WI, I would presume, wouldn’t technically be aware that they were addicted and they may actually view it in terms of having bad pain. Am I, am I correct in that?

Casey: Absolutely. It is exceptionally nuanced. Um, and sometimes you can have kind of all four of the behaviors.

You can have drug dependence, drug withdrawal, addiction, and pain. And what’s hard is, and you sent me an example of somebody who was very frustrated about how. Patients with real pain have been often turned away when they need, uh, legitimate pain relief. It’s been just really hard to parcel out is this pain?

Is it uncontrolled pain? Are we developing an addiction? There are some [00:14:00] obvious red flags, you know, if somebody’s, I. Melting their pills and injecting them, or smoking their pills or snorting their pills. Those are obviously extremely major red flags that somebody is developing an opioid addiction. Again, also known as an opioid use disorder.

But if somebody just comes in and they’re like, doc, my pain is worse. You gotta go up on the dose. That can be really challenging. Mm-hmm. Um, I tend to look for a few kind of, uh, risk factors for addiction. So has this person been addicted to something else? Um, now with a lot, a lot of electronic medical records, when I open the person’s chart, I see their history automatically.

And if somebody has had, for example, an addiction to alcohol, alcohol and opioids can often be similar. And the. Predisposition for addiction to opioids is much higher because of the previous addiction to alcohol. So I usually ask my patients if I’m worried, you know, is there a family history of addiction?

Do you currently have a different addiction? Have you had a previous addiction in the past? And those are all things that I might think of [00:15:00] that are gonna increase my concern that what might seem just like pain could have a more complicated facet of addiction going on as well.

Zach: That’s really what struck me about this.

You know, I’ve, I’ve heard, and I, I’ve even thought this myself, that, you know how much doctors have theoretically contributed to this. You sometimes see doctors as a whole get grief or criticism about the opioid epidemic, but you know, like you’re saying, it’s, it’s a really tough spot to be in as a doctor because, I mean, the last thing you want to do.

Deny someone who, who is suffering, uh, some, some help. So, and, and if it’s basically hard to determine if someone is being deceptive about their pain, it, it’s understandable that most doctors would err on the side of providing the help. And it’s similar, you can see it as similar to the legal system, you know, where you’d rather see a hundred guilty men go free, then punish an innocent person.

It seems like there can be a, a similar dynamic at work that helps us or makes us err on the side of. Providing that those drugs. And does that all sound? [00:16:00] Am I getting some of that right?

Casey: Yeah, there. There’s only one other kind of point that I would like to add, which is that there’s so much more to pain management than just opioids.

Mm. And I’ve been the chair of my hospital’s pain management committee for about six years now, and myself and one of my colleagues where I work. We were kind of the canaries in the coal mine in our community as early as like 2013 to say something’s not right with opioids. And we would tell our colleagues, please don’t prescribe opioids.

And they said, well, okay, but then what can I use? Hmm. And we have sense. About the mid 2010s as physicians really focused on what are called alternatives to opioids or A LTO Alto, and as an example, when somebody had a pinched nerve in their back when I was in residency, I was really taught to give them opioids and that’s it.

Hmm. Now I use what’s called a multimodal approach. I will use an [00:17:00] anti-inflammatory. I will use a steroid. I will use acetaminophen. I will use a nerve pain agent. Sometimes I’ll even add in an IV lidocaine drip or even an antidepressant. And those six drugs combine in an additive fashion that can often be much stronger than a single dose of an opioid.

So I think it’s. Even gotten better from a pain standpoint that we have such better approaches to pain management than we did when this started. As an example, I just gave a lecture on managing kidney stones without opioids, and most people are aware that kidney stones are one of the most painful conditions that we treat.

And so it’s really been great as a physician that as we as doctors have cut down on our opioids, we’ve opened the door to so many other great non-opioid options, and I’m very grateful that. You know, my hospital has been really tip of the spear on writing new protocols and using drugs in new ways that are not addictive and are very effective for pain management.

So it’s a little bit of a different [00:18:00] scenario, you know, as compared to 2010 versus 2022. We just have more options for pain relief. In addition.

Zach: It’s probably an impossible question to answer because it’s so broad and probably varies across the country. But do you think, do you have an opinion on whether.

The problem these days with opioids is that people are prescribing them too much or, or too little. Has it swung the other way?

Casey: Yeah, that is a fantastic question. You are a hundred percent correct. It has definite regional variations. Um, I think that the pendulum in 2010 was to over-prescribing and the pendulum in 2022 may be towards the side of under prescribing opioids.

And you know, I have a number of. Uh, patients that come through the emergency department that, you know, say something to the effect of, you know, I was told the only place I could get an opioid was the ER ’cause it was too dangerous. And there are plenty of patients who can be managed on long-term opioids [00:19:00] by their primary care physician and they do really well.

Not every person who takes chronic opioids gets addicted. Now I have to say, with a caveat, I prefer to avoid. A new start of an opioid in my practice. So I’ll give you an example. If you come in with a fracture, I’m gonna try to do everything I can to keep you as comfortable and treat your pain and avoid starting an opioid.

But if they’re needed, I use them in my practice regularly. I think, and again, you sent me, um, a, I believe it’s a, a Twitter post from somebody who talked about patients being denied opioids. That absolutely does happen. And you know, the circumstance that I find frustrating is you have somebody who’s, you know, 85 years old, they’ve never had an addiction, they’re on a blood thinner and they have a lot of medications, so they can’t take kind of that multimodal approach I talked about.

They take, you know, two to. Two opioids a day so they can walk their dog. They’re not crushing their pills, they’re not snorting their pills. They’re doing fine, and their doctor [00:20:00] says, we need to taper you right now. I think this sounds so silly to say, but really doctors should just use their best clinical judgment if opioids are helping someone who doesn’t have another option.

Then it’s totally appropriate. Obviously that patient would need to be monitored to make sure that they don’t develop any signs of an opioid use disorder. If it’s a 17-year-old that can be managed without opioids, then do that. Um, but I think overall, unfortunately, the pendulum has swung away from opioids.

Whether that’s the right thing from a population standpoint is an interesting question because when they look in the studies, when people get started on an opioid, there’s a certain percentage that end up on the long term. A new start of an opioid is not a benign or kind of innocuous event. So I think if you look at across America.

If we had been more judicious with opioids 20 years ago, we’d see a very different landscape. But on the individual patient level, you know, [00:21:00] again, a person with legitimate pain that’s never misused, their medications may be suffering because their doctor’s not willing to prescribe opiates for them.

Zach: So let’s talk about, uh, some behavioral indicators of people who may be seeking drugs for use, disorder related reasons, and with the caveat, of course, as we’ve said that.

Many of these behaviors, or, or, or all of them probably are, uh, aren’t that reliable and are very, you know, very subjective and can actually be done by people who legitimately have pain and such. Uh, but maybe you could talk a little bit about, of the, of the various behavior indicators, behavior behaviors that tend to.

People tend to point to. Are there some that stand out for you as, as being the most reliable?

Casey: Yeah, absolutely. Um, so the, the research I did, uh, back in the early 2010s, I. I just kind of asked around my colleagues what tips you off that a person is trying to obtain opioids, and we all kind of had a list in our mind and it [00:22:00] was non-specific complaints like back pain, dental pain, or headache that are pretty common and usually don’t involve a lot of testing.

Things like asking for a medication by name, asking for an IV dose rather than an oral dose, saying that your pain is more than a 10 out of 10. Um, asking for a refill. There were a lot of things we looked at and it’s a little hard to understand kind of if that study is still relevant today because again, the landscape has changed so much.

Interestingly. Back pain in my career has really changed when I was in residency in the early 2010s, most patients with back pain were on chronic opioid therapy and were either out and needed a refill or were on that dangerous line of is this addiction or is this pain? I. My back pain patients now are pretty legitimate.

You know, many of them have a pinched nerve. Some of them need an epidural injection, so I think that kind of non-specific pain complaint no longer applies. And people when they come in for these complaints, tend to be very [00:23:00] open to whatever I want to prescribe. And oftentimes patients will actually tell me, doc, I heard about those opioids.

I don’t want those. The one that I do think still carries some weight is asking for a medication by name, particularly when it’s a medication that’s known to be. Somewhat euphoric. And if people will ask me, doc, what are you gonna give me? And I’ll say, you know, I’m gonna give you a dose of an IV anti-inflammatory.

We’re gonna give you a little bit of an opioid, some acetaminophen and a nerve pain agent. And they say, okay, I don’t have any red flags. But if they say, I have to have this medication at this dose. What I now call that is they’re opiate sophisticated. Mm-hmm. They may be a chronic pain patient who is really knowledgeable about how their body responds to opioids.

They may also have opioid addiction, and that’s just a flag to me that I need to dig into their chart more. Mm-hmm. And spend more time talking with them, you know? Do I see in the chart that they had an opioid overdose in the past? Do I see that they were on methadone in the past? It’s just, it’s more work on my [00:24:00] part, which is appropriate for me to do.

Mm-hmm. Um, the other one that’s still interesting is when people say that their pain is greater than 10 out of 10, that to me means the patient wants to get my attention. And that doesn’t necessarily mean it’s addiction, but they, they want to make a statement to me. Doctor, this is serious. Sometime it is because they are addicted and they really wanna push me to give them a shot of morphine or something.

Sometimes it’s, they’re just miserable and they want me to do something and you know, I think other than that, you know, most now, most often now, when people are requesting refills, it’s pretty legitimate and. Since 2010, we now have what are called prescription drug monitoring programs where you as a doctor can log in, um, and look to see what medications someone’s been on.

And I’ll give you an example. I had a patient show up from out of town. Which made me a little bit nervous. And he said he was on Fentanyl patches, which are really, really [00:25:00] potent. And I was nervous. I was like, is this guy trying to obtain opioids because of an addiction? And I logged in and I was able to see that he’s been getting his fentanyl patches every month regularly from the same doctor.

It exactly matched with his story. And I said, sir, I am so happy to help you. And I think, again, kind of like with. Pain going from just opioids to this multimodal approach. There’s more tools available to us as doctors to be able to dig in a little deeper to the history. So I think the one that really kind of makes me the most nervous as a doctor, if somebody has a specific request about name of medication and then also the route and the dose, and again, that just means they’re sophisticated.

I do have to do more work to really dig in.

Zach: Yeah, that kinda reminds me of police interrogation there. There’s nothing that. Specifically will say, this person, you know, is X. It’s more like an indicator that you should ask more questions or look into [00:26:00] it, you know? I think, I think that’s what some people get that confused about police interrogation things too, where it’s like something may be a little suspicious and it doesn’t mean that the cops should think that they’re guilty.

It just means, oh, maybe I’ll follow up on that question a little bit more. That kind of thing. And, and I think that some people can have a, a, a sense or belief that. You know, people are, are just being like, oh, this means that, you know, where it’s, it’s a lot, as you’ve said, it’s a lot more subtle than that and just is there, there’s nothing that will a hundred percent mean anything.

Casey: Yeah. And, and I’m, I, I may be a little bit of an outlier on this. You know, I, I wrote a piece why I believe that the term drug seeking needs to be retired. ’cause I still do occasionally see physicians who identify drug seeking behavior and tell the patient I. That’s it. We’re done. You’re discharged. Mm. I’m not gonna continue this for you.

It still happens. Um, I, I believe that I’m doing those patients harm because, you know, if they have prescription opioids and I cut them off, [00:27:00] they may go to the street market and I don’t want them on fentanyl. If they’re addicted, they’re risk at risk of overdose. I need to treat them. And if they’re just in really bad pain, well I can help with that too.

So I think, you know. I would like to believe that physicians are doing a better job of identifying, Hmm, something’s, something’s making me nervous here. I’m gonna dig deeper. But I think there’s still, unfortunately maybe some reflex to say, something makes me nervous. I’m gonna cut this person off, and I’m gonna tell them that I, I can’t do anything else for them.

Which to me is, is why I wrote the article. It’s a tragedy to your point, you know, patients need the appropriate treatment, particularly for pain, and I wanna do my best to advocate for my patients.

Zach: Yeah, to make an analogy, it’s, it’s probably like any profession where, you know, and the analogy in the, in the police world would be a, a detective who’s interrogating somebody and, and they’re acting strangely, and the detective just immediately a hundred percent thinks they’re guilty without good evidence.

You know, there’s probably, uh, in any [00:28:00] profession, there’s, there’s people overreacting or, or taking a little bit of evidence as, as definitive evidence or something.

Casey: Absolutely.

Zach: Would you say it’s also the case that I assume that, uh, you know, when, when it comes to practice in the field, that, that doctors are kind of subjectively because these things are so subjective and unreliable.

I’d imagine a lot of it just comes down to doctors getting a, a general feeling of how suspicious or trustworthy someone is. And that might depend on, you know, very subtle things, things we haven’t mentioned, you know, just like. Very subtle things, like a story not coming together very logically or someone seeming a little strange, uh, their eyes being a little shifty or something, or someone rambling too much about their reasons.

Basically the same kind of subjective things that can make police, interrogators, interrogators suspicious of someone they’re interrogating. And this isn’t to defend those, uh, more subjective things. It’s just to say that probably it makes [00:29:00] sense because we are dealing with such a. Subjective, uh, area in such a, a, a vague and gray area that it, it probably makes sense that doctors do have to rely on these more subjective reads and their feelings and such.

And do, I’m wondering if you have anything to say about that.

Casey: Yeah, I mean, I think there’s a couple of, couple of answers here. So the first is, is there has been some research on this, and I just pulled this up on my phone while we’re talking. There’s actually a scoring tool called the Opioid Risk Tool for Narcotic Abuse, and I don’t really like that title ’cause number one, narcotic.

Would suggest that it’s illegal and these could be prescription opioids and then abuse is a stigmatizing term. Um, it probably would be best, you know, to be said as the opioid risk tool to assess for opioid use disorder. But I’ll get off my soapbox there about stigmatizing language. But it’s essentially a tool that you can plug in the patient’s variables and it’ll give you some predictions on whether or not the patient’s at high risk for [00:30:00] misusing their, their opioids.

And it’s important to understand exactly when that tool can be applied. And that was really, as I understand it, for the chronic pain clinic where somebody’s on opioids long term and the doctor wants to see are they going down that slippery slope from just pain. To pain and an opioid use disorder. Um, so there are a couple of different, uh, scores.

If I remember correctly, there’s probably about five or six. None of them really caught on in the emergency department just because it was so hard to study and it was more geared again, towards the chronic pain clinic, chronic opioid management world. Um. To your point, sometimes it really is subjective.

Uh, I was thinking about a case where somebody came in and I just got a really weird vibe. Um, it was a young female patient, we’d never seen her at my hospital before, and she kept repeating the same phrase over and over again, trying to describe her pain. [00:31:00] And it almost seemed rehearsed. And I asked her point blank, have you ever been on an opioid before?

She let me. She was very compliant. She let me give her whatever meds I wanted, you know, alternatives to opioids to try to treat her pain. And she said, doctor, I’m doing better, but I think I’m gonna need something stronger. And I just got this weird little kind of vibe of, gosh, something seems weird here.

What I did in her case is I logged into California’s prescription drug monitoring program and I found that she’d had something like 30 or 40 opioid prescriptions of all, almost all from different doctors to suggest that she was basically going clinic to clinic, emergency department to emergency department, trying to obtain opioids.

And that gave me that confirmation. And if, if I hadn’t found that, I may have just given her the benefit of the doubt and said, this is a legitimate pain patient. And in her case, what was really challenging, I. And this was probably about five or six years ago, is I tried to offer her treatment for opioid use disorder and she said, doctor, I don’t have a [00:32:00] problem.

And then asked to be discharged. So, um, it, it’s just a, it’s, it’s, it’s almost like parenting. You know, you kind of know when your kid’s up to something. Medicine is about pattern recognition just as much as you know your child. That’s the look when my child’s hungry. That’s the look of my child’s tired.

It’s almost just looking for this patient is behaving differently than the majority of my patients. Something doesn’t add up. And you’re right, it’s, it’s subjective and I think that’s again why it’s incumbent upon us as doctors to. Take more time with the patient to really try to parcel out what’s driving this behavior.

And again, if it’s prescription opioids, you gotta check that prescription drug monitoring program to really get that objective data. ’cause that, for me, sealed it that this is somebody who’s not using opioids appropriately. So, yes, very subjective. And, um, I think some people feel like they have good radar, you know, and I, I don’t know if they ever get accurate feedback if they cut someone off who was a legitimate pain [00:33:00] patient because it’s, again, so subjective.

You know, as an example, if I miss a case of appendicitis. Usually my colleague will follow up with me or in my uh, department. We have like a monthly educational lecture where we review cases where we can learn from them. There really isn’t that in this space, so if somebody kind of self proclaims or self identifies as somebody who’s really good at picking up drug seekers, they could be really wrong and they don’t get really good feedback to, to learn from it just because oftentimes those patients just won’t come back to our department.

Zach: Do you have any other, uh, interesting anecdotes that, that come to mind for, uh. These kinds of things.

Casey: Well, I mean, you know, sometimes, you know, it can really spiral when people who have a opioid use disorder don’t get their meds. Um, I can think of a case when I was a medical student about a patient who lied about having cancer to get really high dose prescription opioids.

And I was able to, as a medical student, review his [00:34:00] medical record. Um, and without getting too into the weeds, I was able to basically prove that he was lying about his, his cancer and that he had never had it. And this was all to obtain opioids. I. And, uh, when we confronted him of, you know, sir, you’ve not been honest with us, he just erupted.

He yelled at staff, he threatened to commit suicide. He ended up going on an involuntary hold and being admitted to psychiatry. And I don’t know if he was able to, you know, even see an addiction medicine specialist when he was admitted. Um. You know, not as much anymore. Patients would sometimes verbally be abusive with doctors and nurses when they wouldn’t get what they want.

Um, I actually had a patient as recently as about a year ago, who just absolutely screamed at my staff that he wasn’t getting opioids. And you know, that’s, it’s, I. You know, healthcare is really hard right now. I mean, morale and healthcare is low, and I really try to defend my staff. Um, so you, you know, it just, it, addiction is just so disruptive to the [00:35:00] brain as far as the ability to weigh out what is a good decision and a bad decision, and it can really cause people to escalate when they don’t get what they want.

Zach: Do any anecdotes, uh, spring to mind of the opposite situation where you were pretty sure someone had an a use disorder, but. Ended up not having one, anything like that?

Casey: Absolutely. I mean, that goes back to my point about the Prescription drug monitoring program. Uh, as I mentioned earlier, you know, I had a gentleman who showed up to my emergency department, never been to my hospital before from out of town requesting really high dose opioids.

And I was just already kind of skeptical and I did my homework. I actually called his old doctor. Um, he was from OUTTA state. His doctor confirmed, no, this is legitimate. I manage him. She actually faxed me records to confirm, and I was actually grateful that I was his doctor that day because I. I, in my work that I do wanted to do what’s right, I wanted to take him seriously.

I wanted to make sure that if [00:36:00] he needed these meds, I could get them for him. Or if it was a use disorder, I wanted to be able to offer him treatment for addiction. So, in that case, I mean, I, you know, I know I, I, I, I hope. This is not true, but I worry that a couple of my colleagues, you know, in my region of California might have looked at ’em and said, you’re looking for that, and you’re from outta state.

You’ve never been here before. Yep. I’m not buying it. Mm-hmm. Um, but you know, you, you kind of dig deeper. You do your homework as a doctor and you can prove that people are legitimate patients and then they’re so grateful that you took them seriously. It, it ended up being a, a really great interaction between me and him.

He was, um, you know, very grateful that, you know, he was out visiting. You know, my part of California for personal reasons for family, and he didn’t have to fly back home, uh, and disrupt his, his family obligations to be able to go get his meds that he had accidentally forgotten. So, absolutely, I can think of many more similar cases.

Zach: So I guess, uh, I’m, I’m gathering that you would probably agree that training for doctors in this area is, uh, should, should [00:37:00] be better. It’s not as good as it could be.

Casey: I got one lecture, uh, on addiction in medical school, and ironically it was only on gambling addiction. Um, and my training in medical school from 2006 to 2010 was that pain is always to be treated with opioids.

Once acetaminophen and ibuprofen don’t work and you always escalate the doses of opioids. Um, as the patient needs. Um, I believe now there is a lot more work going into education for medical students. I’ve actually personally been asked to speak to medical students, um, about the work that my colleagues and I do, you know, at my hospital.

In this sphere to be able to treat patients appropriately and really kind of dig into what’s really driving the behaviors. Um, and definitely across the nation we are seeing that residency trainings are starting to incorporate addiction. We do have one residency in my county in California, and they do a wonderful job of [00:38:00] giving their residents exposure to addiction.

Many of them come work personally with me and my colleagues, kind of in my, uh, kind of in my sphere of addiction, pain, and emergency medicine. Um, and then really being so aggressive about alternatives to opioids for severe pain. Um, it’s really incredible how much pain relief you can give people without opioids.

So I. Truly, we are seeing more and more over time as America is getting deeper and deeper into what is now the fentanyl crisis. And we just see how bad things are. Uh, I’m actually pretty hopeful. Uh, we just hired three new physicians at my hospital and they are all, uh, very savvy with kind of this sort of con conversation that you and I are having to really kind of dig in and understand those nuances.

Zach: So we’ve talked, we focused on, uh. Opioids and painkillers. But is there anything that comes to mind in terms of differences in behavior for. People that might have a use disorder with, uh, amphetamines or, or other uppers. [00:39:00]

Casey: Yeah. It’s unfortunately the same story as with prescription opioids turning into street fentanyl.

Methamphetamine is, uh, it is so cheap. It is so prevalent. In about kind of the mid 2010s, the formulation of how methamphetamine was made, changed from a plant-based process with Ephedra, um, to a lab-based process. And it just allowed the production of methamphetamine to skyrocket. And in California, the price of methamphetamine dropped by 90% you about the last seven years.

So if again, it’s the same answer, if people really want potent drugs, it’s so much easier to get them on the street than to go to a doctor and get them. That being said, 10 years ago, um, you know, absolutely patients were coming to the emergency department requesting stimulants like Adderall or Ritalin or, um, you know, those A DHD stimulant meds.

Um, and it’s just, again, it’s, it’s as the, as the landscape has changed, [00:40:00] we don’t see that very much anymore. Um, now people do occasionally come in saying, I’m outta my A DHD meds, can I have a refill? And if it’s a Friday, I’ll give them, you know, three doses until Monday if I can confirm that it’s legitimate.

Um, sometimes I’ll, if I can’t confirm it, I’ll say, you know, you’re not really gonna have withdrawal. It’s the weekend. Let’s get you followed up with your doctor on Monday. Um, but yeah, it’s, it’s, it’s much less common than it wa than it was before. And I think just in general, across all the, the different classes of drugs, the street market has just gone crazy with how available and cheap these drugs are.

And if people really are looking for something, it’s just so much easier, unfortunately for them to get it off the street.

Zach: And I’ve, I’ve heard those stories, you know, from, from people personally about saying they, they have a DHD and, you know, need help studying for a test or whatever. They can’t focus and, uh, using that deceptively to, to get, um, Adderall, Ritalin and such.

Do you think there all will ever be like a pushback against that in the same way? I guess it could [00:41:00] be viewed as. Those are theoretically paths to, you know, stronger, um, amphetamine use and and such. But I haven’t really read anything about that. I’m curious if that’s, if that’s a concern of anyone’s.

Casey: Yeah, I mean, I think anecdotally, um, I am seeing much less primary care management of A DHD with stimulants and people are really in the medical community saying.

If you need a stimulant, you should actually see a psychiatrist. Hmm. Um, and I think that’s been, you know, what’s also happened with opioids is if I, if me as your primary care doctor, if I can’t manage your pain and you need to be on long-term opioids, I need you to see a specialist. And I think that’s been kind of what has.

Happened a lot in a good and bad way. Sometimes primary care physicians that could manage opioids just don’t wanna get involved at all. Sometimes it’s absolutely the right move to send someone to a pain specialist because there are more options, uh, than just opioids. But really in my community, and I think in kind of in my region, kind of gen, the general consensus is if you have [00:42:00] a DHD.

You need to see a psychiatrist. If they determine that you need stimulants, they will manage it and we will defer that to them because we wanna make sure it’s really the right thing for you. And, you know, absolutely A DHD can be very debilitating. Um, I’m very lucky where I work, we have a lot of great psychiatrists and, you know, I trust them if they’ve got someone on stimulants, I, I know that they’ve really done their homework and trying to make sure that the diagnosis is right and that they’re choosing the right.

Therapeutics for the patient.

Zach: Mm-hmm. Does seem like people are taking it much more seriously due to the Yeah. The recent, uh, yeah, last few years, absolutely. Of opioid crisis. Yeah. Do you have any, uh, anything else that we haven’t talked about that you’d like to mention?

Casey: Yeah, I mean, I think the only thing that has, you know.

Really me losing sleep at night, you know, in this topic that we haven’t yet covered is just the street market and our youth. And what’s so interesting is when I was in high school, really the only drug out there was alcohol. [00:43:00] And alcohol is very well labeled. It’s regulated, it’s sold in a store, you know exactly how much you’re getting and if you drink too much, it usually is.

You know, bad decisions, slurred, speech, vomiting, alcohol’s actually relatively hard to overdose on in my college years. In the early two thousands, a couple of my friends were starting to dabble in prescription pills, and at the time it was almost all from physicians. And so if you bought five milligrams of oxycodone, it was actually five milligrams of oxycodone.

And so, as you know, kind of the youth have this inherent desire to experiment. It really wasn’t that dangerous for experimenters. Most of our opioid overdoses at that time weren’t people who were chronically on opioids or misusing their opioids or even using illicit opioids. But now what we’re seeing is high schoolers going and buying pills on the street.

And they’re having fatal or near fatal overdoses the first [00:44:00] time they try because of what’s in the street pills, which is fentanyl and these ultra potent fentanyl analogs. And what’s so hard is these kids are being sold Ritalin. They’re being sold. Adderall, they’re being sold Xanax, they’re being sold, you know, Percocet, and it doesn’t contain any of that.

It’s almost all fentanyl. And these Fentanyl derivatives and just the stakes are so much higher for our youth right now. And that’s just so scary that I. You know, it’s, it’s if somebody, you know, just wants to have fun on a Saturday night and 10 years ago when they bought a pill on the street, it was no big deal.

Those stakes are so high now, and so we’ve seen an increasing number of overdoses, including fatal overdoses in our youth, and that’s just so devastating to a community, a school, a family, a friend group. Um. And then of course the tragedy of that young loss of life. So I think that’s one thing that, you know, I, I didn’t necessarily think of as we were just starting to see fentanyl [00:45:00] arrive in my community and the illicit market was just at what great risk it put our youth because of what they were used to in the past.

What the wide availability of legitimate prescription drugs on the street.

Zach: It seems a lot more dangerous out there for sure. Some of the news stories I’ve seen with Fentanyl being in a wide range of drugs and deceptively given to people. Absolutely. Uh, there’s a, I was gonna mention this in the intro, but might as well mention it here too.

There’s a great book. I actually haven’t read it, but I’ve read part of it, the least of us, and I can, oh yeah, I just, I just finished it. Yeah. And it’s the, by the author of Dream Brand, I think, which was also about es He’s wonderful. Yeah. Es yeah. Um, and yeah, that’s, that’s, I read an excerpt from it, but yeah, he talked, he talked about some of the things you talked about where, you know, for example, the, the meth problem is related to the opioid problem too, because some of the people that were addicted to opioids, uh, transition to meth when opioids weren’t available, and the new meth, uh, formulation that you mentioned is so much more mentally destabilizing.

Absolutely. And ends up absolutely. Ends up with people in the, uh, you [00:46:00] know, in taking up mental health, uh, facilities because of the, the meth in a, in a pretty quick order. It’s, it’s, it’s much more aggressive than the, the old plant-based, uh, ephedra variety. But yeah, so all these things are, I. Kind of related and, uh, pretty, pretty scary stuff these days with the drugs and, and also, you know, seeing that related to, uh, someone related to the, the homeless crisis we’re facing.

You know, uh, that, that’s part of that too.

Casey: Totally agree. And, and if anyone hasn’t read them, dreamland was Sam Quinones first book, um, about waves one and two of the opiate epidemic, and then the least of us was his follow-up. Looking at waves three and four. And just to clarify those waves, wave one was doctors over-prescribing opioids.

Wave two was people transitioning to illicit opioids, usually heroin. And the arrival of increasing amounts of heroin into the US wave three is fentanyl. And then as you stated, wave four is meth. And it’s so interesting that just cheap and easy to get meth has [00:47:00] taken people that traditionally use opioids and don’t like stimulants, and we’re seeing them use.

Methamphetamine because it’s so cheap and easy to get. Um, it’s just, it’s so sad. You know, you drive up and down California’s highways and you see tents, uh, and many of those, pat, many of those people unfortunately, have methamphetamine use disorder. Um, and you’re right, the, the newer formulation of methamphetamine causes a lot more psychotic symptoms.

Um, my most recent episode of my podcast was on methamphetamine psychosis, and oh my gosh, that is just so debilitating.

Zach: Hmm. And your podcast is called,

Casey: uh, mine is called Addiction in Emergency Medicine and Acute Care. Um, I put it together about 18 months ago. Um, it’s a podcast written for a medical audience, but I try to keep it pretty simple.

Um, I do have some non-medical people that listen to it. I kind of, the way I think of it is when I go to work and I’m gonna work tonight in the emergency department, oftentimes I’m. Kind of confronted by a clinical question like, is drug A or is drug B better? [00:48:00] Or what’s the best way to diagnose this condition?

And I usually kind of dive into the medical literature, um, to answer the question and then in my own mind, try to come up with what I think is the best practice or the best approach or the best diagnostic algorithm. Just because unfortunately a lot of this stuff outside of having formal addiction medicine training is, is kind of hard to get.

Um, so I’m also sitting for my addiction medicine boards and this was a way for me to learn. And yeah, shameless, shameless plug addiction and emergency medicine and acute care. I’ve had a lot of fun making it.

Zach: Alright, thanks Casey. This has been great. Anything else you wanna mention before we, uh, we end it?

Casey: Just wanna say thank you for having me and thanks for talking about this very important topic and, uh, thanks for, for putting this out on the air.

Zach: Thanks for your work.

That was Dr. Casey Grover, addiction specialist and host of the podcast Addiction in Emergency medicine and acute care.

This has been the People Who Read People podcast with me, Zach Elwood. You can learn more about it at behavior-podcast.com. If you’ve enjoyed it, please consider leaving me a rating on Apple Podcasts; you can find a link for that on my site at behavior-podcast.com.

You can learn more about [00:49:00] [email protected]. If you’ve enjoyed it, please consider leaving me a rating on Apple Podcasts. You can find a link for that on my [email protected]. Thanks for listening. Music by small skies.

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Predicting schizophrenia with language, with Neguine Rezaii

This is a reshare of a 2020 talk I did with psychology researcher Neguine Rezaii. We talk about her research using machine learning to find patterns in language used by teenagers who were at risk of schizophrenia that were correlated with later schizophrenia diagnosis. The two language patterns found in the subjects’ speech were 1) a low semantic density (i.e., low degree of meaning), and 2) speech related to sound or voices.

Episode links: